

Australia's Foreign Policy towards China from the Perspective of the Multiple Stream Framework

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Abstract. The relationship between China and Australia has maintained a trend of fluctuating development for a long period since the establishment of diplomatic ties. However, around 2017, Australia gradually adopted negative policies towards China, and the relationship between the two countries cooled down rapidly, with no obvious easing trend. Based on the Multiple Stream Framework, this paper attempts to use the China5G case to analyze the factors contributing to Australia's negative foreign policy toward China. The paper argues that the definition of problems by the top governmental officials and the urgency of the problem mutually determine whether the final resolution is negative or positive toward a country; that the complexity of domestic political party structure and electoral politics imply the preference for national policy; and that the lead of public opinion, as well as the government's political intention to maintain the rule of legality, are the key factors affecting the policy orientation. This analysis aims to better understand the deep connotation of the relationship between China and Australia and provides a thinking path for improving relations between the two countries. It also refers to analyzing the attitudes towards China's rise from other countries in the Asia-Pacific region.

Keywords: Multiple Stream Framework; China5G; negative foreign policy.

1. Introduction

Since the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and Australia, the political and economic relations between the two countries have always shown a good predisposition for development. In the first *Foreign Policy White Paper* published by the Australian government in August 1997, China was assessed as one of the four most important countries in Australia's foreign relations (the rest being the United States, Japan, and Indonesia), and China's status in Australia's foreign relations was significantly improved, Sino-Australian economic and trade cooperation has developed as well. By 1995, China's real investment in Australia exceeded 1.6 billion US dollars, and Australia's investment in China was about 1 billion dollars, mutual investment agreement was more than 3.5 billion dollars at the same time, China became Australia's largest trading partner in 2007 and has held that position since 2009 till now [1]. In November 2014, China upgraded its relations with Australia to a comprehensive strategic partnership, and the two countries successfully signed a free trade agreement in June 2015. However, since 2016, China-Australia relations have begun to show a downward spiral, before and after 2017, the relationship between the two countries continued to decline, without any obvious easing signal. (Figure 1 for details).




Fig 1. The Score between Australia and China [2]

With frequent negative incidents, China-Australia Relations is in a difficult period since the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries. According to the above phenomena, this paper will focus on discussing the elements that affect Australia's change in its policy toward China.

The article holds the opinion that during the decision-making process, the positioning of issues by the top governmental officials and the degree of the problem urgency determine whether the final resolution is negative or positive toward a country; that the complexity of domestic political party structure and electoral politics imply the preference of national policy; and that the lead of public opinion during the policy output and the government's political intention to maintain the rule of legality are the key factors affecting the policy inclination. The innovation of this article is showcased in the theory--Multiple Stream Framework, by which the article elaborates on the complex reason why Australia adjusts its political preference toward China from initiative to negative. China-Australia relations have a great impact on the geopolitical trend of the Indo-Pacific region, this paper aims to have a better understanding of the deep connotation of China-Australia relations by sorting out and analyzing the characteristics of the development of China-Australia relations, to provide a thinking path for the improvement of China-Australia relations.

2. Literature Review

The current research on the changes in Sino-Australian bilateral relations since the end of the Cold War is mainly based on two perspectives. First, it studies the bilateral issues from the perspective of national interests, believing that Australia's political and economic interests determine the result of its diplomacy with China, and the government's strategic dependence on the United States does not represent the consistency of its foreign policy. Second, from the perspective of alliance pressure, it highlights the influence of the United States, the senior ally, on Australia's foreign policy towards China.

2.1. Sino-Australia Relations from the Perspective of National Interests

Existing studies believe that, based on the analysis of national interests, the Australian government breaking through the restrictions of the US-Australia alliance and actively attracting China through a series of diplomatic means lead to close ties between China and Australia. Australia's former Prime Minister John Howard said that "One of the great successes of Australia's foreign relations has been that we have been able to strengthen our long-standing relationship with the United States at the same time as continuing to build a close relationship with China." Through comparative historical analysis, Shannon R. Tow has explored the "diplomatic mode" by which the Whitlam, Hawke and Howard

governments maneuver to make America support the development of Sino-Australian relations, he argues that the officials are capable of negotiating a specific subsidized and co-operative policy with the United States within the alliance through certain diplomatic means (such as “information sharing”, “costly reassurance”); Michael Wesley finds that Australia spent the decades in post-millennium trying to build strong ties with China and the United States to eliminate the triangle, he attempts to conceptually analyze the dynamic trilateral relationship between the United States, China and Australia as a foreign policy strategy, suggesting that whether Washington or Beijing puts pressure on the Australian government, it is likely to make Australia take defensive measures; Hugh White, an official of the Australian government, also explicitly mentioned in an interview that “for the time being, consideration of alliance may be secondary in the formation process of Australia's China policy.” Hugh White, an official of the Australian government, also explicitly mentioned in an interview that the consideration of alliance may be secondary in the formation of Australia's China policy [3-4].

Meanwhile, safeguarding national security is the core point of national interests. Richard Ullman, an American scholar, included environmental degradation, natural disasters, human poverty, and other problems in the security field for analysis in his book “Non-traditional security”. Then, Barry Buzan proposed that national security should involve social security, economic security, environmental security, and personal security. After the end of the Cold War, more and more scholars have paid attention to the impact of non-traditional security issues on inter-state relations. For example, Zha Daojiong of Tsinghua University analyzed the negative impact of the deterioration of Sino-US relations from the perspective of bilateral cooperation in the field of non-traditional security [5].

2.2. Sino-Australian Relations from the Perspective of Alliance Pressure

As the game between China and the United States intensifies and the United States gradually puts pressure on its Allies, the multilateral relations within US-allies, between China and US-allies as well as among the United States, US-allies and China have become one of the important topics that scholars of various countries pay close attention to. In his book “*Power and Interdependence*”, Robert Keohan elaborated on the complex interdependence between the United States and Australia, and argued that Australian national policies were more realistic-- the reliance on security as the core issue which manifested as a loss of bargaining power and autonomy in strategic decision-making while rely on the strong military power of America; Chinese scholars Cao Wei and Yang Yuan on the first try to use qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) to explain the relative changes between US Allies and Sino-US relations; Using the AUKUS partnership as a case study, Jamal Barnes and Samuel M. Makinda argue that China has come to see the “Indo-Pacific” concept as a tool to contain its rise, Australia's unconditional adherence to the US policy towards China has exacerbated the deterioration of Sino-Australian relations; Li Mingyue and Gu Yuanyuan used regression quantitative analysis to discuss the policy preferences of US Allies between security Allies (US) and technology partners(China) from the perspective of technology competition, that is, the power gap and political identity are important factors influencing the policy choice of US Allies [6-7].

2.3. Shortcomings of Existing Research

First, National interest and alliance pressure reflect the phased characteristics of China-Australia relations, however, once the relationship between the two countries takes a turn, the old perspective of analysis will lose its time value; Second, most studies on the bilateral issues between China and Australia take the academic achievements of higher levels as the derivation formula, to “one-size-fits-all”, with all the factors affecting the change of China-Australia relations.

In this paper, therefore, the Multiple Stream Theory (MSF) is chosen as a new theoretical analysis model to ensure the timeliness of the research, and the case study is to focus on solving a key problem, avoiding generalities, and forming a general theoretical explanation.

3. Method and Organization

This article mainly adopts the case analysis method to carry on the research. This paper takes Australia's policy restrictions on China's network communication technologies as a case study to learn the specific reasons for the formation of the policy. Based on case studies, the paper discusses the general conclusions of Australia's political choice toward China, thus it can be derived to speculate the possible similarities between other countries in the Asia-Pacific region and Australia in formulating relevant foreign policies against China.

This article is divided into five parts. The second part elaborates on the theory of the *Multiple Stream Framework* in detail; the third part objectively introduces the case in this article and analyzes the case based on the theoretical foundation; the fourth part put forward the implication of research and discusses the suggestions in light of case study; and the last part of the article is going to conclude.

4. Multiple Streams Framework

In 1972, James March, Michael, D. Cohen, and Johan.G. Olsen has proposed "*The garbage can theory*", which holds that problems, countermeasures, and decision-makers decide policy-making, and people will seize the opportunity to implement the solutions they have already chosen whenever or wherever the problems come out and finally affect the process of decision-making or the result. *The garbage can theory* introduces that the organization has the characteristics of blurry goals, fuzzy technical methods, and unclear change

To make up for the shortcoming of "*The garbage can theory*", in 1984, John W. Kingdon published his book *Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies*, which primarily referred to the new theory-- Multiple Streams Framework (MSF). Kingdon raised his question in this book which is why certain issues are valued by decision-makers and proposed in the agenda while others are ignored. Based on this question, Kingdon put forward that the whole policy-making system can be seen as a confluence of three streams--problem stream, policy stream, and political stream (they are usually operating independently of each other and in no particular order) [8].

Problem Stream focuses on the definition of the problems, it is about how problems are perceived and how objective conditions are defined as problems. When people realize that certain actions should be taken to resolve the situations, those real situations are what Kingdon thought the problems. Kingdon has introduced that changes in system indicators, focal events (crises and disasters), evaluation feedback of existing policies, and budget constraints are the main approach to cognitive the existing problems; the indicator can act to measure the variation of far things on the ground happened in society, and then bring themselves into the notice of governments; focal events give rise to the public opinions and attention of the masses; evaluation feedback of existing policies operates to bring some issues to the attention of decision-makers; budgets play an important part of government activities, with which projects, organizations, and vocational developments thrive in a country.

Policy Stream is usually in the form of regulations, addresses, documents, and conversations, it is the process of preparing and competing while decision-makers decide on a policy scheme. Through the collision and combination of various policy proposals, the final schemes would be further improved and developed into more feasible ways, such as their technical feasibility, their suitability with the dominant values, and their public acceptance.

Political Stream mainly refers to how politic influence political solutions, it involves the considerations of Nationalism, Public Opinion, Electoral Politics, and Interest groups. If a potential agenda project is in line with the current national character, with the support of interest groups, and with the direction of legislation and administration, it can have an advantage over other projects. Policy Window, Policy Activists, and Spillover phenomenon act as moderator variables to influence policy agenda. Against the background of the Value, Belief, Culture, and Constitutional Structure, Policy Windows open when Problem, Policy, and Political streams converge, Policy Windows are open for Alternatives and Agendas during the decision-making. Those Policy Activists are important

advocators who affect the process of bringing policy issues to the agenda, they are willing to spend a large amount of money, time, celebrity, and efforts to make proposals and come them with real problems. The spillover is a phenomenon that the appearance of an issue in one area on the government agenda also determines the subsequent importance of a similar issue in another area on the policy agenda. According to Kindon’s introduction to the theory of MSF, this paper integrates the theoretical framework (Figure 2 for detail)




Fig 2. Multiple Stream Framework[8]

5. Case Study

5.1. Network Security with 5G

In 2017, the Turnbull government issued a white paper on Australian foreign policy, in which it repeatedly called for the leadership of the United States in the Indo-Pacific region, and even worried that the rise of China would affect the primacy of the United States in the world. Such concern has shifted to non-traditional security issues while paying little attention to military issues. The white paper also makes it clear that “it is very unlikely that another country will attack Australia before 2035.” Although the international system is undergoing profound changes, Australia can still be recognized as one of the safest countries in the world [9]. While the risk of military threat to Australia is very low, there has been significant concern about the potential cybersecurity threats posed by new technological innovations, exacerbated by the expansion of the 5G market in China.

Although the Australian government realizes the importance of technological upgrades in promoting economic development, the emergence of wireless networks and the rapid flow of technical elements around the world make Australia maintain a high level of attention to network security. Officially, its authorities have repeatedly emphasized their notice to cyber security, former Australian Prime Minister Scott. Mr. Morrison asserted that cyber security is one of three fields that would help strengthen the country's resilience, the annual report released by the Australian Security Intelligence Organization (ASIO) reiterated that cyber security has been extending the geopolitical battlefield and threatened the national sovereign security [10-11]. In July 2021, the Australian government publicly accused China's Ministry of State Security of exploiting the Microsoft Exchange vulnerability, explicitly pointing out that some countries may use cyber actions to challenge the sovereignty of other countries [12]. In the “*Cyber Security Strategy*” (hereinafter referred to as the “Strategy”) issued by the Australian Department of Home Affairs on 5 August 2020, four elements that threaten national cyber security are mentioned: External interference and espionage, the security of critical infrastructure, the “weaponization” of social media, the spread of terrorism, and cyber

criminals [13]. The main arguments for Australia's restrictions on science and technology services to China are to prevent external interference activities and maintain the security of critical facilities.

In June 2018, the Australian Parliament passed two bills to implement the national security concerns of “opposing foreign interference” at the legislative level—*“Espionage and Foreign Interference”* and *“Foreign Influence Transparency Program”*. Since 2016, on the grounds of national security, the Australian government has continuously banned Huawei and ZTE from participating in the construction of 5G network facilities in Australia. It is worth noting that the government's sanctions on China's 5G technology are not based on specific official policy documents, and are in the form of a potential restrictive act. In August 2018, Australia's Minister for Communications and the Arts, Senator Mitch Fifield, announced that he was concerned that “suppliers” involvement may be subject to extrajudicial instructions from foreign governments to violate Australian law; in the same year, the Australian government issued *“Government Provides 5G Security Guidance To Australian Carriers”* and pointed out that foreign equipment suppliers may approve actions that do not comply with Australian legal instructions, thereof Australian operators cannot utterly guarantee the security of 5G [14]. Although the two statements did not mention a specific country, soon after, Australia stepped in to restrict Huawei and ZTE's 5G services, implicating that China's 5G technology is at the top of Australia's list of potential threats.

Based on the background described above, this article emphasizes the Restriction Policy on China 5G to analyze the practical reason why Australia decide the negative policy towards China.

5.2. Case Analysis

5.2.1 Problem stream

According to MSF, Problem Stream focuses on the definition of the problems, it is about how problems are perceived and how objective conditions are defined as problems. The attention to network security from the Australian Government started when the authorities realized the increasing number of espionages and information interception.

According to the “Strategy”, Australia has been subjected to cyberattacks since 2019-2020, among which the websites of the Australian Federal Government and state and local governments have been at the top two (Figure 3 for details).




Fig 3. Cyberattacks on Australia from July 2021- June 2022 [12]

Cyber threats to Australia's critical infrastructures are a persistent problem, with the Australian Cyber Security Centre (ACSC) defining about a quarter of the cyber security incidents it responded to as affecting critical infrastructure in the financial year 2020 to 2021 [cyber.gov.au]. Continued disruptions in a certain part of the ecosystem of critical infrastructure, which includes physical facilities that provide essential services, communications networks, and information and operational

technologies, can have knock-on effects elsewhere in the economy, and it remains possible for state actors and cybercriminals to inflict similar damage by targeting critical infrastructure entities in Australia [15].

With the development of 5G markets and the Politicization of technology, normal geopolitics has gradually taken place of technology politics, the conflict between China and America on the 5G rise to a focal event, which leads US allies to come to the notice of the protection of 5G technology and its relative infrastructure. Now Chinese telecom giant Huawei, in the field of 5G has at the forefront of the world.

As Australia is undergoing surging security incidents and wooed by the United States with its technology policy, the Australian government has attached great importance to China's 5G technology, his subsequent Cybersecurity Review also shows that Australia began taking action on 5G technology. The threat of China's 5G technology to Australia's network security has been defined as a problem by Australia from the perspective of MSF.

5.2.2 Policy stream and political stream

The decision behind Australia's 5G policy towards China virtually reflects the integration of Policy Stream and Political Stream, it is unclear to separate the factors of the Political Stream and Policy Stream. According to the Multiple Stream Framework, Political Stream mainly refers to how politics influences political solutions. If a potential agenda item is consistent with current national characteristics, supported by interest groups and consistent with the direction of the legislature or executive, the project will take precedence over other projects; Policy Stream is usually in the form of regulations, addresses, documents, and conversations, it is the process of preparing and competing while decision-makers decide a policy scheme. Political Stream tends to be abstract and macro while Policy flows toward specifics and details

This article holds the opinion that Australia's constitutional structure, political culture, and electoral politics are the prerequisites that determine the final policy formation while the personal political tendency of the leader of the Liberal Party—pro-America and far China, escalates the public discontent which stands in line with their authorities. Australia is a constitutional monarchy with a parliamentary system, and the parliament has the unique power to decide domestic and foreign policies. The Australian Federal Constitution stipulates that the Australian Parliament is composed of the House of Representatives and the Senate. The House of Representatives is composed of members from 151 electoral states across the country, while the Senate is composed of 76 members with 12 seats for each state and 2 seats for the Northern Territory and the Capital Territory. The Liberal-National Coalition (hereinafter referred to as the “Liberal Party”), National Party, and the Labor Party are the three main Parties in the country [16].

From a macro point of view, Australia's foreign policy is affected by the three mainstream political parties, the Liberal Party, the National Party, and the Labor Party, whose foreign policies they committed to are of great importance and embody distinct political traditions and decision-making preferences. Therefore, both parties wouldn't take the same interests when it comes to China's 5G restrictions. From the micro point of view, different factions within the Liberal Party and Labor Party are also competitive in the formulation of foreign policies. In conclusion, the outcome of Australia's 5G policy towards China is determined by the interaction through Parliament between the Liberal Party and Labor Party, the interaction within the party, and other smaller parties seeking interests in the preparation and competition of policy making.

Compared with the other two parties, Labor Party has historically shown more independence in foreign policy, focusing on Australia's relations with Asian countries and advocating multilateralism and internationalism in foreign policy [17]. For example, on behalf of the Labor Party, Edward Gough Whitlam came to power in 1972, changed the long-lasting anti-China policy of the Coalition Party, recognized the People's Republic of China, and formally established diplomatic relations with China, then Bob Hawke launched the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation meeting (which later became APEC), established an international platform for consultation and joint contribution with other Asia-

Pacific countries, after defeating the Coalition Party, Kevin Rudd signed the *Kyoto Protocol*, which the Howard government had always opposed.

Australia's general election is shaping up to be a close race between the Labor Party and the Liberal Party, so gaining the support from Conservatives and Independent Party members become the electoral target of the Liberal Party in the competition. During the Turnbull and Morrison periods, Australia accommodated the Conservative Party's propositions on China in its policy decisions and has shown an increasingly assertive nationalist mood in its China policy [18]. When Morrison, as the leader of the Liberal Party, took office after defeating the Labor Party in the general election, Australia's 5G policy towards China gradually showed a tendency of unilateralism. During his tenure, government officials displayed or implied a deep distrust of the Chinese government. Mr. Morrison has claimed that cyber security is one of the important fields that would help strengthen the country's resilience, the annual report released by the Australian Security Intelligence Organization (ASIO) reiterated that cyber security has been extending the geopolitical battlefield and threatened the national sovereign security [11, 19]. In August 2018, Australia's Minister for Communications and the Arts, Senator Mitch Fifield, declared his concern about the "involvement of vendors who are likely to be subject to extrajudicial directions from a foreign government that conflict with Australian law" [20]. In the same year, Australian authorities issued three sets of laws the "*Security of Critical Infrastructure Act 2018*", and the "*Government Provides 5G Security Guidance to Australian Carriers*", which completely restricted Huawei's domestic operations in Australia. It is worth noting that during the Morrison government, Australia's attitude towards China's 5G was consistent between the official and the folk, plus, within the Liberal Party, there's a relatively accordant opinion about 5G—precaution and restriction. Therefore, the two bills were introduced smoothly after the national network security review [21-22].

The negative public and official attitude towards China in Australia emerged as early as 2017, and it was almost shown by social media. This year, the Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC) produced a program called "*Power and Influence: The Hard Edge of China's Soft Power*", interpreting Chinese students in Australia as a political group that helps the Chinese government spread its influence in Australia [23]. The outbreak of COVID-19 directly depressed public mood in Australia, then Morrison made an international appeal for an independent investigation into the head of the coronavirus, in the following months, Australia attacked China over Hong Kong, Taiwan, and the South China Sea Question, further cause the public discontent about China.

Liberal Party's success in the general election (won in the competition) is the first step in changing Australia's policy towards China, as well as the prerequisite for the Liberal Party to legally obtain the right to make policy against the other mainstream parties in Australia. Firstly, the 5G Restriction is in line with the political interests of the Liberal Party; secondly, the introduction of Australia's 5G policy to Huawei is consistent with the popular values of the mass towards China during the Liberal period; thirdly, in order to accumulate the support from the public in the election and obtain the legitimacy for executive, the Australian authorities wouldn't curb the escalation of the anti-China mood, on the contrary, their decisions will conform to the mainstream public opinions to stay in power.

5.2.3 Policy window and policy activists

Australia's restrictions on China's 5G technology are the result of the convergence of the three Streams and the opening of the Policy Window. Australia's diplomatic decision-making mode is mainly a small group mode with the prime minister being the center. Officials of the administrative department have the power to make suggestions in the decision-making process. However, such a decision-making mode has drawbacks, namely, the prime minister puts personal preference over rational discussion during decision-making, and excludes many responsible officials and political activists from the decision-making process [24]. Thus, those groups of people have the least affection for Australian foreign policy. In 2017, as the image of China gradually deteriorated in the Australian media and public, Turnbull, the leader of the Liberal Party, formally said in the Federal Parliament that he would take seriously the increasing number of reports of "Chinese infiltration" and "Chinese threat", and decided to promote the "*anti-foreign intervention Act*" and "*anti-espionage legislation*".

Subsequently, with the emergence of the 5G policy during the Morrison period, the anti-foreign interference and the anti-Espionage question occupy an important position on the policy agenda as well.

6. Discussion

6.1. Implication

As Australia is less concerned about military issues while the emergence of wireless networks has shifted its attention on national security from traditional military security to network security. In recent years, the number of cyberattacks on federal and local governments has increased sharply, which makes Australia strengthen prevention on technical equipment and network infrastructure construction. The sanctions against Chinese tech companies are a continuing escalation of this precautionary measure. It is worth paying attention that, in Australia, government officials and civilians have drawn a togetherness opposing the 5G markets opened for China, which implies an ideological confrontation. In contrast, to quickly keep up with the pace of international 5G development and make up for technological losses due to restrictions on 5G services from China, Australia still stands in line with the U.S. side when it comes to international cooperation in 5G or even 6G. After restricting 5G services from HUAWEI and ZTE, Australia chose Ericsson, Nokia, and others as its 5G equipment suppliers. Meanwhile, the United States, India, Japan, and Australia are jointly developing 5G technology based on Quad. Together with America, since 2015, the Quad has provided more than \$48 billion in government-backed financing for infrastructure for the region in Indo-pacific, representing thousands of projects across more than 30 countries, from rural development to renewable energy [25]. In late June 2020, Australia also announced that it would spend 1.35 billion AUD (6.8 billion RMB) to hire 500 additional technicians for the country's digital security sector to ensure the security of the country's network.

Australia's deepening cooperation with the United States and its Allies on 5G and 6G is further distancing itself from Beijing, and this negative trend of decoupling from China is gradually spilling over into economic and trade cooperation between the two countries. The deterioration of the political relations plunged the bilateral relations into a situation of “political and economic cooling”. According to the statistics of the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, from 2020 to 2022, the import and export of Australian commodities to China showed a rapid decline trend, and this pattern did not ease until September 2022. Second, China's economic sanctions on some Australian exports (mainly seafood, meat, and wine) have resulted in a 5.2% negative growth in gross merchandise exchange from January to August 2022 [26]. The overall situation of Australia's economic dependence on China and political dependence on the United States stays unchanged, therefore, while deciding its foreign policy, Australia's role as an ally of the United States will be caught in a dilemma during the game between China and the United States.

6.2. Prospect

With Anthony Albanese's election victory over Morrison, there are no obvious signs that the Australian government would change the previous restrictive policies towards China. But after the two heads of state met in Bali for the first time since 2016, there is a possibility of detente between the two countries. Relations between the two countries have also achieved breakthroughs in trade during this period--Australia has not completely decoupled from China in the face of a growing alliance, but traded iron ore in RMB, bypassing the dollar.

However, the two countries are still unable to reach an accommodation on the issue of Internet Communication Technology in the short term, and Australia will keep considering the threat of China's rise to its national security in all aspects of its policymaking. Some scholars even believe that the key to Australia, Japan, and Korea's responses to the United States' Huawei ban alliance has nothing to do with the alliance itself, but with their different assessments of security risks related to Chinese technology [27].

The current international situation is faced with many uncertainties. Even though Australia still has many policy restrictions on China, China's will to support globalization and trade liberalization makes it possible for the two countries to cooperate.

7. Conclusion

With the development of 5G markets and the Politicization of technology, normal geopolitics has gradually taken the place of technology politics, the conflict between China and America on the 5G has risen to a focal event, which leads US allies to come to notice the protection of 5G technology and its relative infrastructure. During the decision-making process, the positioning of issues by the top governmental officials and the degree of the problem urgency determine whether the final resolution is negative or positive toward a country; the complexity of domestic political party structure and electoral politics implies the preference of national policy; and that the lead of public opinion during the policy output and the government's political intention to maintain the rule of legality are the key factors affecting the policy inclination. Unlike Japan and South Korea, Australia's rejection of 5G technology has been more euphemistic and implicit in specific policies.

As one of the important countries in the Asia-Pacific region, Australia's preference for China policy is similar to the attitude of other countries in the region towards the "rise of China". Considering the integral national interests, in order to avoid excessive deterioration of relations with China, some countries may consider taking indirect restrictive measures to show their doubts about China and support the United States. Ideological confrontation plays an imperceptible role in the process of national policy-making towards China, such confrontation is inevitable and may affect public sentiment on a larger scale with the emergence of more negative events, thus leading to the polarization of China policy.

The deterioration of relations between China and Australia has had a huge impact on both countries. Their cooperations should seek common ground while reserving differences and resolve differences through direct official exchanges and communications, rather than more subjective interpretations of each other's political signals.

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