

The Outbreak of the Korean War and the Change in US-Taiwan Relations

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Abstract. The question (or 'issue' for some other nations) of Taiwan is a significant matter that has been attracting attention from multiple political entities. To further study and analyze the case might help to address Taiwan question in a peaceful manner. And the outbreak of the Korean War along with the change in US-Taiwan relations in that period is an important part in studying Taiwan question. The specific time period has made the interests and relations between the US and Taiwan appeared rather obvious, therefore it may contribute to the later study as well as the final resolve of Taiwan question by studying the case in this unique period. This article is to study the US-Taiwan relations in the period of the Korean War and will contain three stages of relevant history: before the outbreak, after the outbreak and after the end of the war. The history and factors will be analyzed and the article would summarize briefly from an neorealism perspective that US-Taiwan relations is dominated by the US's interests.

Keywords: the United States; Taiwan; US-Taiwan relations; the Korean War.

1. Introduction

Recent tension between the US and China once again attracted attention to Taiwan question (or 'issue' for some other nations). The existence of Taiwan question has long been the obstacle in Sino-US relationship. It was claimed to be the mutual goal for both the United States and China to see the question solved in a peaceful solution. Hence thoroughly studying Taiwan question is definitely necessary and could hopefully contribute to the best result for all political entities at stake. In the attempts to address or study Taiwan question, the US plays an important role and facts have proved that US-Taiwan relations has been largely influencing the progress of handling Taiwan question. So despite many aspects and topics relating to the matter are worth-studying and could help to better understand or address this particular question, US-Taiwan relations stood out and must be considered as an important element to discuss.

Within China, the study of US-Taiwan relations mainly started from 1980s. The establishment of diplomatic relations between China and the US provided Chinese scholars with necessary archives, leading to the development of studies in US-Taiwan relations. Chinese aspects to US-Taiwan relations are always concentrated on the military allies or strait crisis. Some studies have included US-Taiwan relations during the Korean War but the studies are more engaged in a longer range of history. (Chinese literature: *China and the US within the Korean War* by Xuegong Zhao, *The US's China Policy and Taiwan Question* by Ge Su, *History of Sino-America Relations* by Wenzhao Tao, *The Planning of the US Taiwan Policy and the Decision-making Process of the Armed Occupation of Taiwan in the Early 1950s* by Zhihua Shen, *The US government's Taiwan policy after the war (late 1940s to early 1960s)* by Xiaoguang Lin) There are not much studies about US-Taiwan relations targeted specifically in the period of the Korean War. On the other hand, scholars outside China mainly study this case on the basis of Sino-US relations. In most situations, US-Taiwan relations would be mentioned only when discussing about strait crisis or the normalization of Sino-US relations, such as in *Crisis and Commitment: United States Policy toward Taiwan, 1950-1955* by Robert Accinelli or *Uncertain Years: Chinese-American Relations* by Dorothy Borg and Waldo Heinrichs. But there are handful of studies targeted mainly in US-Taiwan relations during the Korean War period and provided multiple angles for the process of the US's policy toward Taiwan.

By concentrating on the period around the Korean War might help us to clearly identify the essence in their relations. It must be understood that US-Taiwan relationship is neither fragile nor indestructible. The key factors that can influence their relations are definitely the crucial part for studies. Since US-Taiwan relations has altered significantly in the period of the Korean War and the US's attitude toward Taiwan changes accordingly when it confronting China under different circumstances, it might help us to reveal the reasons behind actions if studies about the changes during the Korean War are conducted.

By using the method of literature study and interdisciplinary, US-Taiwan relations' history during the Korean War will be studied and policies as well as the behaviors will be analyzed by political theories. Source of material include *Theory of International Politics* by Kenneth Waltz *The Types of Legitimate Domination* by Max Weber and *The Concept of The Political* by Carl Schmitt. This article will mainly analyze from an neorealism perspective, in which nations were considered as basic elements and regarded as units. And the entire international system is in the status of anarchy. The task of all units is to survive in this anarchy. To complete the task, they have to form structures which is interpreted as the distribution of power. The units have to consider their own power and position in the structure in order to fight against the concentration of power of other units to ensure their interests. From such aspect along with some theories from other thinkers, the article will try to explain the complexity of US-Taiwan relations and potentially interpret the US's action pattern in its strategies.

2. The Change in Relations in Different Time Period

2.1 Potential Changes Occured in Several Concerns

In December 1949, Chang Kai-Shek's administration had been driven out of mainland by CCP and retreated to Taiwan. The US was extremely disappointed with Chang's government and wanted to make a clean break with it. However, due to the reasons including the shifts in the US's domestic political environment and the official alliance of China and the Soviet Union, Truman administration had to give up their former attempts and restart to manage its relations with Taiwan.

2.1.1 The US's Policy To Taiwan Was To 'Keep Distance'

With Chang Kai-Shek's failure, the US's relation with him was at the bottom. In fact, before Chang's administration finally collapsed in mainland, the US had already felt unsatisfied with the administration's corruption and incapability. The US had even tried to stop Chang from retreating to Taiwan or overthrow his government. The idea came from a realism concern that Chang's incapability would resort to the liberation of Taiwan by CCP, therefore could potentially threaten the US's security and jeopardize the US's strategic arrangement in Asia Pacific. But through certain means, Chang managed to escape to Taiwan, marking the failure of the US's attempt.

As Chang retreated to Taiwan, the US had no claim to cast his administration out and seize control itself. From the neorealism perspective, CCP was not an imminent threat to the US's national security could be a potential threat to its power in Asia Pacific if CCP joining up with Soviet Union. So the option the US had was whether to continue to support Taiwan to assure the US's strategic benefit in the region. And because Chang lost mainland as the Americans had greatly supported him in the civil war, the decision-making circle of the US considered Chang's administration untrustworthy. They sent an observer group to Taiwan and concluded that Chang's administration was incapable as before and only wish to sacrifice the US's interest for its own existence. Under this circumstance, Truman administration decided to 'keep distance' from Taiwan.

There were primarily two concerns behind the decision and can all be analysed by neorealism aspects. The first was that the decision-making group including the Secretary of State Acheson thought that the US's strategic priority should be in Europe. And their thought made sense from an neorealism perspective. Under the international system are the nations as units fight for their survival and structure is a crucial factor to the units and the stability of the system. Since the structure referred

to the distribution of power, powers like the UK and France was definitely vital for the US to gather to form structure against Soviet Union. So define Europe as top priority was understandable. In February 1949, the report of Joint Chiefs of Staff suggested that navy can be sent to demonstrate powers but it was unnecessary to stop CCP from seizing Taiwan through military interventions. And the reason was the US's strategic priority should stay in Europe. [1] George Kennan agreed with the idea and thought that the US should not invest much strength in Asia, his strategy of setting the perimeter that time finally included Okinawa, Philippine, former Japanese islands, mid-way and Aleutian Islands. [2] Taiwan was obviously not in that perimeter, because including it might make the US get involved in the civil war of China and consume the US's strength. Americans hoped to avoid that situation. So in January 20th 1950, apart from repeating Truman's statement of not getting involved in the Chinese civil war, Acheson made clear that Korean and Taiwan was not in the US's perimeter in a public speech.

The second reason was the US was trying to 'drive a wedge' between China and Soviet Union. Even though China had announced 'lean to one side' policy, the US diplomats shared a different view. They believed that the relationship between China and Soviet Union is not indestructible. 'There is and always has been a latent history between the Chinese and the Russians. It's cultural, it's visceral...the Russians seized all kinds of Japanese assets and transferred them to Russian ownership. Factory equipment they stole.' [3] The thought was approved by Acheson, he thought China was a geopolitical great power and its interests is different from Soviet Unions. His idea could be right in neorealism aspects. China, as a separate unit with enough power, did not necessarily have to join Soviet Union's alliance. China made the decision obviously because forming such a structure is of its best interest, and if the US could provide a better option, China might choose otherwise. Based on such idea, continue to support Taiwan would destroy the relation between the US and China, forcing China to form strong alliance with Soviet Union.

Hence, keeping distance from Taiwan match the US's interests. It allowed the US to concentrate on forming structure in Europe and stop pushing China to join the structure of Soviet Union in neorealism ideas. The result was out of the concern of the US's best interests, Truman administration stopped providing jets and tanks to Chang and restricted any diplomatic activities with Taiwan.

2.1.2 Changes in the US Domestically

After the policy of keeping distance from Taiwan, US-Taiwan relationship was coming to the end. But the domestic political environment changed in the US at the period. In February 1950, Senator McCarthy gave a speech suggesting some communists is 'hiding' in the department of state. His action then caused Red Scared and led to great change in the US's Taiwan policy. Many would wonder how a state senator impact foreign policy significantly. Weber's authority theory may explain this case. Though foreign policy seemed to come from legal-rational authority that could not be changed easily by individuals, McCarthy actually triggered traditional authority and led to the change of the policy. Traditional authority made people follow it with little rational thinking. In this case, the fear for communism was 'traditional' for the US people. Therefore when McCarthy suggested the communism had infiltrated the US government, the traditional authority of anti-communism triggered. The traditional authority made people felt naturally it was the right thing to do, therefore the policy toward Taiwan was criticized despite it had been decided out of rational thinking and legal-rational process.

When McCarthy learnt about the related policy to China, he criticized brutally about Truman administration being 'weak' to communism. And because media and people were influenced by that traditional authority, officials and experts were severely impacted. They were relieved from Asia affairs or casted out of the department of state. Others in the department were afraid be branded as 'traitor' so their analysis were 'worded in such a way that it wouldn't offend McCarthy. It was a shameful period in terms of the US's democratic process.' [4] And military took advantage of the event. They did not to intervene Chinese civil war by force directly, but they hate to lose the strategic benefit in Taiwan as well. They suggested the US's China policy would led to more regions fall into communists' control. MacArthur was one of them who intentionally leaked the confidential

documents of the department of state to express his unsatisfactory to the policy, making Acheson embarrassed. [5] Apart from that, the opposite party seized the chance to criticize Truman administration at the same time. Under such combined pressure, the US government had to reconsider its policy to China and Taiwan. The traditional authority McCarthy triggered had formed the 'conventional wisdom at that time all over...all people believed China and Soviet Union is a monolithic communist bloc.' [6] The thought had overthrew the rational conclusion and forced the US's policy to make imminent changes.

2.1.3 China Joining Socialist Camp

In February 1950, *Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship* was signed, China and Soviet Union officially forged alliance. With this fact along with the domestic political environment of the US, the former policy of separating China and Soviet Union clearly had failed. As neorealism suggested, the new situation indicated that Soviet Union had already had China in its structure, the US may have to conclude Taiwan in its structure to gain some power. Or it can be interpreted easier in Carl Schmitt's enemy or friend view of politics which is similar to neorealism view here that China, as a nation, had already decided Soviet Union as its friend and the US as its enemy, the enemy and friend choice for the US was obvious to make. Since Taiwan is the enemy of mainland China, restart the relationship with Taiwan might be a reasonable choice. The result was Truman administration decided to act tough to China. To keep distance from Taiwan was no longer an option, all pressure was pushing the US government to restart the support to Taiwan.

And because of McCarthyism mentioned previously, Rusk and Dulles along with others who were anti-communism and supportive to Chang gained discourse in related policies. They suggested that the US should reevaluate its Asia strategy and consider Taiwan as American's friend. And advised the US to take actions to help KMT army in order to reinforce the perimeter in south-east Asia. [7] And the National Security Council adjusted the US's global strategy, applying the ideas from military of including Taiwan in the perimeter. The NSC claimed that consider only Europe as the core strategy can no longer protect the US's global interests.

Eventually, the US determined to decide its friend. Truman administration took tough measures to China by providing military protection for Taiwan like the NSC suggested.

2.2 War's Influence Toward US-Taiwan Relations

The outbreak of the Korean War had led to a thawing in US-Taiwan relations. Providing more aid and the policy of unleashing Chang Kai-Shek demonstrated the US's support to Taiwan to some extent. However, such support was often 'unwillingly' made due to the influence of war and political environment. Hence the US actually posed various restrictions for Taiwan's behaviour despite the two seemed to stay close. The true target of the US was only to maintain its strategic perimeter in Asia-Pacific and had no interest in Taiwan's wish of strengthen itself to attack mainland.

2.2.1 The Policy of Neutralization of Taiwan Strait

In June 25th 1950, the Korean War broke out. The war was not regarded as a normal civil war by the US, it was thought to be a challenge posed to the Western camp by Soviet camp instead. As mentioned, the NSC adjusted the global strategy for the US and at that time they concluded the outbreak of the war as a symbol of communism expansion. The adjustment and the thought to the war of NSC can be explained in neorealism. The US and Western Europe found Soviet Union threatening their national security, as a result they together formed their structure to confront. But as Soviet Union creating its own structure with Eastern Europe and powers from other continent in the form of communism or Soviet camp, the US had to realize that it had to include more powers from outside the Europe to its structure to balance Soviet Union's structure. Thus the NSC's adjustment in strategy was reasonable. And under neorealism's frame, the Korean War can be interpreted in to the attempt of gathering the power of Korea for its Soviet camp structure. Hence this could not be ignored, the US must intervene to promote its own structure, especially after Soviet Union had just included China in its structure. Back to US-Taiwan relations, the new policy for Taiwan and China had made under

the influence of McCarthyism and the alliance between China and Soviet Union. The US announced the policy and conducted it after the outbreak of the war. In June 27th, Truman openly stated that the attack in Korea had suggested communism could use the means of direct force to conquer independent nations. He implied that should CCP took Taiwan, the security of Pacific would be threatened. The result was the seventh fleet was sent to Taiwan Strait and he claimed the fleet was there to ensure both sides of the strait did not attack each other. And Taiwan's future position according to Truman will judged by UN or the peace treaty with Japan after the security in Pacific restored [8].

The announcement was in its essence the NSC's adjustment in strategy as mentioned. Taiwan was clearly included back to the perimeter for the US's defense. The aid for Taiwan was restarted and the seventh fleet, claimed to avoid the expansion of the war, objectively ensured the security of KMT government. Truman administration had passed NSC48/5 document, aiming to provide long-term protection as well as military and economic aid and including Taiwan in its Far East perimeter [9].

Even though the relation between the US and Taiwan seemed to be ever close at the time, it did not mean that the US would fully support Taiwan's idea. Chang Kai-Shek had regarded the outbreak of the war as a great opportunity for him to ask the US's support to attack and 'take back' mainland. But Truman's announcement in June 26th indicated that the US would stop the attacks from the both sides of strait. From neorealism view, the US did not want to expand the war to danger its core interest of national security. The intervention in the Korean War was only to promote its structure in order to confront Soviet camp. The ultimate goal was to keep the international system stable to ensure the national security or the survival of the US and other nations in its structure. But if Taiwan attacked mainland and the war expanded to a world war, it could directly damage the US's national security. The explanation worked for other powers in the structure as well, no unit would risk directly its own national security if it could be avoided. So Taiwan's wish of attacking the mainland would never be supported from this perspective. By this analysis, though the aiding including military was provided to Taiwan, the core of these series of policy was the neutralization of Taiwan Strait. The whole idea was to create obstacles for Soviet camp expansion and keep a relatively balance between Western camp and Soviet camp but not to start a world war that would threat most nations' security.

2.2.2 'Unleash Chang' and Increase the Support

The aid for Taiwan was at one time stopped but restored after the outbreak of war and the influence of McCarthyism. In July 27th 1950, the NSC approved to provide military aid to Taiwan and sent military advisory group to Taiwan [10]. And the aid increased greatly as China participated in the Korean War. In January 1951, Taiwan received 29 million dollars' worth military equipment and department of defence further instructed Truman to provide 71 million more military aid to KMT government at the same year. Apart from that, a mutual defence agreement was signed and the military advisory group helped with military training for KMT military force [11].

But Truman's administration was not acting actively as it appeared. The protection for Taiwan was mainly for its strategy but the aid policy was mostly forced under the pressure of McCarthyism. So eventually many of the aid plan did not implemented completely. For example, during 1951 to 1952 financial year, the total amount of aid authorized by congress was up to 300 million dollars, but till February 1952, the real aid was only worth 25 million dollars [12].

In 1952, Eisenhower was elected as the US president and his policy toward China seemed tough. He claimed that the seventh fleet duty of stop attacks from both sides of the strait is not reasonable since China was engaging with the US in Korea, so that he will stop letting the seventh fleet to be the shield of CCP. And in March 1952, the US claimed the seventh fleet would express support for KMT military if they attacked mainland [13]. These claims can be understand as to cancel the restrictions for KMT government to launch attack to mainland.

Chang Kai-Shek felt that his plan of attacking mainland and 'take back' China could be supported. But later he did not seem to be impressed even when Eisenhower announced the policy of 'unleashing Chang Kai-Shek'. The reason was he realized through the US's true action that the US never really considered to allow him attack mainland. The facts behind Eisenhower's tough policy was only the effort to end the Korean War quickly. Eisenhower visited the battlefield of the Korean War, he

concluded the small scale battles in Korea would not end the war. He believed the war would only end if the US pose great pressure to China in military, economic, diplomatic and psychological aspects at the same time [14]. As for 'unleashing Chang Kai-Shek', the policy was never really targeted to support Chang's plan for attacking mainland. It was merely for getting China back to negotiate on the matter of the Korean War. Behind the scene, the US made sure that Chang understand his plan for attacking mainland, if without the permission from the US, would not be supported and would even be objected to a great extent. And the permission was one that Eisenhower never intended to give [15].

The real concern behind all this was exactly the reason when we analysed the neutralization of the strait policy from the neorealism perspective. And the core policy since then remained unchanged. But still, aid and tough policy were mentioned publically under certain pressure. It was more like the sovereign of the nation had determined its enemy and friend in Schmitt's theory. And people forced the policy of supporting friend and fighting enemy to be carried out. But even under this sort of pressure, the core decision-making group of the US keep its strategy unchanged to match its realism concerns. In this 'contradiction' between the realism need and branded enemy or friend, the US clearly pursued its realism interest, though it had to act to the enemy and friend standard posed by its people and political environment.

2.2.3 Taiwan's Fear to Peace

The outbreak of the Korean War had once brought Chang Kai-Shek administration hope. When Taiwan was about to be abandoned by the US, it was the war that objectively restored the relations between Taiwan and the US. And even the US was clear to Chang that it would not support his plan of attacking mainland, Chang still hoped that he could manage to get the war out of control and took advantage of it to strike back. And even if all means failed, the US would at least provide military protection or aid to Taiwan due to the war.

During the Korean War, Chang Kai-Shek asked three time to send troops to Korea, hoping to attack mainland from north of Korea. Such request was denied by the US and its allies. Because as analysed previously, such action of expanding war would damage the national security of the US and other nations in the same structure which lead the effort of foring structure to survive Soviet's threat jeopardised. And Taiwan, under such circumstance, feared the end of the war. To explain it in neorelism, awaring that its position in the structure was not as important as other powers, Taiwan thought itself could be kick out of the structure and its relations back to valley with the US.

By the influence of such fear, Chang had attempted to destroy the peace negotiation. Syngman Rhee, South Korea leader, sharing the similar fear with Chang, had tried to stop the negotiation by series of actions. Rhee wanted a agreement of mutual defence to be signed to assure its safety, only under this condition would he continue the peace negotiation. In neorelism aspect, the agreement of mutual defence or alliance would be a symbol to include south Korea in the US's structure, vital for South Korea to survive in the international anarchy. Chang took advantage of the situation and wrote to Eisenhower to support Rhee's proposal. These actions angered the US, for its concern in neorealism, the war had already created obstacles for Soviet Union to gather more power for its structure, over consuming in this particular war would be meaningless. Hence the US threatened to retreat from Korea directly and then reconsider its policy to Taiwan if the two leader continued their efforts to stop the peace negotiation [16].

Recieving such attitude, Taiwan could only choose to compromise. In the essence, US-Taiwan relationship was never a equal relation. The US could adjust it however it like to meet its own interest and Taiwan had no other option other than the US. As the only support for Taiwan, the US dominated their relations completely.

2.3 Different Thoughts in the Relation

Taiwan had tried to sign mutal defence agreement as the US approaching to the end of the Korean War. But the US had little interest in signing such agreement due to the concerns of its own benefit. However, as the war finally end, the strait crisis in 1954 resulted in Taiwan and the US signing *Sino-*

America Mutual Defence Treaty. The treaty did represent the relations of ‘military alliance’ for both sides, but it did not reflected that the two shared the same interest. Taiwan and the US had different views about the defence for outlying islets.

2.3.1 Signing Sino-America Mutual Defence Treaty

As mentioned, Taiwan feared for its position after the Korean War. The rejection of his plan to send troops to Korea marked the failure of the attempt to expand the war. The war was approaching to an end, and Taiwan tried Syngman Rhee’s method of persuading the US to sign mutual defence agreement. As analyzed by neorealism view, the agreement could ensure the unit’s position within the structure and benefit its security. In 1953, Vi Kyuin Koo was sent to deliver the proposal of mutual defence to the US. But the US administration did not agree to officially sign any defence treaty with Taiwan imminently. The attitude of the US can easily explained by neorealism, first was the treaty could bring negative impact to the peace negotiation of the Korean War which had already consumed the US strength and provided only limited benefit for the structure. The war did become a setback for Soviet Union’s efforts to gather more power for its structure, but the US only got half of Korea at a ‘high price’ and unable to gain more. Therefore it made sense that the US wanted to end the war imminently. Another reason, if use neorealism to analyse, was the more important elements in the structure such as the UK or France feeling unsatisfied with the US. Their interest in Indo-China region was not supported greatly by the US who concentrating its military force in the Korean War. And if the US were to sign defence agreement with Taiwan ahead of the UK and France, they would question their position in the structure which could lead the structure insufficient in confronting Soviet Union in Europe. The powers like the UK and France were the powers the US could not afford to lose.

But not signing the treaty did not imply that the US was giving up Taiwan. The strategy of the US remain unchanged and Taiwan was still a part of its Asia-Pacific perimeter. The situation once again changed as Chinese leader Mao saying to ‘liberate Taiwan’ and regarding not liberating Taiwan a political mistake [17]. The US treated it as a real threat, for the peace in Korea could spare enough CCP’s military force to attack Taiwan. In neorealism perspective, the US should still try stop Soviet camp gather more power for its structure and signing a defence treaty might stop the expansion without the need to have a real military conflict to consume the US’s strength. Eisenhower thought signing the treaty with Taiwan at this time might deter China from attacking Taiwan. But China was rather angered than deterred, it started shelling Jinmen, an outlying islet of Taiwan, as a punishment for the attempt to sign the treaty. Chang Kai-Shek took advantage of the event, blaming the US’s previous delay in signing the treaty had caused the shelling. Using neorealism view, the US was in an awkward situation, France suffered from defeat in Vietnam due to the lack of military support of the US previously had already caused questions and instability within the structure. And if at this time Taiwan fell into the control of socialist camp, the nations in the US’s structure would question the ability of the structure, wondering if the US’s structure could really ensure their survival. Under this pressure, the US and Taiwan signed *Sino-America Mutual Defence Treaty* in December 1954.

But the US and Chang shared a different view in defending the outlying islets. Chang strongly asked the US to defend the outlying islets such as Jinmen Mazu with him. He deployed a large portion of his military force on these islands, considering it the symbol of his determination of taking back mainland [18]. In his mind, Taiwan was only a temporary military session that would help him to take back mainland eventually. The US had a totally different understanding with Chang. The US signed the treaty only to ensure the safety of Taiwan island since it was in the US’s perimeter and the outlying islets hardly had any value for the US’s strategy.

The US are considering things in an neorealism way. Those outlying islets could not provide any power to the US’s structure so that it would be better if the US did not waste any strength on it. Also, China was already shelling Jinmen, if the US clarified to help Taiwan protecting these islands, the US may once again have war with China directly. Once a war started, Soviet Union may participate and lead to the hot war between the US and Soviet Union damaging the US’s national security. Or Soviet Union could took advantage of the war, keeping the US occupied and expand its structure

elsewhere. Either way was unacceptable for the US if all this price was paid only to defend these worthless islands. On the contrary, Chang Kai-Shek was more concerned about the 'sovereign' claims. He might share the idea a bit like Carl Schmitt's view about sovereign power. Behind the enemy and friend description, Schmitt thought that the sovereign power was essential and should not be violated regardless the reason. Chang here also valued very much about his sovereign claims and sent large portion of his troops to defend these islands regardless the practical concerns, risking the Taiwan island insufficient defence. His mind was obsessed with his sovereign claim, that was to take back mainland, and would not easily give in.

Chang's idea sure have great conflict with the US's idea and had put the US in a difficult situation. The US definitely would protect these islands for Chang risking all realism interest and concerns. But Eisenhower worry a direct rejection might push Chang to negotiate with CCP and compromise to join the mainland government and give out Taiwan [19], which was also an undesirable result in neorealism view as we analysed about losing Taiwan. The result was the US would help to defend the outlying islets if the president considered the situation was 'necessary'. And it was merely a psychological trick to deter Chinese attack. Eisenhower had clarified in the decision-making group that the US would not protect these islands, he only would not mention it in the public

3. Conclusion

Objectively, US-Taiwan relationship did alter from the edge of break back to forging allies due to the influence of the war. But in its essence, it was a relationship that fully dominated by the US. By the changes in the relationship during this period, the conclusion can be drawn that every change in the relations was based on the realism concern of the US. Taiwan was clearly having a different ultimate goal of taking back mainland. But the US rejected directly or indirectly to stop Taiwan's plan from ruining the US's interest. In neorealism aspects, the US only cared most about its national security and the structure which ensured it. Any action that damage could possibly its national security or to cause the instability of its structure was unacceptable. So US-Taiwan relations was led by the US's realism need and Taiwan would be completely a tool for America's strategy and could be easily abandoned or 'pick up'. In a word, the US's strategic concern is the dominating element in the changes in US-Taiwan relations.

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