

The Impact of the Russia-Ukraine War on China-US Relations

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Abstract. The past few years have been unfavourable for world stability. The rise of new economic and military powers, particularly China, raises concerns about the established market and geopolitical balances that have been solidified over the era known as the “Long Peace” after the Cold War. This concern has been mostly driven and powered by the United States. While China and the U.S. may not be directly engaged in this conflict, it is clear that it has transformed into a “silenced battleground” for these nations regarding global political and economic influence and ideological differences. Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Russia has entered a new phase characterised by ongoing challenges and conflicts in its relationship with the U.S., which continues to struggle with geopolitical challenges, particularly concerning the lasting impact of historical military capabilities of the Soviet Union. China’s involvement in the conflict, however indirect, demonstrates its explicit support for Russia and its antagonistic stance toward the U.S. and NATO. The escalation of tensions of Sino-American relationship is likely to exacerbate in the geopolitical crisis that the world is experiencing.

Keywords: China, United States, geopolitics, relations, ideology, decoupling, Taiwan.

1. Introduction

The ongoing military campaign conducted by Russia against Ukraine has persisted for a duration exceeding one year. The ongoing confrontation between Russia and Ukraine has garnered the attention and involvement of not just the two belligerent warring parties, but also the two globally most powerful and influential nations, namely the United States and China. The rise of new economic and military powers, in particular with China, raises global concerns about the established market and geopolitical balances that have been solidified over the era known as the “Long Peace” after the Cold War. This concern has been mostly driven and powered by the US government [1]. The Russian-Ukrainian war encompasses not only military hostilities between two direct belligerent parties, but also serves as an arena for the interplay of several elements such as global ideology, geopolitics, national interests, and even nationalism between another two most influential powers, namely the United States and China.

The United States has been the greatest backer on the Ukrainian side, providing significant financial assistance in the form of billions of Euros; following the United States, NATO, the European Union, the United Kingdom, and most of the US allying Western nations also provide substantial financial support to Ukraine [2]. The coalition led by the United States which advocates for Ukraine and staunchly opposes to Russia, is the most powerful alliance in the world and also embodies the dominant global liberal-democratic order and its principles.

Nevertheless, the United States perceives China and Russia as strategic allies who pose a challenge to the established ‘rules-based system’ by disputing the American global dominance and economic interests [3]. Firstly, China has shown a measured response to the invasion, opting to refrain from endorsing UN resolutions pertaining to the issue and expressing condemnation towards the act of aggression [4]. Secondly, China is aligning itself closely or fully endorsing Russia’s rationale for its conflicts with Western nations. Beijing concurs with Moscow’s perspective that NATO has overlooked the security interests of Russia. Multiple stages of NATO expansion have occurred previously. There exists a tangible potential for Ukraine’s integration into the NATO alliance in the next period. China strongly opposes the implementation of broad economic sanctions on Russia, which are intended to isolate and blockade the country [5].

Therefore, some specialists have put out the argument that the increasing collaboration between China and Russia might be seen as a de facto alliance and such a development of a Eurasian coalition challenging the U.S.-led alliance system has been driven by similar interests in weaponry and oil, common ideations of autocracy and great power status, as well as heightened conflict with the liberal international order [4]. It has also been argued that the strategic relationship between Russia and China might potentially possess a level of effectiveness comparable to many treaty alliances headed by the United States [4].

The alteration in the trajectory of the overall pattern between China and the United States intensified by the Russian-Ukrainian Crisis has resulted in the deep divergence of ideologies, geopolitical disputes, military rivalry, economic, commercial and technological disentanglement, and ultimately a possibility of escalation of tensions surrounding the Taiwan issue. There exists a propensity for the emergence of a comprehensive new cold war, and if not well managed, it might escalate into a conventional armed conflict and carry the potential for a nuclear war.

2. The Stances of China and the USA Regarding the Ukraine-Russia War

The United States, as the sole global hegemonic power and largest defender of democracy, has supported Ukraine against Russia and sees Russia as a ferocious threat to US domination and global democratic values. China, on the other hand, like Russia, as a similarly conspicuous and competent challenge to the US power status and liberal-democratic order, blames the US for causing the Russia's aggression as an excuse to resist to NATO's eastward expansion. Even though it generally plays a "neutral" role, the Chinese government refuses to get involved in the two warring sides at the official level of the UN [6]. A severe Cold War scenario with ideological conflicts and economic withdrawal has become increasingly prevalent in the China-US relations. Influential individuals in both nations contend that such a situation is detrimental to the interests of both the American and Chinese societies and the global economy in a long run.

China and the United States are currently encountering numerous frictions and disengagements in various fields. A historical background is that, from the 1990s and 2000s with China's accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in the 20th century until the 2010s, there were frequent cooperative dynamics between China and the United States, and this relationship has until recently evolved into a more confrontational relationship with the changing of international geopolitical situation. The most recent change of relationship between China and the US has experienced significant growth in light of Russia's prominent shift towards the East: the decline of Russia-US (or Russia-West) relations following the Ukraine Crisis, and China's increased assertiveness in siding with Russia and other provocative behaviours (such as in South and East China Seas), has successfully caused escalation of rivalry between China and the US, as the deteriorating relations between Washington and Beijing have increasingly resembled a "new Cold War-style" geopolitics [7].

In the current period characterized by potential significant transformations of global orders, there exists a dilemma concerning the dominant global liberal international order led by the United States to be transitioning into a multipolar world. Additionally, there are inquiries surrounding the identification of adversaries, as pondering over the topic of "who are the enemies" and "who are the friends" has significant importance within the context of the Chinese state [1]. Undoubtedly, prominent scholars characterize in China-Russia relations in Russia openly acknowledge the mutual recognition that China and Russia possess a shared interest in mitigating U.S. hegemony and they contend that this shared security concern serves as a foundation for stability within the relationship between China and Russia and constantly growing adversaries of China towards the U.S. and the West [1].

The Russian-Ukrainian Crisis issue has emerged as a significant catastrophe of great magnitude, comparable to some of the most severe crises seen since the conclusion of the second World War. Due to its severe and systemic nature, this crisis has had a significant impact on several aspects of the

American and Chinese interests respectively, which may include nuclear survivability, global security, the economy and commerce, and the bilateral relationships between China and other nations and partners [2].

3. The War's Impact on the Relationship between China and the USA

3.1. A Shift from Coordination to Geopolitical and Ideological Confrontation

The character the China-US relationship has undergone transformations from adversaries to allies over the duration of the Cold War period: during the 1980s, China emerged as a de facto ally of the United States in its efforts to counter the influence of the Soviet Union. During the era after the Cold War, China's approach of integrating itself into the global system aligned with the United States' objective of engaging with China [8]. Since 2012, there has been an escalation in the strategic rivalry between China and the U.S. and then the bilateral relations have been influenced by evolving views of security challenges and economic priorities shared by both nations [8]. Due to the fact that China is currently the second largest economy (the largest one if in terms of PPP) and with military expenditure only ranked behind the United States, the US has begun to be cautious and hesitant to.

China Siding with Russia: the global landscape has seen a discernible division into two distinct factions, namely authoritarian and democratic, primarily catalysed by the ascent of China and the recent instances of Russian aggression [9]. For the recent Russian-Ukrainian Crisis, Specifically, China has been taking a side that US and NATO's eastward expansion should constantly be blamed for starting the Russian-Ukrainian conflict (according to the Chinese government). China, geopolitically siding with Russia, have a similar geopolitical interest in confronting and resisting the United States "hegemony" and "continuous of NATO expansion in the Asia-Pacific [6]. The examination of the geopolitical interests of the Russian Federation and China, as well as the alignment and divergence of these interests, is a crucial aspect to consider [10]. Both nations are governed by leaders who appear to uphold a pragmatic worldview that may have been shaped by their experiences in a communist regime and past during periods of societal upheaval, such as the dissolution of the Soviet Union and China's Cultural Revolution; it is also important to analyse the areas where the survival interests of Putin's and Xi's leadership systems coincide and intersect [10]. This has also caused a more intense ideological dissention, simply the collision between the "character of democracy and liberalism" and the "character of dictatorship and authoritarianism."

Ideological rift: the United States considers China as a threat to its leading liberal international order and the US has begun increasingly referred China as an authoritarian state and a severe violator of human rights (for instance, the Xinjiang Uyghurs) [11]. On the other hand, this ideological hostility has led to a tighter ideological agreement between the two governments: China, same as Russia, has been increasingly expressing its opposition to the "Western liberal-democratic principles" favoured and guarded by the United States and China particularly argues that these concepts are frequently being unjustly presented as universally applicable, but are really being used as instruments by the U.S. and Western powers to exert influence and destabilise China (and Russia) [11, 12]. China asserts that these principles are not fit for China (or Russia) due to their unique characteristics and circumstances and are the tools of the US and Western imperialism to maintain their global dominance. In addition, the "Summit for Democracy" held by the US Biden administration has aimed the "authoritarian opponents" of China and Russia and character democratic entities, including Ukraine and Taiwan, in order to counteract political aggression from the Chinese and Russian [9]. There is potential for future administrations to consider transforming these summits into a distinct international characterize that can effectively mobilise democratic forces within the evolving global landscape, particularly in instances when the United Nations may no longer be able to provide this role. The invitation extended to Ukraine and Taiwan signifies the acknowledgment of a new global framework and the United States' commitment to officially and explicitly supporting its democratic friends and partners and opposing and confronting to the Chinese and Russian under its alliance.

Thucydides Trap: either hypothetically or pragmatically, the rise of developing economic and military powers has indeed posed a challenge to the existing major countries, as they try to shape a new global order characterized by many centres of power. Indeed, in contemporary times, there are emerging powers that are challenging the existing order dominated by the United States. These powers, namely China and Russia, can be compared to the rising nations of Austria-Hungary, Italy during the First World War, Germany and Japan on the Second World War, and USSR during the Cold War [1]. Like their historical counterparts, these emerging powers also aspire to attain the status of great power. This aspiration is driven by their pursuit of expanding their sphere of influence, achieving technological and industrial superiority, as well as enhancing their business and trade capabilities [1].

Moreover, when considering the similarities to the Cold War, it is evident that China presents a more complex and formidable challenge compared to the Soviet Union or other previous adversaries of the United States due to the multifaceted nature of China's threats, which encompass diverse domains such as the market, supplier relationships, technological competition, military capabilities, ideological differences, and geopolitical positioning [9]. With China's growth of its comprehensive national capability and its challenges to the United States, perception of threats has a significant role in shaping the change of relations: when a state perceives another state as posing a risk to its national security or existence within the global order, it is probable that their relationship will evolve into a state of competition [8]. In the event that the impression of danger intensifies, it is possible for the two nations to become engaged in adversarial relations or maybe develop a state of hostility [8].

3.2. Economic and Technologic Decoupling

In debates between China and the US over the Ukrainian crisis, it is evident that economic changes and consequences also took the stage [5]. In the aftermath of Russia's invasion, the U.S., in collaboration with its European and Asian allies and partners, implemented a series of rigorous and far-reaching sanctions against Russia and these measures entailed freezing the assets of Russia's central bank, excluding certain Russian banks from the international financial messaging system SWIFT, and imposing export limitations with the objective of impeding Russia's capacity to effectively participate in the modern global economy [13]. Nevertheless, China, unlike the US and its allies, unequivocally expressed its decision to abstain from participating in the endeavour and the Commerce Ministry of China has often stated its commitment to sustaining regular trade and economic collaboration with Russia and Ukraine, emphasising the principles of equality, mutual benefit, and mutual respect [13].

The escalation of technical decoupling between the United States and China occurred after the breakout of the Russian-Ukrainian Crisis as a significant change in the United States' economic policy towards China [14]. The primary driving force behind the decoupling is rooted in national security and geopolitical considerations, as the rapid ascent of China is increasingly perceived as the foremost challenge to US hegemony [20]. Furthermore, the decoupling strategy focuses on high-tech sectors due to the crucial role technology plays in sustaining America's global dominance [20]. Therefore, instead than formulating export restrictions with the intention of maintaining a technology gap, the current purpose of the US seeks to halt China's present state of technology development: the Biden administration has made official declarations on the export restrictions with some equipment and services to Chinese semiconductor and other high-tech businesses [18]. The objective of these limits is to impede China's capacity to manufacture sophisticated chips, which is seen as a matter of national security for the United States.

As "bottlenecks" in technical exchange with the US impede its sustainable economic development and international commerce, China is increasingly gravely worried about them. The recent US actions to limit China's access to cutting-edge American technology for the manufacture of microchips and high-level processors in particular had a significant negative impact on it. Currently, China barely satisfies 20% of its demands for complicated microchips and processors for export goods, according

to estimates. Despite China's successful efforts to remove this strategic barrier, it continues to be very sensitive for the country's military, aerospace, and supercomputer production sectors [2].

In addition, the current China-US can be seen as a "post-Trump" commercial connection between them and are still deteriorating, making things worse for the Chinese businesses and markets [2]. Chinese businesses might not have complete access to the US and European markets as a result of the new restrictions, and they might struggle even more to get credit from Western banks. The stability of banking services for Chinese firms operating in the western countries could face potential risks. Chinese assets denominated in US dollars, US securities, and other Chinese assets under US jurisdiction might be vulnerable. Furthermore, conducting technical interactions with the United States could become much more challenging [2].

The data indicates that there has been an increasing proportion of American enterprises are contemplating relocating their supply chains away from China: such as Apple. The prospective imposition of outbound investment restrictions by the United States poses uncertainties for the prospects of US investment in China. The Biden administration expresses apprehension over the potential role of US investors in promoting Chinese technological advancements inside crucial areas for enhancing its capability to further challenge the US status [14]. Consequently, it is actively devising a system aimed at restricting the influx of US investment into China [14].

Through China's character in the Russian-Ukrainian Crisis, the US has realised more clearly that the emergence of China as a formidable economic force can also bring about potential challenges to the US: it is particularly anticipated that the remarkable economic expansion of China, along with its increasing geopolitical prominence allying with Russia, would pose a menace to the Western nations in terms of their economy, military capabilities, and cultural impact, rather than posing a danger primarily to the countries within the Asia Pacific area [15]. China is projected to ascend as the dominant global power in the foreseeable future, especially rivalling the United States' status as the only superpower; moreover, rather than adhering to Western universalism, the global society will see a shift towards embracing non-Western cultural norms characterised by such a transition through China's prominent emergence and its "authoritarianism" or "communist" mode as a significant influencer to jeopardise the US and the West [15].

However, through the decoupling process, China also has challenges stemming from the complexities inherent in global supply systems due to the predicaments with the United States. The escalation in energy, commodities, and agricultural product prices is anticipated to result in a further upsurge in worldwide inflation, thus augmenting the cost of living for those in ordinary circumstances [3]. Because China is dependent on imported agricultural commodities sourced from the international market, hence, the impact of rising energy and agricultural commodity prices on China is shown via amplified production expenses and elevated consumer prices [3]. Furthermore, the manufacturing sector in China has also had adverse effects as a result of the ongoing conflict. In addition to the withdrawal of foreign orders, Chinese businesses engaged in trade with Russia face significant currency rate concerns: the commencement of the conflict has resulted in a significant decline in shipments from Chinese smartphone manufacturers Xiaomi, Oppo, Huawei, and some other brands in the international market [3]. A significant decline was seen in the Chinese stock market, which was instigated by the identification of a number of Chinese businesses listed on the New York Stock Exchange by US authorities and these companies were faced with delisting unless they provide comprehensive audit documentation to substantiate their financial statements [3].

Considering the United States expressed objective of upholding a substantial advantage in crucial domains such as semiconductors, quantum computing, and artificial intelligence, it is understandable that President Xi Jinping of China has asserted that the United States is endeavouring to confine, encircle, and stifle China [14]. China is now allocating substantial financial resources towards the development of advanced technologies with the aim of attaining self-reliance. Chinese policy-makers express concerns about the potential application of economic penalties by the West, in light of Russia's aggressive actions against Ukraine.

3.3. Taiwan Issue Has Appeared to Be More Critical

The repercussions of Russia's invasion of Ukraine are being particularly felt in Taiwan as well: there is a prevailing concern among Taiwanese citizens over the potential vulnerability of their nation to an invasion by a neighbouring country with superior military capabilities [16]. Despite the existential differences between them, Ukraine and Taiwan have comparable geopolitical predicaments as relatively young democracies coexisting with bigger authoritarian neighbours that have longstanding territorial ambitions [16]. As the Russian President Vladimir Putin has articulated his aspiration to re-establish the "historical unity" between Russia and Ukraine as a spiritual undertaking, similarly, Chinese President Xi Jinping perceives the reunification of mainland China with Taiwan, which he considers a province that has been detached, as a means to solidify his historical legacy [16].

Through the Ukrainian war, due to the similarity between the Russia-Ukraine case and the mainland-Taiwan case noted by the United States, it has emphasized more on the importance of Taiwan (the ally with shared liberal and democratic values against the authoritarian Mainland and allying Russia) and takes practical actions (Pelosi's visit, and growing international support [12]). The US has conveyed a clear message to Mainland China that it is determined to defend the "ideals of democracy" against "authoritarianism" on all active fronts, especially here including Taiwan as well as Ukraine [17]. Moreover, since Taiwan serves as a paradigmatic illustration of a well-functioning democratic society within the Chinese context and such situation poses a significant challenge and potential risk to the authoritarian regime of the mainland People's Republic of China (PRC), the witness emphasised that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) perceives Taiwan's example as a significant challenge, as it contradicts their narrative that the Chinese populace is only suited for authoritarian rule [18]. Consequently, the desire to assert control over Taiwan stems from the Chinese Communist Party's discomfort with Taiwan's existence as a democratic entity [18].

The incursion of Russia into Ukraine serves to validate the conviction of Chinese authorities that they are embarking onto a period characterised by heightened peril, necessitating their proactive measures to ready themselves for an increased probability of armed conflict. During his conversation with President Joe Biden of the United States after to the commencement of the conflict, the Chinese President Xi acknowledged the existence of significant threats to the present trajectory of peace and development of the mode of the mainland PRC regime, emphasising the absence of tranquilly and stability in the global landscape due to the US interference [16]. Xi's statements clearly imply that China would continue in increasing its defence expenditure, with a specific emphasis on enhancing the People's Liberation Army's (PLA) capabilities required for potential military action against Taiwan and the US intervention [16].

The mainland China regards Taiwan as its internal affairs and considers the US behaviour as a violation of China's national sovereignty and the "one China" policy [5]. Mainland China's response was to step up PLA and naval activities in the Taiwanese neighbouring waterways. Chinese soldiers launched missiles on a trajectory that crossed the island as part of military displays. Beijing also declared an end to working-level military communications between the Taiwanese army and the adjacent units of the PLA and suspended defence ministry talks indefinitely with the US [5]. Surely, the United States should also refine its strategic approach as a deterrent role to discourage a potential Chinese attack on Taiwan and effectively address instances of Chinese aggression in order to reassure its democratic allies and principles [13]. Even if relying just on the imposition of penalties is insufficient to alter Xi's decision-making process of "liberating Taiwan by force," and it is suggested that the United States need to engage in the coordination of a sanctions package with its friends and partners in times of peace, while also exploring strategies to mitigate their economic reliance on China [16].

Washington has strategically seen Taiwan as a more crucial means to exhaust China's substantial economic and military resources, without compromising itself explicitly to confront China on the Asia-Pacific area and this may be achieved via the sale of weaponry and the provision of military and economic aid to the Taiwanese administration [16]. According to this perspective, the US national

security establishment seeks to strategically leverage Taiwan by means of symbolic diplomatic gestures (such as the recent visit of then House Speaker Nancy Pelosi to Taiwan), increased arms sales, and the provision of defence strategy advice [19]. The underlying objective is to incite China into initiating an attack on Taiwan, thereby “weaponizing” the island and a considerable number of politicians affiliated with the Kuomintang (KMT) party held the belief that alike Ukraine, the United States harboured a genuine strategic objective of “Ukraine-izing” Taiwan [19]. China is assuredly being seen in a manner comparable to how Russia has been perceived within the context of this geopolitical scene.

4. Suggestions

Although the situation in bilateral ties between the US and China may be described as “dramatic,” “troublesome,” and “transitional,” the high level of animosity between the two nations is still not wholly irreversible [17]. Furthermore, it is important to note that this division between the United States and China is not as straightforward as the binary categorization observed during the Cold War era, owing to the complexities inherent in the contemporary global order [9].

It is crucial that China does not collaborate with Russia in carrying out the special military operation in Ukraine. Such cooperation and unity would be fatal to China’s fundamental foreign policy objectives. If China adopted such a stance of solidarity, it would fundamentally conflict with China’s existing position as a rival global power to the United States [5]. Therefore, Beijing should avoid putting its fundamental geo-economic interests in peril. China should try to reduce the possibility of blocking and unfair Western economic penalties [5].

In order to stop a growing Chinese tilt against the United States and the West, the US may give in to Beijing by easing restrictions on some high-tech goods imported by China, taking a less strident stance in the South China Sea dispute, or even freezing or reducing activity in the recently formed anti-China military alliance with Australia and the UK (AUKUS) [5].

In conjunction with trade fragmentation and the practise of ‘friend-shoring’, technology decoupling has the potential to result in substantial economic losses on a global scale and the pursuit of self-sufficiency incurs significant expenses and does not ensure achievement and stability [14]. The two countries, both the US and China with the entire world are fraught with significant uncertainty, and a complete decoupling scenario could potentially result in the division of the global economy into two distinct blocs centred around the US and China, resembling the past Cold War’s full confrontational scene [9]. In the contemporary era characterised by extensive globalisation, wherein the global economy, commerce, and trade are significantly reliant on China and the United States, it is imperative that these two influential powers refrain from descending into a state of absolute opposition. It is imperative for both nations to actively pursue areas of agreement while acknowledging and preserving their divergent perspectives. Additionally, they should endeavour to establish additional avenues for constructive dialogue and nonviolent means of resolving conflicts. Efficiently address the diplomatic challenges between Russia and Ukraine, as well as the complex dynamics between China and the United States, in a conscientious and judicious manner.

5. Conclusion

The ongoing Russo-Ukrainian War, which lasted for over a year, has contributed to a sustained deterioration in Sino-US ties amidst a series of ongoing transformations. Since the emergence of China as a significant global power in the 20th century, the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war has perpetuated the pre-existing tensions between these two nations, resulting in a continuous deterioration of their overall relationship.

China’s emergence as a prominent global force and its rapid economic growth have led to an increased presence worldwide and there are also rationales for the mutual dependence of China and Russia in pursuit of their own goals to be against the United States and the Western alliance [20]. The

rationales of collaboration for China and Russia are contingent upon the participants' desire and goals towards their respective ambition to oppress to the US influence during Asia-Pacific and Eurasia, mutual anti-NATO security and overall anti-West ideology [20]. This scenario seems to have made a fast and highly effective resolution of ideological antagonism and alignment difficulties between China and the United States seems improbable within a foreseeable future timeframe to be alleviated and such enduring binary dichotomy between "democracy" and "dictatorship or authoritarianism" is expected to persist for a certain duration as well. Due to geographical, economic, and multifarious variables vying for global dominance, it seems that there is a strong inclination among Beijing and Moscow to establish an anti-US coalition, since they have a mutual interest in diminishing American dominance inside their respective regions and it is also the primary causation for the continuous deterioration of China-US relations since the Russian-Ukrainian Crisis [20].

The Taiwan issue is seen as much more likely to be the potential catalyst for armed conflict between the United States and China [19]. Given the ongoing competition between the United States and China, it becomes imperative for Washington to navigate the complexities of maintaining Taiwan's alignment with the United States, while simultaneously mitigating the risk of engaging in armed conflict with China [19]. This necessitates a key objective is to provide a viable means of dissuasion against the mainland PLA army, whereby Taiwan may demonstrate its capability to repel a potential Chinese incursion with the assistance of the United States; however, it is crucial to underscore that if China were to achieve victory, the United States would perceive the related costs as excessively disproportionate [19]. Additionally, Xi's unwavering commitment to the objective of cross-strait reunification and the unpredictable nature of potential military actions further compound this matter. The similarity between Taiwan and Ukraine is not in an entirely comparable given their different geopolitical situations.

From the perspective of economy and commerce: although the economies of the United States and China exhibit a high degree of interdependence, however, recent trends have initiated a gradual erosion of their economic linkages [14]. In spite of the notable surge in bilateral trade between the United States and China in 2022, there is a discernible trend towards reduced interdependence in their trading relationship [14]. The United States has initiated a process of economic decoupling from China, wherein national security considerations supersede economic rationale, and the notion of mutually beneficial gains from globalisation is replaced by a scenario of mutual losses and the process of decoupling between the United States and China is having significant implications on a global scale [11].

However, it is imperative that these two major nations assume the onus of safeguarding global security and stability, and endeavour to resolve issues via peaceful discourse to the greatest extent feasible. In a global context wherein China and the United States, widely recognised as the foremost influential nations, can harmoniously coexist, it is my contention that the international community would see an amelioration in overall peace, hence expediting the resolution of the ongoing conflict between Russia and Ukraine.

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