Impact of Strengthened Financial Regulation on Commercial Banks' Asset Risk: A Case Study of China CITIC Bank

Qi Li

doi:10.54097/082h2f78

Authors

Qi Li

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.54097/082h2f78

Keywords:

Financial regulation; Commercial banks; Asset management; Finance.

Abstract

As an integral part of China's economic system, the financial market plays a crucial role. In recent years, China has attached increasing importance to the financial market and intensified efforts to improve financial regulatory systems, with a particular emphasis on banking supervision. Banks, as vital components of the financial market, have a significant impact on the stability of the entire financial system due to their level of risk exposure. In order to better explore the changes in bank asset risk under the trend of strengthened regulation, this paper conducts a case study on China CITIC Bank. The case of China CITIC Bank being penalized serves to illustrate the inherent risks in the assets of China CITIC Bank. Furthermore, through this penalty, China has sent a signal to financial institutions to strengthen regulation, thereby compelling banking institutions to enhance their risk management capabilities. Under the trend of intensified regulation, it can be inferred that central oversight of banking institutions will gradually strengthen.

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