On Empty Names: Russell’s Theory and His Rivals
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.54097/ehss.v8i.4288Keywords:
Logic; Philosophy of Language; Definite Descriptions; Bertrand Russell.Abstract
Talking about non-existent beings is a great and important constituting part in ordinary languages. However, it is not as easy to make a judgement about whether a statement involving non-existent terms is true or false. Many philosophers gave their own solutions on this issue and one of the most famous theories was brought up by Russell. This article discusses several of the most prominent theories of non-existent things, centered on Russell's theory of definite descriptions. Some of vital objections to Russell would also be demonstrated. The choice of solution is very significant since it could affect not only analysis of ordinary languages but also a variety of other issues.
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