Supply, Security and Sustainability: British Wartime Administration in the Middle East, 1941-1945

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Abstract. During World War II, Britain established the Middle East Supply Center in the Middle East to coordinate and manage the economies of the countries in the Middle East, so as to ensure Britain's control over the Middle East and to make use of the strategic location of the Middle East to allow the Middle East to develop into a supply base and transportation corridor for the Allied Forces. The Middle East Supply Center (MESC) began as an advisory agency, but as its authority continued to expand, it gradually became the largest representative of British national interests in the Middle East. Acting under the duty of contributing to the war effort of the Allied Forces, The Middle East Supply Center was rather successful which tackled various crises and more importantly, making Middle East an invaluable supply route, bringing out the strategic potential of the Middle East. However, the Middle East Supply Center and the role of colonialism it represented could not win the future of the Middle East. It not only failed to ensure Britain's influence in the Middle East intact, but also failed to receive support from the United States and Middle Eastern states. It's not merely a matter of power, but a matter of leadership in postwar world order.

Keywords: Middle East, Middle East Supply Center, WWII, Keynesianism, colonialism.

1. Introduction

Middle East, where three continents meet, has been blessed and cursed by its strategic location since the dawn of human civilization. The ancient land saw Empires waging countless wars to seize her, leaving traces of destruction and prosperity in the history of the Middle East. Until present days, the Middle East is still suffering from ubiquitous violence and conflicts, enjoyed less peace and development much less than its Western and Eastern neighbors. Despite the war-torn memory of the Middle East, the area escaped a particular war that swept across every continent in the globe, the Second World War. Luckily, the Middle East was not involved in apocalyptic wars that were fought in Europe, Asia and the Pacific, remained a state of peace and stability during 1941 to 1945, at the cost of British occupation and wartime administration.

The Middle East Supply Center (MESC), born out of the Mediterranean shipping crisis, had become the biggest representative of British interest in the Middle East since 1941. The primary goal of the British wartime administration in the Middle East was contribution to the war effort, while the MESC focused initially on import control, then the stability of the Middle East. The influence of the MESC was broadened and deepened by the United States' Lend Lease aid, much needed by civilians suffering from shortages of necessaries. As a civilian agency, the MESC did not give military-style orders, but rather rely on advisors and professionals to persuade local administration into co-operation, while its power to control import serving as a vital leverage. In short, the MESC is the key to understand British wartime administration and to reconstruct a more comprehensive picture of the Middle East society during WWII.

The methodology of this research involves an in-depth investigation into the archives and literature of the MESC and its related topics. The aim is to identify the nature of British wartime administration in the Middle East by examining British ruling methods, colonial administrative traditions, and the wartime circumstances that necessitated such administration, as embodied by the MESC. Understanding the nature of British wartime administration will provide insights into the wartime period of the Middle East, providing a local perspective on the allied war effort. Moreover, the MESC was also one of the turning points of American's Middle East policy, which shaped the post-war international hegemony of the United States.

2. Literature Review

Studies on the Middle East during WWII was not abundant concerning its comparably state of peace and lack of major battles. There are fewer in the specified field of British administration in the Middle East and the MESC.

George Kirk, a former British archeologist engaged in wartime decisions in Cairo, gave a comprehensive account of military operations and political events in the Middle East in his The Middle East in the War [1]. The work established the knowledge background for latter research on the wartime Middle East. His A short history of the Middle East, from the rise of Islam to modern times also serves as a valuable handbook for those interested in region's history [2]. It was the first literature that gave a systematic account of the history of the MESC, approved its contributions to Allies' war effort as well as criticized its ineffectiveness and mentioned the inflation in the economy of the Middle East and policies introduced to ease the severe economic problems during WWII. The literature also originally stated the conflicts between the United States and Britain in terms of the MESC, breaking the Anglo-American alliance paradigm which only focuses on the co-operations in the Allies. However, the accounts were rather generalized. Many details, for example, the relation between MESC and local government were not mentioned. There are also reviews criticizing the hostility that Mr. Kirk held towards Zionism and the lack of perspective from Free France and the Zionists, whose actions were not fully justified under the official and Britain-centered view of the wartime Middle East.

The history of the Middle East Supply Center was also told from the perspective of economic regionalism, Economic regionalism in the Middle East during World War II: the Middle East Supply Center [3], which was wrote by Dr. Martin Wiznitzer Wilmington. The Doctoral dissertation focused on the economic achievements that the MESC made during the war, especially in the field of regional economic co-operation in the Middle East. Dr. Wilmington specified his accounts on the working status of the MESC. However, the dissertation avoided the problem that it was under the circumstance of the strong control by the British wartime administration, propelled by wartime military needs that the integration of Middle East Economy could be made possible, without which the first step that the MESC achieved in years of hard work would vanish, just as post-war Middle East history has revealed. The dissertation neither discussed the relation between MESC and local governments, we could not recognize whether the economic regionalism integration was imposed on local governments or was conducted under fair cooperation.

In another thesis The Middle East Supply Center: A Reappraisal the problem was partly solved [4]. He admitted that though the MESC, with its working man and women, remained an advisory agency all the way through wartime period, the adoption of colonial administration was frequently used. For the locals, no matter how many local interests the MESC was consulted for, it remained a foreign agency, which inevitably kindled frictions and suspicion. However, the problem of generalization still existed. There are not many examples shown in the thesis that demonstrates how policies from the MESC were enforced, neither was the attitude that local officials hold towards advisors from the MESC shown. Still, the thesis served as a great supplement to his doctoral dissertation.

Another account of the history related to the MESC was the work of Swansinger A. Jacqueline titled The Magic Carpet: Lend-lease in the Middle East, 1940-1944 [5]. The Doctoral dissertation focuses on the perspective of Lend Lease, which contributed enormously to both the Allies' war effort and civilian needs, and American Middle East policies. The dissertation concluded that the Lend Lease to the Middle East, which was initially co-operated with the MESC, had brought the attention of the policy makers in the United States to Middle East, thus triggering the competition between Britain and the United States for the post-war Middle East. However, Dr. Jacqueline did not pay much attention to the influence of Lend Lease in the Middle East. Moreover, the conclusion simplified the Anglo-American competition for the Middle East to mere competition for interests, which was maybe true in terms of oil, and the co-operation and competition inside the MESC, but what about the problem of Arab nationalism movements and the Problem of the Zionism? If the United State did not seek global leadership, who would be qualified? Nevertheless, Dr. Jacqueline's account on the change in United States Middle East policies was a great background for the study of the MESC.

In terms of the influence of the MESC on the local society, inflation was the No.1 issue. Literature on British wartime financial policies and the economic conditions in wartime Middle East could bring more insight to its less successful task of easing inflation in the Middle East. Hancock, W.H. and Gowing, M.M. Systematically analyzed the wartime British economy as an official historical record [6], providing a wealth of economic data, but is briefer in its coverage of the colonies and dominions, and in the Middle East is simply relegated to the military, ignoring British economic policy in the region. Work of the famous economist, John Maynard Keynes, How to Pay for the War: A Radical Plan for the Chancellor of the Exchequer was a strike to the Chamberlain Government wartime financial policies, and laid way to Churchill Government wartime financial policies that tried to prevent inflation and promote production [7]. However, the focus of the renowned economist was the economy of Britain Homeland, that rarely was written about the Middle East, nor the colonies and dominions. Which was quite ironic when the MESC adopted similar Keynesian policies to try and tackle inflation, and in some cases the measures taken to ease inflation became price riser themselves.

3. A Fragile Chain of Supply Route: The Establishment and Dissolution of the MESC

The Middle East Supply Center inherited the British's continuous investment in the Middle East, a region that had traditionally been of strategic interest to Britain, primarily for security reasons. For Britain, the Middle East was extremely important in terms of defending India against Russia and maintaining control over the Mediterranean Ocean. Controlling this region provided safe passage from India to the Mediterranean, thereby connecting and defending the empire's precious colonies. Chances appeared when the Ottoman empire collapsed after the First World War, providing Western powers with an opportunity to carve up former Ottoman territories. Due to the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia, these occupied territories were left in the hands of Britain and France, leading to the creation of British Mandates of Iraq and Palestine and France Mandates of Syria and Lebanon in the Middle East.

However, there was still a missing cog in the chain "stretching from the Mediterranean Ocean to the Pamirs and protecting not the Indian Frontiers merely, but our communication with our further empire" [8]. Iran managed to maintain its sovereignty after the First World War, with its powerful leader, Riza Shah, who distanced Iran from Britain influence while adopting a xenophobic foreign policy to unite Iranians in the nation-building efforts of newly established Pahlavi Dynasty [9]. Concerning the memory of the foreign occupation by British and Russia, the new regime could only escape the appetite for annexation by strengthening itself and seeking alley outside of the region. Among all major powers, Iran chose Germany and the United Sates, who possess strong economic power and little intention of imperial intervention in the Middle East. However, the prevailed mood of isolationism hindered the United States from expanding its interest into the Middle East. Moreover, the Middle East was long considered under the influence of Britain, with whom the United State tend to avoid having conflict.

On the contrary, German participates actively in the infrastructure construction programs propelled by Riza Shah himself, who was eager to lead the ancient state of Iran into modernization, with barely little concern about adopting Blood and Iron method to implement his nationalism and secularization reforms. For Germany, investment into Iran could be promising, since the state seemed determined to stride towards modernization under the rule of Riza Shah, hence providing a potential market for German products and services. In fact, Germany had played the most significant role in the economic development in Iran before the Second World War [8], which had become one of the pretexts of the interference of Britain and the Soviet Union, who launched a joint military invasion, Operation Countenance, to take over Iran in August 1941 [9], resulting in the abdication of Riza Shah. The occupation of Iran finalized British scheme of controlling the Middle East, forming a chain of states which, whether on their own will or not, stood with the Allied forces.

However, the control of these territories was not as stable as it looked. The British mandate of Palestine was facing increasingly dangerous conflict between the Zionists settlers and local Arabs. In Egypt and Iraq, the modernization of their Army was proved counterproductive [10]. The rising nationalism in these societies produced non-cooperative attitude towards British war effort. To make things worse, British defense in the region was thin, compared to the aggressive Italians who sought to control the Mediterranean Ocean and triggered the shipping crisis in the Middle East.

In June 1940, Italy declared war on Britain and France, threatening British and French controlled territory around the Mediterranean Ocean. The shipping in the Middle East was also serious affected by the Italian navy and air forces. Suffered from shortages in conveys and losses of cargo ships, the Mediterranean Ocean was closed for civilian shipping resulting in ships detouring to the Cape to reach the Middle East. Moreover, the war effort in North Africa required prioritized shipping of military supplies, equipment and troops, leaving fewer shipping capacity for civilian purposes. The lack of shipping capacity could result in great disasters in the Middle East, since traditionally, Egypt served as the breadbasket of the Middle East and if transportation malfunctioned, the rest of the Middle East would suffer from hunger.

In order to coup with the shortage of shipping capacity, the British government had made 4 plans:

a) Giving better protection to cargo ships to reduce losses.

b) Obtaining more cargo ships to compensate the losses.

c) Minimizing the time cargo ships spent in waiting and maintenance, as well as reducing laytime to improve efficiency.

d) Optimizing shipping process to maximize the benefit [6].

Although Britain had managed to secure certain number of ships from allied states and surrender ships from the Axis, the shipping capacity available still cannot meet the increasing demand. As for the United States, their military cargo ship fleets were restricted under the Neutrality Act, namely unhelpful towards the shipping shortage. The overall shipping crisis that Britain was facing left the Middle East with only one solution: Rely on its own production and existing cargo ships to carry out shipping for both civilian purposes and military ones.

Given the harsh transport situation, the Middle East Supply Center (MESC) was set up to coordinate shipping in the Middle East, saving as much shipping capacity as possible from civilian transport to supplement the shortages in military transport. At the same time, the agency must also deal with the economic disaster in the Middle East, in case of potential social upheaval. It was also agreed by General Wavell and Miles Lampson, the British Ambassador to Egypt, that a new civilian agency, not the existing military agency, had to be established to handle everything from collecting information about shipping and economic status to imposing import control on British controlled states [11]. Collecting information, regulating shipping and promoting production had become the three major goals for the MESC. The import control policy built up a regulated trade system, where the MESC dominated the import and distribution of commodities in the Middle East.

Initially, the MESC would collect import orders within its compass of competence, the orders would later be selected by central supply committee, comprised of representatives from local British military, United Kingdom Commercial Cooperation (UKCC) and ministry of war transport, which were in capitals of Middle East states. Finally, the selected orders were then transmitted to the headquarter of the MESC, located in Cairo, Egypt, where they were second examined and given suggestions on supply or distribution. However, if the requested goods were inaccessible in the region, then the MESC would arrange a search for requested goods within the whole United Kingdom, in most cases these goods were manufactured and dispatched from India. Only when nowhere in the empire could not provide requested goods, would the UKCC purchase the requested goods from the

United States. The UKCC office in New York would accept lists of requested goods on the 15th of every month, and the requested goods were expected to start their voyage to the Middle East in Next month [12]. The MESC would also handle orders from the Soviet Union, transporting supplies, weapons and equipment from the Persian Gulf to the coast of the Caspian Sea, where transport units from the Soviet Union would take over their requested goods [13].

In fact, despite its original purposes, the MESC expanded rapidly with American lend lease supplies pouring in the Middle East and soon became an agency with great influence among Middle East states, controlling international transport and advised local government on economic development. As a civilian agency, the MESC did not give military-styled orders, but was still able to implement its plans. If London backed the decisions of the MESC, the MESC could obtain region-wide compliance by using the leverage of import quota, which was ultimately in the hand of the MESC. The MESC was also trusted with handling imported goods, given the scarcity of available supplies in the Middle East, the procurement and the distribution could not be left on the hands of local merchants, who were infamous hoarders exploiting the scarcity of commodities. Hence the MESC became the controller of the market, who held and manage the largest quantities of various commodities [3]. Furthermore, since Middle East states were all eager to acquire goods from the MESC, Cooperation with the MESC would be their best choice [14].

The Anglo-American alliance was co-operative and solid in terms of war effort. President Roosevelt emphasized on the significance of the Middle East, especially Iran, for the security of the United States [15]. The co-operation in the Persian corridor had become one of the most successful operations within the alliance, the British and American personnel divided the construction work and enhanced the infrastructure to great extent. The MESC also contributed significantly to the regional economic co-operation in the Middle East. With the assistance of the MESC, great effort had been made to modernize agriculture in the Middle East, including the introducing of mechanized farming, science support and the construction of essential infrastructure [16]. It objectively maintained the basic peace in the Middle East during World War II, and the local agriculture and industry also grew rapidly due to military needs.

As the United States further engaged in Middle East affairs, the significance of the Middle East was better recognized by United States, especially in terms of the post-war value of the Middle East. Though committed the Lend Lease supplies to the MESC, the United States had shown greater ambition towards the Middle East. A series of new agencies were established, for example, the Board of Economic Warfare (BEW), an agency intended to improve the image of the United State among locals, was also permitted to transport goods from the United States to the Middle East. Later, the United States Commercial Cooperation (USCC) was established, intended to end the reliance on the UKCC [3]. These agencies, with their similar but distinct missions, indicated the hesitation existed in policy making towards the Middle East. United States was not content with the situation in the Middle East, where the British dominated MESC handled the distribution of Lend Lease supplies, hence it was the British who took the merit of aiding the Middle East with the fruits of American worker's labor. The United States realized the necessity of bypassing the British domination of the Middle East and conducting direct diplomatic contacts with Middle East states. In 1942, as an increasing number of Middle East states were receiving Lend Lease supplies from the United States, the United State started to sign formal Lend Lease treaty with these states, intended to establish direct contact without the interference of Britain.

The British also had greater ambition for the MESC. Apart from its mission of contributing to the war effort, the agency was entrusted with British post-war plan for the Middle East. Britain saw the MESC as an instrument of promoting economic cooperation with Arab states, attempting to pacify the tense situation in the Middle East by expressing goodwill towards local Arabs. Given the turmoil that had already taken the British by surprise, for example, the Rashid Ali al-Gaylani coup in Iraq and the tendency of militancy and extremism among the Zionists in Palestine, where the Zionists were organizing armed forces, attempting to challenge the status quo [17]. The British was eager to re-consolidate its alleged traditional, Lawrence of Arabia like relationship with the Arabs, to retain the control over the Middle East during and after the war. The British Minister-Resident for the Middle East, Richard Casey, explained the reason why he and his colleagues were so keen on keeping and prolonging the mission of the MESC: The British control of this obscure yet powerful bureaucracy offered “one of the most hopeful means of keeping the general initiative in the Middle East in our hands” [18].

The Americans in the Middle East produced dual effect on the British. In terms of the war effort, the American Lend-lease supplies and personnel greatly relieved the threat and pressure that Britain was facing. However, the British was beginning to worry about the increasing American engagement in the Middle East, which could result in a shift of power in the Middle East after the war. Though the Middle East policy of United States focused on aiding the Soviet Union and British allies during the wartime, she would assume greater responsibilities in the Middle East, given the tremendous amount of investment that had already been poured by Lend lease. Since 1942, Americans personnel had been entering the Middle East in great numbers, reaching a peak at 65,000 U.S. civilians and 30,000 uniformed service members [19], until they pulled out in late 1945 and 1946. For the United States, the Middle East supply center provided a good opportunity to break through Britain's monopoly on the Middle East and enter the Middle East market. The original intention of Britain introducing American capital into the Middle East was to restrain the US government and keep it in the MESC, but it failed to prevent the infiltration of American capital into the Middle East. The Anglo-American alliance could not convince the United States to give up its existing investment in the Middle East - economic investments, such as the MESC and Lend-lease agreements, as well as the massive deployment of US military and civilian personnel in the Middle East. Of course, anxiety over post-war oil reserves also prompted the United States to compete with Britain for Saudi Arabia during World War II. American Lend-lease and the promise of free trade provided the Middle East region, which had long been under British control, a new choice. By the end of World War II, the reputation of the United States in the Middle East was unprecedented, undoubtedly laying the foundation for its involvement in the political situation in the region.

The dissolution of the MESC was a process of crystallization of the Middle East policy of the United States, which was contrary to British plan of prolonging its dominance over the Middle East. The MESC, with its regulated trade, went against American’s free-trade spirit that as long as the emergency was lifted, the Anglo-American co-operation in the MESC had to go. In 1944 the Mediterranean Ocean reopened to shipping, leaving no necessity of imposing strict import control on Middle East states. The war seemed to have ended for the Middle East, where merchants were eager to bring business back to the Middle East [20]. In 1945, the Middle East finally got rid of the unwelcomed MESC, with the competition for the Middle East between the United States and Britain continued.

4. At the Cost of Inflation: A Compared Study of Wartime Finance in Britain and the Middle East

There was another reason why the MESC was no more welcomed in the Middle East, which its failure to tackle the serious inflation in the Middle East. The most Conspicuous influence feature of the inflation was the soaring of prices. From 1939 to 1945, In Iraq, the general price index had risen 580%, In Damascus the general price index had risen appallingly 830%. In 1944, the Middle East Financial Conference identified the inflation as the central problem in the Middle East [21], since the rise in prices was not an isolated incident and the whole Middle East was suffering from an economic collapse, where rising prices were destroying the livelihood of people.

The import control that had been imposed on Middle East States was the main contributor to the inflation. Firstly, due to import control, commodities imported in the region had been reduced greatly, by 1943, the import of civilian commodities had dropped to a quarter of the figure before the war. Moreover, the local transportation was occupied with military transport missions, leading to the scarcity of commodities that could reach the hands of consumers in the Middle East. Secondly, the massive military unites stationed in the Middle East and huge number of military orders had greatly increased the amount of liquid currency in the region. The military expenditure had exceeded 20% of the total value of local commodities and service combined [14]. As the expenditure of the allied forces grew increasingly high, the liquid currency in the region had caused the prices to go higher, since the outlet for this liquid currency was extremely limited. The supply of commodities failed to fulfill the demand of Middle East consumers, since the MESC import control still existed, hence the price of commodities available had to rise. Lastly, apart from outside interference, Various local conditions also contributed to the rise of prices. The scarcity of commodities and the cumbersome process of obtaining them through the MESC lured people who had access to imported goods into exploiting them for higher prices, even the local government would be found raising the prices. The Iraq government purchased a shipment of sugar through Lend-lease, then sold them with additional taxes [20]. Despite the strict control of commercial imposed by the MESC, the black market still existed, where hoarding, stealing and reselling of Lend-lease and other import commodities were impossible to control for the local government or the MESC.

The MESC was not unaware of the serious inflation problem, however, their solutions were not effective, since the inflation was mainly caused by import control, the MESC and the British administration could only try to ease its influence while not altering the general practice of import control. For example, the MESC managed to import gold worth eight million dollars from India. In 1943 and 1944, the purchasing of gold made up 18% of British military procurement [12]. The purpose of importing gold, was that the Middle East had a long history of using gold as saving, importing gold could digest the excessive purchasing power. Other measures were also implemented to control the economy, for example, banning private trade of grain, collecting supplies, introducing price limit mechanism etc. The MESC was the first to introduce these economy regulating techniques, which was pioneering in the Middle East.

Wartime economic control, including import control, was consistent with British wartime financial policies in the homeland. After Winston Churchill came into power in 1941, the wartime financial policy of Britain had undergone a drastic reform. The shift was marked by the personal campaign of the renowned economist John Maynard Keynes, who called upon the implement of a more regulated wartime financial policy, with an essay published in New York Times that caused a sensation. The Goals of this regulated financial policy could be summarized as three points: activating the war potential of Britain, securing people’s freedom and fending the weakest population [7]. Keynes regarded the potential inflation as the major enemy of the livelihood of people in wartime economy, hence measures had to be taken to tackle inflation in advance. Keynes argued that inflation was inevitable in wartime economy, because as military production increased drastically, production of commodities was therefore limited. Military production provided more jobs and salaries for the working class that suffered from low employment before the war, hence improving their purchasing power.

However, as commodities were not increased as the total production was diverted to military purpose, the excessive purchasing power was generated, leading to a potential rise in general price [7]. If inflation did break out, the working class would be the population that were affected most. Keynes believed that inflation could be controlled by reducing the excessive purchasing power in the society, while free market still played its role in the economy, providing incentive that could generate productivity and confidence. However, what make Keynes’ proposition controversial was the way of removing excessive purchasing power. He argued that through delayed payment, which could result in reducing the salaries of the working class, would prevent the inflation, thus protecting the working class from potential inflation [7]. Regardless of his correctness, asking the working class to accept a reduction of wages was a political suicide given the tense opposition between the working class and the Chamberlain cabinet [22]. It was not until Winston Churchill’s united cabinet came into office that Keynes’ scheme was accepted. Although the British government did not adopt the controversial delayed payment scheme, The 1941 war budget absorbed most of the viewpoints proposed by Keynes, and techniques like price control and rationing for various commodities ensured the quality of life of the British people in wartime to large extent.

If we make a comparison between the MESC policy and British financial policy in homeland, similarities could be found in terms of imposing control on the economy. The MESC even imposed tougher import control on the Middle East. However, the administration in the Middle East was neither modernized nor efficient enough to implement policies that tried to tackle the inflation. In a classified report from U.S. embassy concerning British activity in Iraq, to purchase food and promote food production, the British administration offered purchase prices several times higher than pre-war prices, which led to a significant increase in the currency held by farmers, stimulating the expansion of black market and exacerbating inflation. However, the British administration was also uncertain about whether to stop this over-priced procurement, in fear for a potential emergency food shortage in the Middle East or India [12]. Although British officials in Iraq believed that the British should be fully responsible for Iraq's affairs, the local government did not have enough honest and experienced employees. To make matters worse, the local government, especially in Iraq, was completely supported by the British, whose legitimacy came from British trust and assistance rather than trust from local population, making it unpopular among local population, thus reducing its capability to govern [12].

5. Conclusion

The Middle East supply center shouldered missions far beyond its original design, evolving from a consulting agency to a massive power structure during the World War II, but was finally dissolved as its relevance faded. It is hard to imagine the catastrophic consequences that would have occurred if there had not been such an agency. However, the economic control measures of the MESC were strange combinations of colonialism and Keynesianism - reflected in its disrespect for the sovereignty of Middle Eastern states and its efforts to maintain and prolong British dominance over the Middle East. At the same time, the economic regulation measures it adopted were relatively advanced and effective at the time, although not necessarily effective in the Middle East, they were consistent with the policies implemented domestically in the UK.

The impact of the MESC on Middle Eastern society is twofold. It carried a colonialist color, and Britain did not attempt to “assimilate” the Middle East into a part of Britain. Instead, it aimed at maintaining its rule, inevitably requiring cooperation with local powers and the support of vested interest holders. It also attempted to introduce a “modern” economic system into the Middle East, but due to the need for a stable rule, it was unable to carry out deep and thorough reforms. On the other hand, the Middle East supply center not only helped the Allied powers win the war further, but also promoted the development of the Middle East region.

The MESC witnessed the transformation of imperialist rule from Britain to the United States from its birth to its demise. Colonial imperialism, even if cloaked in the guise of science, has lost its legitimacy, while American imperialism, which claimed to spread freedom and democracy since the beginning of the Cold War, was not yet to form. This transformation process also became the starting point of the post-war conflicts in the Middle East, and its impact still exists today.

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