Corruption and Investment Promotion in Developing Countries: A Study of the Informal System

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Abstract. The real-world context of this study may involve countries with emerging economies where bureaucratic inefficiencies hamper development. In such contexts, understanding the precise impact of moderate corruption can have significant policy implications. What are the specific characteristics that distinguish "moderately beneficial corruption" from more destructive forms of corruption? Do the short-term benefits of moderate crime outweigh its long-term impact on governance and institutions? How do cultural norms around gift-giving and relationship-building affect the prevalence and acceptability of moderate corruption? Conduct a longitudinal study to track the extent of corruption to changes in governance and economic performance. Moderate corrosion brings short-term benefits, such as speeding up bureaucratic processes and fostering relationships. However, its long-term effects are usually adverse, leading to institutional decay and lack of accountability. The line between moderate and severe corruption is often blurred, which can lead to bribery sliding into more destructive areas. While the issue of beneficial or transitional corruption in developing countries is fraught with moral and operational dangers, it is an area that requires rigorous academic scrutiny. This research aims not to endorse these practices but to fully understand their positive and negative implications to guide better policy formulation. This paper contributes to this discussion by providing a balanced analysis of moderate corruption's potential benefits and inherent risks.

Keywords: sufficiency, corruption, development, politics.

1. Introduction

Corruption, a word that often evokes revulsion and condemnation, is recognized as a major obstacle to development, investment, and growth. Significant institutions such as the World Bank and Transparency International have consistently argued that corruption is a significant deterrent to investment in developing countries. However, a nuanced view suggests that, under certain conditions, moderate levels of corruption can instead be a catalyst for investment in these countries. This seemingly contradictory view depends on understanding the intricate socio-economic dynamics, regulatory environment, and role of informal networks in developing countries.

At first glance, the argument favoring corruption for investment seems counterintuitive. How can an inherently harmful activity lead to positive economic outcomes? To elucidate this point, it is first necessary to understand the concept of "moderate" corruption. Unlike rampant or systemic corruption that weakens the economy, moderate corruption involves only occasional or limited circumstances and usually stems from bureaucratic inefficiency. In situations where regulatory processes are cumbersome, time-consuming, and lacking transparency, moderate corruption can allow businesses to achieve their goals more quickly, effectively acting as a lubricant for the business machine.

When bureaucratic delays may lead to significant financial losses, businesses may resort to bribery to speed up the process. Although unethical, This form of corruption can determine a business's development problems and increase development speed. This is particularly true in a highly competitive environment with narrow profit margins. Moreover, in countries with weak institutional frameworks and regulatory institutions, the growth of corruption can sometimes substitute for the absence of formal institutional support. Investors and entrepreneurs often find it easier to navigate the business environment by utilizing these networks, thus compensating for the lack of formal institutions. In essence, a moderate amount of corruption can create an alternative system of governance that, despite its shortcomings, can provide a prototype of stability and predictability.
However, it is essential to emphasize that this perspective does not endorse corruption. Instead, it seeks to shed light on the complex interplay of socio-economic factors that sometimes make moderate corruption an attractive option for businesses and investors in developing countries. In sum, while the ethical implications of corruption cannot be ignored, it is crucial to understand its subtle role in promoting investment in certain circumstances. Recognizing the dynamics involved can help develop intelligent strategies to mitigate the adverse effects of corruption and promote sustainable economic growth in developing countries.

2. Literature Review

The conventional wisdom is that corruption harms economic development, leading to inefficiencies, market distortions, and stunted growth. However, a body of academic literature argues that, under certain conditions, corruption may have a counter-intuitively potentially helpful or favorable relationship with economic development. This review will explore some main arguments and evidence underpinning this unconventional view.

2.1. "Grease the Wheels" Hypothesis

Several scholars have developed and analyzed the notion that corruption 'lubricates' business. Lefebvre (1964) suggested that in countries with bureaucratic bottlenecks and administrative inefficiencies, bribery can speed up the process and act as an informal mechanism for bypassing these obstacles. This is further supported by Huntington (1968), who argued that corruption can stimulate economic growth in the short run, especially in transition societies with over-regulated economies. Building on this, Lui (1985) proposed a model whereby firms can save time by bribing bureaucrats to obtain licenses more quickly, facilitating increased business activity. In addition, Shleifer and Vishny (1993) recognize that corruption undoubtedly introduces distortions. However, it can also serve as a coordinating mechanism in societies lacking effective institutions, and bribery can serve as a pricing mechanism that leads to a more predictable business environment. Finally, Meon and Sekkat (2005) suggest a distinction between 'productive' and 'unproductive' corruption, arguing that some forms of corruption may appear less harmful and even improve economic efficiency to some extent in the face of more disruptive problems, such as policy instability [1].

2.2. Corruption as an Informal System

Several scholars have also emphasized the role of corruption as an informal institution. North (1990) and Bratton and van der Waal (1997) highlight the importance of informal institutions in developing countries, arguing that corruption sometimes facilitates interactions without solid formal institutions. Soto (1989) emphasizes the role of the informal economy in promoting growth in developing countries, arguing that informal practices, including some types of corruption, maybe a response of firms to state inefficiencies. Similarly, Bardhan (1997) argues that corruption, as a resource allocation mechanism, can sometimes stabilize regimes, especially in societies with decentralized political power, attracting foreign investment and promoting economic growth.

2.3. Arguments for Nonlinear Relations

Finally, some scholars have suggested that the relationship between corruption and development is non-linear. Paldam (2001) proposes a U-shaped relationship whereby there may be a positive correlation between corruption and economic growth in the early stages of economic development, which becomes negative once the economy reaches a certain level of development. Treisman (2007) argues that the relationship between corruption and development may be more subtle than most of the literature describes, noting that the perception of corruption, which is the primary source of data for many studies, may not reflect the actual impact of corruption, leading to potential misinterpretation. Finally, Rice (1965) and Nye (1967) argued that what is commonly perceived as corruption in one culture may be a traditional or accepted form of exchange in another, suggesting
that such traditional forms of exchange can sometimes facilitate business transactions and economic dealings, especially in societies where trust is paramount.

In sum, the relationship between corruption and economic development is complex, with the dominant view emphasizing the negative impact of corruption. However, as this review shows, a part of the academic literature suggests that, under certain conditions, corruption may have a neutral or even positive impact on economic development. These perspectives emphasize the importance of context, the nature and extent of corruption, and prevailing economic and political conditions. While this literature does not endorse corruption, it emphasizes the need for a more nuanced understanding, urging scholars and policymakers to move beyond one-size-fits-all solutions.

3. How Moderate Corruption can Contribute to Economic Development in Developing Countries

"Corruption" often conjures images of shady dealings, backroom deals, and compromised integrity. However, in the complex administrative systems of developing countries, a moderate amount of corruption can improve the business environment. Investment in developing countries is essential for growth and development. While the ideal in these countries is to attract investment transparently, the reality is often far from that. Policymakers sometimes view moderate corruption as a tool to stimulate investment. This is a complex and controversial topic, and understanding the nuances is crucial. Corruption is often seen as a destabilizing factor, but there is a difference between its predictable and unpredictable forms. If corruption is moderate and persistent, like an unofficial ‘tariff,’ a business can count it as an operating cost. It becomes part of the business operations rather than a variable or arbitrary expense [2]. Of course, this is not to support corrupt behavior, but it is essential to understand the mechanics of it.

First, bureaucratic procedures in many developing countries are slow and cumbersome, often preventing businesses from getting up and running quickly. A modest amount of corruption, sometimes called "grease," can speed up these procedures. By paying unofficial "fees," businesses can obtain licenses, permits, and other required documents more quickly and thus begin operations quickly. [3] If corruption is moderate and persistent, it can bring a degree of predictability to an otherwise volatile environment. Businesses can sometimes anticipate these "unofficial costs" and factor them into operating costs. This apparent stability can make it easier for companies to strategize and make informed decisions. For foreign investors, this can mean faster project implementation or a quicker return on investment[4].

Moreover, in many developing countries, building relationships is critical. Participation in these activities can facilitate business processes, build trust, and foster partnerships critical to success in the marketplace. In some societies, gift-giving is part of an entrenched business culture. From a Western perspective, what may be seen as corrupt behavior may be seen as goodwill or a relationship-building gesture in another country. Companies can strengthen their ties with the local community by understanding and participating in it. However, is this approach sustainable? The challenge: While the above view paints a pragmatic picture, the long-term impact of even mildly corrupt behavior can be significant. Reputational risk: Businesses, especially those based in Western countries with strict anti-corruption laws, face the risk of reputational damage. There are also legal implications, such as the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. Moral and ethical implications: Engaging in corruption raises significant moral and ethical issues even at a moderate level. It fosters a culture that rewards dishonest behavior, which can be harmful in the long run. Economic distortions: Dependence on corruption can lead to economic inefficiencies. Resources may be used based on corrupt behavior rather than genuine market demand or opportunity. Inequitable growth: Corruption benefits elites or the well-connected, leading to unequal economic growth and further exacerbating income disparities [5]. Secondly, in developing countries, corruption is a significant factor in the economy’s growth [5]. Secondly, bureaucratic processes in developing countries are often mired in inefficiencies and outdated legal systems. When regulations are outdated or inadequate, a degree of bureaucratic autonomy can make
decisions more responsive to the current socio-economic environment. Autonomous institutions can respond to new challenges, innovations, or crises without going through layers of political or administrative approvals[6]. A more autonomous institution can be a more efficient and effective way to address the needs of the developing world. [A more autonomous bureaucracy can attract professionals eager to make influential decisions and insulate them from excessive political interference or restrictive legal norms. While moderate corruption and bureaucratic autonomy provide mechanisms for circumventing outdated legal rules, they pose different challenges. Even if considered a necessary evil, moderate corruption can become more entrenched and destructive, undermining the system's integrity. On the other hand, unfettered bureaucratic autonomy may lead to a lack of accountability, and decisions may not always be made in line with broader societal needs [7]. To attract sustainable investment, developing countries should consider regulatory reform: streamlining processes, reducing bureaucratic hurdles, and ensuring clear guidelines will naturally attract investment without having to breed corrupt behavior. Strengthen institutions: Building sound, transparent, and accountable institutions can give investors confidence. Emphasize other competitive advantages: Many developing countries are rich in resources, human capital, and market potential. By emphasizing these advantages and making strategic policy decisions, they can attract investment without resorting to corruption. Using moderate corruption to attract investment is only a short-term solution to a long-term challenge. While there may be an immediate effect regarding investment inflows, the long-term effects can be economically and morally detrimental. Sustainable growth involves structural reforms, strengthening institutions, and capitalizing on competitive advantages.

4. How to Define the Boundaries and Risks of Corruption

Corruption, often synonymous with fraud and malfeasance, poses a complex dilemma for developing countries. When corruption is categorized as "medium-benefit" or "transitory," it appears to encompass short-term benefits, albeit with potential pitfalls. Striking the right balance between capitalizing on these "benefits" and guarding against the inherent risks is crucial for countries seeking progress. Defining Beneficial and Transitional Corruption Moderate Beneficial Corruption is corruption that brings short-term, tangible benefits. For example, in some bureaucracies, small bribes can speed up processes and thus potentially promote economic activity or facilitate urgent projects. Transitional corruption, as the name suggests, refers to corruption that occurs during major social, political, or economic transitions. The assumption is that these behaviors will temporarily subside as the new system stabilizes. Why Boundaries Matter To capitalize on beneficial or transitional corruption without destroying the socio-economic fabric, developing countries must draw clear boundaries based on the following points.

Scale: Identify the currency or impact threshold distinguishing between "moderate" and "severe." Duration: Ensure that corrupt behavior is short-lived and does not become chronic.

Outcomes: Ideally, behaviors should produce tangible, positive results consistent with broader development goals [8, 9].

The lure of unchecked power can be overwhelming: a one-two punch. As power dynamics change and greed intensifies, what is perceived as benign behavior today can become a springboard for rampant corruption tomorrow. Blurred boundaries: When moderate, beneficial corruption persists, it becomes difficult to distinguish it from harmful crime. Entrenched: Over time, these practices can become deeply entrenched in the institutional framework, preventing genuine reform.

A country's ability to absorb and recover from the effects of corruption is not static. Initial vulnerability: In the early stages of development, a country may lack the necessary checks and balances and is therefore susceptible to the adverse effects of even minor corruption. Medium-term overconfidence: As development proceeds, the state may mistakenly believe that it is immune to the dangers of corruption, leading to lax oversight. Advanced stage regression: Complacency may set in as it approaches developed country status, leading the state to ignore the gradual normalization of corruption and thus potentially reversing hard-won gains. Using Moderate Beneficial and Transitional
Corruption: Continuous Monitoring: Use real-time surveillance systems to track each corrupt act's extent, duration, and outcome. Any deviation from the "moderate" range should result in immediate corrective action. Public Participation: Encourage public discussion of these issues. An informed and engaged citizenry is a natural deterrent to unbridled corruption. External oversight: Consider periodic reviews by external agencies to maintain objectivity. International monitors may provide insights that local authorities overlook or deliberately ignore. Legislative adaptability: As the social and economic environment changes, so should the legislation. Regularly reviewing and updating legislation ensures that it remains relevant and practical. Clear exit strategies: Each sanctioned corruption case should have a clear endpoint. Measures should be taken to ensure that such conduct ceases as soon as the desired outcome is reached or the transition period ends. The paradox of "beneficiary" and "transitional" corruption lies in its duality - the potential for short-term gains coexists with long-term vulnerability. For developing countries seeking to tap into this precarious treasure trove, the challenge is to define its scope precisely and implement it wisely. While quick wins may be tempting, the vision should remain firmly focused on establishing sound, transparent, and accountable governance structures. Only then will the delicate dance of utilizing moderate corruption for growth truly serve its intended purpose without jeopardizing the country's future.

The interplay between moderate corruption and bureaucratic autonomy becomes crucial as developing countries strive to grow. While both can be used to circumvent lagging laws and regulations, the long-term focus should be strengthening the legal framework and ensuring transparent, efficient, and accountable governance. Outdated and burdensome regulations can stifle innovation and progress. A modicum of corruption can provide an alternative where the official route is not feasible. Firms can bypass obstructive regulations and launch innovative products, services, or solutions that might otherwise be blocked. Moderate corruption can provide short-term convenience, but its long-term effects can be detrimental. Over-reliance can lead to systemic inefficiencies and ethical dilemmas and ultimately undermine trust in the institutional system. Moreover, as global business standards evolve, practices tolerated today may lead to reputational damage tomorrow. While a modicum of corruption creates a more accessible environment for developing countries to do business, it is also a double-edged sword. The ideal path would be for these countries to simplify bureaucratic procedures and increase transparency, eliminating the need for unofficial "shortcuts."

5. Conclusion

The discussion in this paper delves into the controversial topic of using moderate corruption to stimulate economic growth in developing countries. The panel argues that moderate corruption can act as a "lubricant" for bureaucratic procedures, bringing predictability and a form of competitive differentiation. Culturally, what is seen as corruption in some societies may be seen as a form of relationship-building in others. However, this "realpolitik" view of corruption has significant moral and economic drawbacks. First, it can damage the reputation of the companies and countries involved. Second, even if corruption is mild and predictable, it leads to economic inefficiency and perpetuates a system in which the allocation of resources is determined not by market forces but by the extent of corrupt behavior. The text suggests a nuanced, controlled, and monitored approach to corruption, which may need to be more practical. The administrative overhead required to prevent corruption and limit it to "favorable" levels may offset any expected benefits. Third, there is the moral issue; condoning corruption undermines the moral fabric of society. The idea that transitional corruption is temporary and will naturally subside once the system has stabilized seems overly optimistic. Bad habits are hard to break, both for individuals and institutions. Fourth, corruption tends to benefit elites disproportionately, thereby exacerbating social inequality. By its very nature, moderate corruption benefits those who can afford to pay bribes and disadvantage poorer individuals and businesses. The idea of an international body monitoring corruption levels in developing countries may seem reasonable, but it raises questions of sovereignty and may be seen as neo-colonialism. The text also
introduces the concepts of beneficial and transitional corruption, emphasizing the need to define the boundaries of the scale, duration, and impact of corruption. However, the text also warns of corruption getting out of hand and becoming institutionalized. It suggests various ways to control such corruption, such as continuous monitoring, public participation, external oversight, legislative adaptation, and clear exit strategies.

In sum, while using "moderate corruption" as a tool for economic development may offer some pragmatic benefits in the short term, its long-term effects are fraught with economic, moral, and social risks. By treating corruption as a solution, even temporarily, policymakers may be less inclined to address the systemic issues that make corruption seem necessary. The focus should be on systemic improvements and institutional strengthening, naturally attracting sustainable investment and promoting long-term growth.

References