Causes And Solutions for Low Turnout Rates in Chinese Local Elections: From A Plebeian Perspective

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Abstract. There have been ample academic efforts discussing prospects of liberalizing the authoritarian regime in China, but most of them primarily addressed possible institutional reforms by the party and to some extent overlooked importance of the mass. Therefore, this article attempts to identify factors that dissuade or refrain Chinese citizens from voting in local elections and devise corresponding solutions, for their political enthusiasm to be improved independently of state sanctions, while the finding may provide a novel theory regarding weak correlation between the level of political freedom and turnout rate in liberal democracies. By considering subjects as economic agents in cost-benefit analysis, the combination of underestimated benefits and overestimated costs of voting is highlighted as one fundamental reason for non-voting, which comprises of antiquated cultural norms, aloof social relations and inappropriately handled class struggles. In response to phenomenon of apoliticism, political cynicism or political inactiveness, this paper suggests eligible voters to keenly defend their interests, for instance studying publicized government information, participating in trade unions and respecting their suffrage, as the prerequisite for becoming genuinely and consistently active in political affairs.

Keywords: Democratization, political structure, Chinese institutions, utility theory.

1. Introduction

China has hardly been praised for political freedom given its alleged suppression of oppositions and one-party regime, as a report ranked the country as the 12th least democratic country in 2022 [1]. Some may not view this system as particularly surprising or illegitimate, because the nation’s constitution defined its power structure as ‘people’s autocratic democracy’ --- respecting will of ordinary people while being merciless to reactionaries. From this perspective, certain atrocities against ‘enemy of the proletariats’ can be defensible if consented by the majority, but the prerequisite may not always hold true, as Tsimonis argued that even the association (China Youth League) most organized and most closely affiliated to the ruling party had no reliable channels political participation except for ceremonial presences on certain occasions, which may have induced cynicism even across the most elite next-generation (e.g., people around 30s) successors [2]. Therefore, it can be postulated that many eligible voters are either discouraged from developing own opinions and turned apolitical or prevented from reaching the authorities for expression, which could explain widespread political inactiveness in China. Correspondents may simplistically blame this problem to the repressive communist party, but ability and/or willingness for Chinese to think critically is a latent yet equally important problem, and the latter points to my intended scope of research that may have not been carefully studied: by discovering causes of apoliticism in a down-top manner, we can explore viable approaches to improve citizens’ engagement in governance of local communities without extensively challenging traditions and regimes of the nation, so that overwhelming public and official pressure against reform efforts may be circumvented.

Although China is famous for its two-millennia-long history of centralized administration since Qin Dynasty, there has been literature discussing feasibility of vitalizing Chinese voters, or more specifically appending democratic values to current institutions. For instance, according to Ni, while the hierarchical social structure that Confucianism ingrained --- everyone knowing one’s places (it says in The Analects of Confucius that ‘one should not consider politics unless one is in office’) --- contradicts liberal democracy’s core idea of individual autonomy, it makes the state where citizens
ardently advise on governance but leave the decision to experienced, well-informed technocrats theoretically compatible with China’s prevalent political philosophy, so long as modern ideas that redefine duty of the people are incorporated. Besides, this ideology entailed the concept of relatedness that encourages citizens to be responsible for each other, where governance by the people and for the people is exactly Sun Yat-sen’s envision on democratic China and in concordance with communist manifestos. [3].

In terms of field experiments, Ma recorded two types of electoral reforms CCP conducted at township level in the 2000s: one is ‘electoral democracy’ where party candidates directly compete for votes, and the other one refers to ‘deliberative democracy’ where the government confers with residents for their preferred choices but makes the decision internally [4]. The research acknowledged improvement in the government’s performance and reputation from the intervention but rejected any correlation between deliberative reforms and citizens’ appeal to democratization. The author ascribed its ineffectiveness to absence of ‘sense of empowerment’ given that most voters were not able to join public hearings of consultation meetings due to limited availability or unawareness of the activity. While Ma’s efforts correctly pointed out that unshackling of electoral control does not automatically lead to increase in participation, it fails to explain how people could be mobilized to vote provided with opportunities, and such causal mechanism is what these paper aims to clarify.

2. Causes of Apoliticism

For different voting options to be directly compared, this article attempts to analyze involvement in local political affairs of ordinary Chinese citizens based on an analogy from expected utility theorem. Therefore, eligible voters are assumed to be economic agents to make their collective behavior apprehensible as explained below.

The fundamental criterion is that agents follow certain rationales in decision making processes, which means they will vote if and only if expected benefits exceed costs --- alternatively speaking, it is assumed that people would refrain from voting because of low rewards and/or high expenses associated with the action. Moreover, in reality their behavior is subject to three additional constraints: firstly, citizens exhibit bounded rationality, which implies that suboptimal behavior may be executed due to unawareness or misinterpretation of relevant knowledge (i.e., not voting when they should have been, or the opposite); secondly, agents take emotional elements like moral considerations into account, and are able to quantify its value alongside with monetary and policy-wise payoffs in their utility functions; lastly, people are in general risk-averse, as a result voting will not occur when expected benefits does not surpass costs by a perceivable amount, and participation will become impossible once they believe, regardless of the truth, voting may induce costs unrecoverable despite favorable policy changes, such as time spent on registration procedures or risk of being summoned by the police (if not detained).

Provided with evaluation pattern of subjects, this research will identify causes of apoliticism among Chinese citizens from a down-top perspective. As a consequence, rather than discussing alleged suppression of the communist government, attention will be dedicated to spontaneous factors dissuading political participation of commoners. Besides, apart from cost-benefit aspects, underlying reasons can also be differentiated by rationality of individuals, that whether they would still refrain from voting given perfect information and maximum intellectual capability of their own. this study will focus on correcting subjects’s perceptions instead of adjusting exogenous circumstances: people have unique preference profiles shaped by backgrounds of their own, and the ultimate objective is to unveil true utility functions via rectification of false estimates, but not to optimize their payoff selections by elevating their education level and increasing values for voting externally.
2.1. Underestimated Benefits

2.1.1 Utility Concerns

Scholars define the nature of civil political activities in China differently. One commonly held view is that they are tolerated as a strategic instrument to keep dissents under control, but Liu criticized this top-down perspective as leaving little space for individual agency, and instead defined four categories of political participation in China depending on whether subjects engage in state-sanctioned and/or contentious activities [5]. The key index for this model is ‘integrity ratio’, which measures the extent citizens trust local bureaucrats less than the central government; when it equaled to zero, approximately 70% of respondents were politically nonchalant ‘outsiders’, but a significant proportion of them would convert to ‘agitators’ involved more in mutinous actions as the divergence increases. The author therefore concluded that Chinese people participate in politics as a result of rational calculations: because different layers of officials have disparate priorities where lower-ranked administrators tend to concern with own benefits more than social stability, citizens would start to protest upon infringement of their interests by the local government, expressing discontent in the community as a worrisome signal for higher-level authorities to intervene and resolve the issue; on the contrary, most citizens will remain fairly apolitical if they believe instructions from the central government will be faithfully implemented: they either find the party trustworthy for one reason or the other (patriotism, economic performance, etc.), or understand that opposing Beijing cannot produce positive outcomes.

2.1.2 Belongingness to the Community

As previously raised, altruistic members may play a leading role in embedding democratic qualities to the community; but this also indicates that if strong social ties between households are not established, people would not include welfare of strange neighbors into their utility functions while Prisoners’ Dilemma would inhibit individual protection of collective assets, leading to low level of political participation. Guan and Cai studied municipal governance in China and identified two layers of grassroots organizations: self-elected homeowners’ committee that deals with private entities like property management companies, and semi-official residents’ committee to whom local authorities designate resources to coordinate governance of all real estate sites in the neighborhood [6]. Compared to rural elections where over 90% of villagers may be mobilized, urban citizens were less enthusiastic towards residents’ committee for two reasons: they interact less with the community (city dwellers may work in other places and thus spend less time around their houses than farmers), and they are so pragmatic that election results do not concern them if their problems are solved. On the other hand, residents developed incentives to take part in homeowners’ committee as the sole legal representative of a housing estate: given that homeowners’ committee can only endorsed by corresponding residents’ committee, importance of a supportive senior organization for defending their rights motivated voters to also participate in elections for residents’ committee in spite of its less transparent processes, as authors found turnout rate to be much higher when neighborhood offices attempted to mediate conflict between homeowners and service suppliers (7/10 vs. 1/6). This outcome corroborates relatedness as an important determinant, since people were much less likely to be involved in even slightly more remote institutions unless interests of their immediate vicinity became threatened.

2.1.3 Cultural Norms

Lastly, differences in democratic inclinations of institutions can be produced by country-specific traditions. The investigation by Pang et. al. on voting behavior in rural China addressed impact of socio-cultural conventions on turnout, who tested their hypothesis that female was systematically less likely to vote because they lacked knowledge on women suffrage by informing village women and/or leaders of this before local elections [7]. The primary finding is that subjects were not voluntarily apolitical, since teaching the former increased their turnout rates while training village heads only did not have significant impact. More importantly for females as a social group, as ‘100% housewives’
appear at polling stations and receive confidence in public, the education programs could inspire subjects to become more passionate in politics and disseminate such enthusiasm via social connections of women in casual conversations. Besides, the authors also highlighted extant barriers: one example is that villagers hardly think voting is worth the effort, because they are apathetic to selection of candidates where few of them could make changes. Another cultural bias against women is that their ideas have been ignored by husbands and patriarchs, or they may stay silent due to social stereotypes treating opinions from women as unwise and the behavior of speaking ‘externally’ (i.e., outside the house) as undisciplined, which incidentally explained ineffectiveness of simply reminding village leaders of electoral legislations --- because some residents waived voting rights themselves.

2.2. Overestimated Costs

2.2.1 Docility in workplace

An appalling violation of labor laws, some corporations in China are notoriously known for their ‘996’ schemes that internally practising 72-hour working schedules [8]. Unfortunately, rather than standing with labor unions in class struggles, ill-treated employees either ‘involuted’ (similar to stagflation, where people work even harder to retain their positions/salaries) or ‘laid flat’ (deliberately withdrawing from competitions) [9], and it was left-wing elite students who were most devoted to protect their rights [10]. The author attributed such irony to increasing unemployment during economic slowdowns: firms were forced to cut labor costs, and the state acquiesced deterioration of workers’ benefits to ensure survival of businesses so long as the situation does not escalate to large-scale strikes; moreover, automated upgrades in production lines reduced bargaining power of workers, particularly in low-value-added, labour-intensive industries where subjects are greater in numbers but inferior in self-protection capabilities, including savings to undergo temporary unemployment and knowledge (education) to use internet or laws. This leads to Hui’s argument that most workers eventually have to succumb to salami tactics (or ‘normalizing mechanism’ as the author defined) of surplus value extraction to make a living [11]; the other theory of ‘countervailing mechanism’ from Hui, that Chinese authorities interpreted relevant legislations flexibly in their favor to dampen workers’ class consciousness and subsequently political activeness, justified from another perspective than cultural norms why Chinese workers were less likely to wield political weapons against unfair treatment. To summarize, some workers are submissive to exploitative terms because they believe their employers are in a significantly advantaged position; it could be an overestimation, but that is especially likely for the blue-collar from rural areas of China. Degenerating working conditions lead to physical and psychological fatigue that make voting no longer attractive (e.g., due to tiredness) despite possibilities of profound improvements.

2.2.2 Misguided Feminist Movement

Apart from industrial relations, there may be other forms of struggles that divert attention of citizens from electoral affairs. According to Hu, while Chinese Communist Party’s emancipation campaign in 1950s relieved women from masculine control, when the country transformed into market economy and no longer guaranteed everyone a job, female workers again fell victim to severe discrimination [12]. As a result, younger people (post-1980s) remembered deepened gender inequality more than Chairman Mao’s socialist revolutions that made women ‘half the sky’; furthermore, because they belong to the one-child generation that receives concentrated monetary and educational resources in their families, young feminists turned out to find the harsh reality of being frequently pretermitted intolerable and started to strive for a more radical version of feminism --- for instance, instead of equal opportunities, they may demand some privileges in compensation for previous sexual inequality [13]. On the other hand, because of distrust towards ‘oppositional and confrontational’ authorities, they collaborated little with the governmental All-China Women’s Federation when advocating progressive thoughts, and instead arranged most of their activities on social media. Absence of experienced and esteemed organizers means grasping the delicate balance for offline demonstrations effectively attracting public attention without angering the government
becomes unlikely [14], while decentered protesters cannot settle conflicts among coalitions and agree upon their guiding principles [15]. In other words, intended political participation may not occur because the cost of being arrested from unregistered assemblies is too high, or activists are so adhered to their ideologies that compromises of any kind are unacceptable.

2.2.3 Prevailing Patriotism

Social costs of expressing complaints on the nation might be increasing in China. Chi stated that CCP is competent in guiding discussions on internet to strengthen its regime, and existence of state censorship usually made ‘netizens’ apolitical except in certain forums/interest groups, which essentially makes political participation a private, exclusive matter [16]. On the other hand, there were pro-government and anti-government sponsored commentators debating heatedly in hope of influencing the public, known as ‘fifty-cent army’ or ‘public intellectual’ respectively. Power balance used to exist between two sides, but recent evidence indicates that more neutral observers are being converted to perfervid loyalists, because the former could elicit patriotism among audience and excelled in identifying discrepancies in adverse contents [17]. Chen supplemented that young internet users experienced and became proud of China’s rapid growth in 21st century, hence they would voluntarily demonstrate their approval to the party via networks, creating a ‘pressure cooker’ that diffuses nationalist ideas. Some worried that this trend could be irrational and superficial with such ‘Red-Guard’ fervor to, for instance, mark any dissenters as foreign spies [18]. In this sense, extreme online atmosphere may lead to disinterest in politics, while recent policy of automatic IP reveal for comments has made opposition more susceptible to the authority.

3. Arousal of Political Enthusiasm Among Chinese Citizens

In summary, within the framework of this research, ordinary Chinese citizens would prefer the status quo because prospects of favorable policy adjustments are not worthwhile of expected costs to pursue for changes. These reasons may or may not really be in their individual interests, and “viable approaches” to encourage political participation refer to clarification of underestimated benefits and overestimation of costs. For instance, living far away from the place where they are registered as eligible voters in Hukou system (most likely for university students) is a justifiable cause, because returning to home cities simply for voting in local elections would most likely be considered cost-ineffective given that their contribution to the voting pool is only incremental; on the other hand, antiquated cultural discrimination ridiculing female involvement in politics are to be tackled, because it constitutes barriers that misleads to the suboptimal action of non-voting. Additionally, it must be stressed that solutions are proposed on behalf of ‘lay’ entities (in comparison with members of the government) in the society without legislative power, given that more active political atmosphere may not be welcomed by local authorities for stability concerns. Consequently, tempting methods such as establishing online polling stations must be abandoned since such reforms must be initiated by the communist party.

Based on preceding preconditions, this paper outlines following approaches to increase turnout rates in local elections.

3.1. ‘Open Government’ from a Plebian Perspective

After the Cultural Revolution, China enacted some reforms upon plebiscitary constitutions (where people vote for policies rather than governors) that allowed for choices in organizations, but elections were categorized as semi-competitive, primarily because the government still prohibited formation of parties and self-nomination of candidates, which restricted options to a pool of communist party members with circumscribed variation in manifestos and ideologies [19]. The author studied voting behavior under limited choice scenarios across the nation and found access to information regarding political affairs fundamental for voters’ involvement, as the experiment indicated that a standard deviation of increase in education level improves probability of turnout in local elections by 10.9%, while the figure for the binary variable of affiliation with the authority (member of Chinese
Communist Party or China Youth League) is 8.6%. In relation to this paper’s hypothesis, two kinds of causal inferences can be validated: “psychologically mobilized people” assign more values on political participation (e.g., moral obligations to the society) to their utility functions, and complete knowledge helps depict payoffs from voting more thoroughly to facilitate the action. Similarly, the paper stated that because citizens possess fewer feedback channels and inferior negotiating power in authoritarian regimes, Chinese people are expected to decide whether to abstain depending on their internal efficacy, the capability of comprehending and then taking part in grassroots administration, more than belief in responsiveness of the government (‘external efficacy’ as the author defined) or behavior of neighbors. The most common case in reality may be removal of unpopular bureaucrats from office, where perception of corruption or incompetence is an effective motive for residents to elect an alternative. This factor turned out to increase local turnout rates by more than 8%, confirming understanding of local administration as an influential determinant of political activeness.

Also, it is important to notice that intermediate causes like education level are subject to exogenous shocks. A qualitatively similar experiment was later conducted in Beijing [20], where degrees and internal efficacy were in fact negatively correlated to voting. The authors believe their results conflicted with Shi’s on that respect because 1989 Democracy Movement occurred in between two interventions: the incident not only depressed more educated and politically aware residents in the capital, but also made CCP extremely vigilant against ‘unhealthy bourgeois thoughts’ such as requesting dialogues with the authority. Therefore, government information would not --- and could not --- be accessed.

Although neither providing extensive education programs nor improving transparency of the government appears to be realistic, there remain corresponding solutions to make the government more open from people’s perspective. Encouraging citizens to visit official websites and post inquiries is a perfectly practical example: by reviewing annual financial reports of one’s city, residents may readily evaluate whether their taxes have been spent properly, and the right to oversee fiscal budgets from external entities like local people’s congress would reshape the power balance between the government and its people [21]. Bearing this in mind, as previously shown that Chinese people take their economic interests very seriously, they are then expected to take punitive actions, for instance appealing to higher authorities (known as Xinfang), if they deem responsible official’s incompetent or corrupt, which exhibits an increase in their political participation.

3.2. Unionization

Wang and Sun studied correlation between social class and voter turnout in urban China [22], and their primary finding was significance of citizens’ working status: white collar workers in private sectors were most likely abstainers while their counterparts in state enterprises participated the most in elections, where it was recorded that 27 percentage points more of the former group cited ‘unawareness’ as the reason for non-voting. The authors raised better mobilization during election periods in the public sector as the main reason, which can be justified in two ways: firstly, private companies were not obliged to propagate voting as a formality for their employees, given that the party exerts looser control on them while they carry no ‘social responsibility’; secondly, workers in this sector were more occupationally and geographically mobile, which means a lower proportion of them can be registered in the local precinct, incapacitating official organization of mass voting campaigns.

Compared to Shi’s studies, this paper’s research design additionally fixed objective, observable characteristics (age, gender and education level) of subjects [23], and found that subjective motivations (e.g., democratic orientation, anti-corruption sentiment) only exhibited minor variation across voters and non-voters. Thus, there must be certain institutional factors exclusively affecting people inside the state, and regression analysis of the model indicated that one unit of increase in regime support (scaled from 1 to 5) would widen the difference in turnout probability between public and private employees by 2.14 times. In conclusion, working in state enterprises would induce endorsement of CCP governance, which leads to greater likelihood of election turnout. Besides,
according to the investigation, every group of subjects (39% on average) identified busyness as the
biggest obstruction for exercising their voting rights, which is surprisingly positively correlated with
affiliation with the government. It might be counterintuitive to argue that nationalized entities have
worse working conditions depriving employee’s ability and willingness to vote, but some scholars
demonstrated possibility of the case, because labor at this case may be less solidary since state
enterprises are usually large enough to be isolated (an alternative term for ‘independent’) from each
other and subsequently prevent cross-firm collaboration of employees [24], and Chinese trade unions
may still implement Leninist practices that manage welfare of workers poorly compared to Western
counterparts, where within this paper’s context it may refer to foreign companies operating in China
[25].

Active involvement in trade unions appears to be a viable solution: although this organization may
be ineffective, it remains the most straightforward and least risky approach to protect one’s labor
rights in comparison with strikes and protests, while modern elements can be incorporated by aspiring
activists to enhance its operation. Research on union power in contemporary China discovered that
because unions’ power to mediate labor relations is derived from official recognition [26], it is union
bureaucracies (namely All-China Federation of Trade Unions and its branches), not workplace unions,
that are really capable of enforcing compromises to employers, which explained why the majority
(63.2%) of union chairs considered ‘carrying out instructions from the party or superior’, rather than
‘safeguarding workers’ interests (18.7%) as their primary task. As a result, labor rights can indeed
be protected under contemporary institutions, and the author attributed absence of pressure favoring
workers from authorities to nonexistent grassroots operation of unions: in one cited investigation on
two enterprises claiming to have union setup rate of 84.2% and 89.3% respectively, less than 10% of
employees on average correctly interpret the definition of unions, indicating great potentials for
Chinese workers to participate in and functionalize trade unions together for sake of their own.

3.3. Respect of Own Votes

As emphasized at the start, this research aims to create complete and accurate utility functions for
individual voters for their decisions on election turnout, therefore contemplated action of abstention
would not be altered. However, in reality citizens may be bribed to vote for certain candidates, which
grants them some immediate monetary payoffs but incurs long-term losses that would eventually
outweigh benefits even with time discounts by bad governance (please note that deliberate action of
this kind, to whom accepts the money and leave the precinct so that subsequent policy implementation
does not concern them, is not considered because most residents are not expected to move). Based on
Yao’s observation of several consecutive local elections in a Chinese village [27], villagers and
predatory entrepreneurs (who exploit the town’s resources without fair payment) are on two
conflicting sides of justice, while local officials act as arbitrators. The author concluded once corrupt
officials take office via vote purchases, there would be little prospects for improvement of
administrations in two non-mutually-exclusive ways: firstly, if the ‘campaign fund’ is raised by
candidates themselves, they will certainly start to embezzle on collective assets, as an example
revealed that a local Party secretary with annual salary of 21,600 yuan could easily afford a car of
400,000 yuan; secondly, it has been common practice for companies and officials to collude, with the
former offering money to voters in exchange for convenience and favors in forthcoming conflicts.
Loss of confidence in village heads would gnaw away citizens’ enthusiasm for political participation,
especially leaving electoral affairs to elites who may greatly benefit from successes. In summary,
selecting candidates for money instead of manifestos would incur a self-reinforcing loop that
persistently discourages voting behavior as well as ability to confront incumbent officials.

Zhang discussed another similar form of deterioration in the government’s accountability: constitution of China stipulates that representatives in the Local People's Congress (LPC) up to county/district level must be directly elected, but in practice most positions are reserved for different occupations (farmers, intellectuals, etc.) [25], so that actually very few seats can be contended by
‘normal’ candidates without any backing factions or fame, which means the meetings would
disproportionately focus on proposals about different industries and to some extent overlook civil affairs, weakening the feedback channel with people and undermining its reputation. A more depressing fact for commoners is that while cadres dared not to compete in underhanded ways, private entrepreneurs were particularly keen on ‘commercializing elections’ to build connections (guanxi) within the government, since they had neither knowledge to comprehend the action’s legal risks nor extant public positions to be revoked; for the same reason, these amateur part-time deputies was complained to be extremely incompetent and irresponsible, therefore this committee would never reach the efficiency it could have achieved with fair and transparent elections.

The precautionary measure for this factor is simple: when people feel unnecessary to visit polling stations after thorough consideration (possibly because controlled policy variation under China’s one-party system will not produce significant utility differences at village/neighborhood level), they should cherish their right to abstain instead of accepting briberies of any kind, so that their political weight can be preserved in case supporting a certain candidate becomes worthy in the future.

4. Summary

Given the assumption that voting behavior is dictated by certain reasons, this report contributes to existing research on its guiding principles by qualitatively defining determinants in agents’ cost-benefit analysis, which allows for more straightforward evaluation of agents’ decisions. Additionally, under current limited authoritarian regime of China, the paper focused on the more realistic direction of embedding democratic elements into the nation’s electoral system, that is to identify underlying psychological, monetary and environmental causes for citizens to (or not to) exercise their political rights, and subsequently devise solutions that provide spontaneous motives for them to vote without requiring mass organization from the party. To briefly conclude suggestions from the research, if Chinese people could bother to learn how individual interests and collective assets of their community may be misappropriated, they may swiftly become active participants in grassroots administrations, where with their presence erosion of commoners’ political influence and undermining of their enthusiasm by malicious powerful figures can be resisted --- one’s interests must be protected by one oneself.

Unfortunately, because the political atmosphere has been considerably less liberal since the 18th Party Congress in 2012 as President Xi assumed the office and tightened party control over the nation, large-scale intervention, like pilot studies changing election procedures of a town under state sanction, that test the relationship between ‘legal awareness education’ (pufa) and turnout in local elections may be less applicable than a decade ago; an alternative is to conduct the experiment in private enterprises, where the specific research design is left for future endeavors. Besides, the entirety of this paper’s discussion is based on the premise that proposed actions would not be thwarted without violating current legislations, but it can be overthrown by unfavorable amendments of constitutions from Beijing, while hostile interventions from local governments will be a great obstacle.

This paper also provides theoretical references for forthcoming projects in several directions. For instance, although the preceding investigation recognizes possibility of voluntary apoliticism, what affects the threshold for abstention remains unclear, and it may lead to the discussion on whether overreactive citizens could descend ‘deliberation and consultation’ process of the nation into activism once the mainstream turns attention to political affairs. Besides, Chinese government has a parallel system, that in simple terms electable governors manage the public and internally nominated party secretaries control the administrative body, but unlike civil servants in the west the latter is authorized to approve or veto any proposal. Thus, the hypothesis that restricted room of maneuver for officials empowered by the public could dampen trustworthiness of the authority is another option for testing. Lastly, this research treats ordinary votes as a whole, but demographic characteristics would make subjects more susceptible to certain factors, as a result scholars may focus on behavioral patterns of a particular group, for instance urban adolescents.
References


