Research on Decision-Making Behavior of Oligopolistic Competitive Enterprises under Initial Unit Carbon Emission Level

Chunhua Qiao

doi:10.54097/2s4ysm25

Authors

Chunhua Qiao

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.54097/2s4ysm25

Keywords:

Carbon Quota Allocation, Carbon Trading, Carbon Emissions, Carbon Emission Reduction, Oligopolistic Competition

Abstract

This article studies the decision-making behavior of various oligopolistic competitive enterprises based on the initial unit carbon emission level by establishing a game model. Research has shown that under this allocation mechanism, the output of low emission enterprises is always greater than that of high emission enterprises, but their emission reduction level is always lower than that of high emission enterprises. Secondly, the profits of enterprises are closely related to the potential market demand. When the potential market demand is strong, the profits of low emission enterprises are greater than those of high emission enterprises; When the potential demand in the market is low, high emission enterprises can obtain higher profits from lower emission enterprises.

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