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Cross-Level Coordination and Precise Resource Downward Allocation: The Practice Logic of "Government-Led, Town-Village Linkage" Assistance Mechanism in Rural Revitalization

-- A case study of Qingyuan City

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Abstract: In the macro context of comprehensively promoting rural revitalization and the in-depth implementation of the "High-quality Development Project for Hundreds of Counties, Thousands of Towns, and Tens of Thousands of Villages" (hereinafter referred to as the "Hundreds, Thousands, and Ten Thousands Project") in Guangdong Province, underdeveloped areas face a dual dilemma: the "fragmentation" of external assistance resources and the "weakness" of internal grassroots undertaking capabilities. How to break the departmental segmentation of the bureaucratic system and achieve the precise transformation of policy resources from "suspension" to "implementation" is a core issue in the modernization of county-level governance. The "Government-Led, Town-Village Linkage" assistance model explored by Qingyuan City provides a highly explanatory observation sample for understanding cross-level collaborative governance and precise resource downward allocation. Based on the theoretical perspectives of holistic governance and organizational sociology, this study constructs an analytical framework of "Structure-Process-Mechanism" to deeply analyze the operational mechanism of this model. The study finds that the model reshapes the power structure of resource allocation through the vertical administrative coordination of "Government Leadership," integrating dispersed departmental resources into "policy potential energy." Simultaneously, through the horizontal organizational reshaping of "Town-Village Linkage," it constructs an interest community of "Strong Towns Leading Villages," activating the endogenous undertaking carriers at the grassroots level. Under the political logic of Party building guidance, these two aspects form a closed-loop practice logic of "Administrative Empowerment-Organizational Absorption-Interest Linkage," effectively resolving the "last mile" obstruction in resource implementation and realizing an endogenous transformation from "blood-transfusion" assistance to "hematopoietic" development. The article further points out that to establish the long-term effectiveness of this mechanism, it is necessary to be wary of "mobilization fatigue" under administrative dominance, promote the shift of governance focus from one-way administrative intervention to two-way pluralistic co-governance, and deepen the market-oriented reform of the collective economy of towns and villages to achieve the sustainable release of assistance efficiency.

Keywords: Cross-Level Coordination, Resource Downward Allocation, Government-Led, Town-Village Linkage, "Hundreds, Thousands, and Ten Thousands Project", Rural Revitalization, Qingyuan Experience.

1. Problem Statement and Research Background

1.1. The Dilemma of "Resource Downward Allocation" in Rural Revitalization

Entering the new era, the focus of China's work on agriculture, rural areas, and farmers ("Three Rural Issues") has historically shifted towards comprehensively promoting rural revitalization. As an important part of Chinese modernization, rural revitalization requires not only the continuous input of national fiscal resources but also institutional mechanism innovation to ensure that these resources can be accurately and efficiently transformed into the development momentum of rural areas. As the vanguard of reform and opening up, although Guangdong Province has ranked first in the country in terms of economic aggregate for many years, the problems of unbalanced regional development and prominent urban-rural dual structure remain severe. In particular, Qingyuan City, located in the ecological development area of Northern Guangdong, faces realistic challenges such as weak county economic strength, weak town functions in linking cities and driving villages, and the hollowing out of village-level collective economies.

To solve this structural problem, the Guangdong Provincial Party Committee implemented the "High-quality Development Project for Hundreds of Counties, Thousands of Towns, and Tens of Thousands of Villages" (the "Hundreds, Thousands, and Ten Thousands Project"), aiming to build a new pattern of coordinated urban-rural regional development by strengthening counties, revitalizing towns, and enriching villages. Under this strategic deployment, a large number of policies, funds, talents, and other assistance resources began to sink into the Northern Guangdong region. However, existing academic research and grassroots practices indicate that resource downward allocation is not an automatically effective linear process. Under the traditional bureaucratic system, resource downward allocation often faces the risks of

"institutional exclusion" and "implementation dissipation" [1].

Specifically, this dilemma is mainly reflected in two dimensions: First, in the **vertical dimension**, constrained by the "fragmentation" administrative system, assistance resources from higher-level governments are often scattered among more than a dozen functional departments such as agriculture, forestry, water conservancy, transportation, and culture and tourism. This presents a "fragmented" characteristic, causing grassroots levels to face governance overload described as "thousands of threads above, one needle below," making it difficult to form a resultant force. Second, in the **horizontal dimension**, town and village grassroots organizations, as the main bodies undertaking resources, often fail to "catch and use" resources well due to their low degree of organization, lack of talent, and weak operational capabilities. This results in a large number of resources remaining only at the surface level of infrastructure construction, failing to penetrate the texture of industrial development, and even leading to the phenomenon of resources "suspending" above rural society [2].

1.2. Practical Exploration and Research Significance of the "Qingyuan Model"

In response to the aforementioned pain points, Qingyuan City, in the process of promoting the "Hundreds, Thousands, and Ten Thousands Project," based on its positioning as a major agricultural city in the province and a pilot area for integrated urban-rural development, explored and implemented a new assistance model of "Government-Led, Town-Village Linkage." This model attempts to build a vertically consistent and horizontally linked governance system by strengthening the government's top-level design and coordination capabilities while reshaping the collaborative relationship between the town and village levels. Its core characteristics are: Vertically, through the "Top Leader" project of the Party and government and the operation of special task forces, it breaks down departmental barriers to achieve "packaged" resource downward allocation; Horizontally, by strengthening town nodes and establishing new business entities such as "Strong Town and Wealthy Village Companies," it incorporates village-level organizations into a unified industrial chain, solving the problem of weak power in single-village operations.

This model is not only a local practice innovation for Qingyuan City to implement the provincial "Hundreds, Thousands, and Ten Thousands Project" but also provides a vivid case for the academic community to reflect on cross-level collaborative governance. So, how does this model operate? Through what mechanisms does it overcome the inertial resistance of the bureaucratic system? What is the practice logic behind it? What challenges does it face in the process of transforming from administrative dominance to market endogeneity? Academic responses to these questions will not only help summarize rural revitalization experiences with Guangdong characteristics but also provide theoretical references for county-level governance reforms in similar underdeveloped areas across the country.

2. Literature Review and Analytical Framework

2.1. Resource Downward Allocation and the Risk of Involution in Rural Governance

"Resource Downward Allocation" is an important orientation of the reform of the national governance system in recent years. The "Project System" theory proposed by scholars like Zhou Feizhou points out that the state transports resources to the grassroots through special funds and project packaging, intending to bypass the interception of intermediate levels and improve resource use efficiency [3]. However, research by He Xuefeng and others found that when huge resources are intensively input into organized but loose rural societies, it often triggers "involutionary" consequences: On the one hand, grassroots cadres have to spend their energy on complex account preparation and inspection reception to cope with strict assessment indicators from superiors, leading to the proliferation of formalism; on the other hand, villages lacking endogenous hematopoietic capacity are prone to developing a dependency psychology of "waiting, relying, and demanding." Once external assistance is withdrawn, development stagnates. This dilemma of "input-type development" is essentially a mismatch between external administrative forces and internal social foundations [4].

2.2. Holistic Governance and Cross-Level Coordination

To overcome the drawbacks of "fragmented" governance, Holistic Governance theory emerged. This theory advocates coordination and integration between governance levels, functions, and public and private sectors, emphasizing solving complex social problems through information sharing and collaborative action. Under China's administrative system, cross-level coordination mainly solves the problem of "Tiao-Kuai relations" (vertical functional lines vs. horizontal territorial blocks). Scholars like Chen Wen point out that rural revitalization needs to build an interactive mechanism of "City-County-Town" three-level governments, reorganizing dispersed administrative powers through high-level promotion and task force mechanisms to adapt to the comprehensive needs of rural development [5]. However, existing research focuses more on vertical integration within the government and pays insufficient attention to how to achieve horizontal linkage of "Government-Market-Society," especially the collaborative mechanism between towns and villages.

2.3. Organizational Reshaping and Interest Linkage

With the evolution of the "Town Administration and Village Governance" pattern, the role of town governments in rural governance has become increasingly prominent. Scholars like Zheng Yongnian emphasize that towns are key nodes connecting cities and villages, and their coordination functions must be strengthened to become the "engine" of rural revitalization [6]. At the same time, to activate the agency of village collectives, a close interest linkage mechanism must be established. Luo Biliang points out that simple administrative orders are difficult to maintain long-term cooperation. Only through property rights system reform and market-based allocation of factors, allowing towns and villages to form a community of "risk-sharing and benefit-sharing" in the industrial chain, can endogenous power be truly stimulated [7].

2.4. Analytical Framework: "Structure-Process-Mechanism"

Based on the above theoretical review, this paper argues that the essence of the "Government-Led, Town-Village

Linkage" model is a systemic change involving power structure adjustment, governance process reshaping, and power mechanism transformation. Therefore, this study constructs an analytical framework of "Structure-Process-Mechanism":

1) Structural Dimension: Analyze how "Government Leadership" reshapes the vertical administrative power structure through high-level promotion and organizational architecture adjustment, breaking departmentalism and providing institutional guarantees for resource integration.

2) Process Dimension: Examine how the town and village levels interact and collaborate in the specific implementation of assistance projects, industrial cultivation, and public service provision under "Town-Village Linkage," revealing the micro-processes of resource implementation.

3) Mechanism Dimension: Distill the Party building guidance mechanism, interest linkage mechanism, and mobilization and absorption mechanism running through it, revealing the deep logic of the effective operation of this model.

3. Vertical Coordination: Power Structure Reshaping and Resource Aggregation under "Government Leadership"

In Qingyuan City's practice, "Government Leadership" is not a simple issuance of administrative orders but a complex resource integration action based on "high-level promotion." Facing the reality that rural revitalization involves a wide range of areas, scattered funds, and solidified departmental interests, Qingyuan City has strengthened the government's "meta-governance" role in assistance work by reconstructing the organizational system and resource allocation methods.

3.1. Organizational Reconstruction under High-Level Promotion: Breaking "Departmental Segmentation"

Traditional assistance models often exhibit "departmentalization" characteristics: the Agricultural Bureau manages agricultural production, the Housing and Construction Bureau manages village appearance, and the Cultural and Tourism Bureau manages rural tourism. The lack of effective communication between departments often leads to awkward situations where grassroots levels "build roads without industries" or "have industries without supporting facilities" when undertaking projects.

To solve this problem, Qingyuan City first "upgraded" its organizational structure. Relying on the "Hundreds, Thousands, and Ten Thousands Project" command system, a leading group headed by the Municipal Party Secretary and the Mayor as "Dual Leaders" was established, with several special task forces for industrial development, urban construction, and rural revitalization. This high-specification leadership system elevates rural revitalization from a general departmental function to the central work of the entire city, forcibly breaking the "invisible walls" between departments through the injection of political potential energy.

Specifically, the government led the implementation of "One Map for Planning." At the municipal level, departments such as Development and Reform, Natural Resources, and Ecological Environment were coordinated to compile special plans for high-quality development of counties, towns, and villages, coordinating industrial layout, infrastructure construction, and public service supporting facilities across the entire region. For example, in the ecological functional area of northern Qingyuan, the government halted scattered and inefficient small hydropower and small mining projects and uniformly planned a cross-town ecological tourism demonstration belt. This cross-departmental and cross-regional top-level design can only be achieved under the strong intervention of "Government Leadership," effectively avoiding the "Tragedy of the Commons" where towns and villages fight their own battles and engage in low-level redundant construction.

3.2. Resource Packaging and Precise Allocation: Overcoming "Sprinkling Pepper"

In the use of fiscal funds, the core task of "Government Leadership" is to solve the problems of "where the money comes from" and "how the money is spent." For a long time, the management of agriculture-related funds has suffered from being "fragmented, scattered, and small," resulting in low efficiency of fund use.

Qingyuan City explored and established a long-term mechanism for the coordination and integration of agriculture-related funds, adhering to the principle that "funds follow projects, and projects follow planning." The Municipal Finance Bureau took the lead in "bundling" special funds scattered across various lines and established a special fund pool for the "Hundreds, Thousands, and Ten Thousands Project." This change in resource allocation allows assistance forces to concentrate firepower on key areas.

For example, in the process of building the "Qingyuan Chicken" multi-billion-level industrial cluster, the government did not distribute funds equally to every farmer but concentrated investment in public links such as the breeding system, cold chain logistics centers, and brand marketing promotion. The high-standard modern agricultural industrial park built under government leadership not only solved the problem of infrastructure investment that individual farmers could not afford but also exerted the leverage effect of fiscal funds by introducing financial living water (such as "Rural Revitalization Loans"). This resource allocation logic of "concentrating forces to accomplish major tasks" greatly improved the marginal benefits of assistance resources [8].

3.3. Administrative Empowerment and Decentralization: Solving "Small Power, Great Responsibility"

"Government Leadership" implies not only the concentration of power but also empowerment to the grassroots. For a long time, town governments have been at the periphery of administrative power, facing the governance dilemma of "seeing but not being able to manage," leading to a lack of leverage when promoting project implementation.

Combining with the reform of the township and sub-district system, Qingyuan City vigorously promoted the "Strong Town Empowerment" action. On the one hand, part of the county-level administrative law enforcement power was delegated to towns and sub-districts according to the law, giving towns greater autonomy in project approval, planning and construction, and comprehensive law enforcement. On the other hand, the allocation of staffing resources was tilted towards towns to enrich grassroots professional and technical

forces.

More importantly, through the selection and dispatch of station-in-town and village-assistance work teams, the government achieved precise downward allocation of talent resources. Unlike previous point-based dispatching, Qingyuan City adopted a "Group-style" assistance strategy, led by a provincial or municipal unit, uniting finance, universities, enterprises, and other units to be stationed in a town as a complete formation. The work team brought not only funds but also concepts, technologies, and market channels, effectively becoming the "external brain" and "staff office" of the town government. This administrative empowerment transformed "Government Leadership" from rigid control into service and support for the grassroots, creating institutional space for the subsequent "Town-Village Linkage."

4. Horizontal Integration: Organizational Carrier Innovation and Endogenous Activation of "Town-Village Linkage"

If "Government Leadership" solves the problem of "where resources come from," then "Town-Village Linkage" solves the problems of "how resources land" and "how resources appreciate." In Qingyuan City's practice, the town and village levels are no longer simple administrative superiors and subordinates but have formed a close action community through organizational reshaping and interest binding.

4.1. Strengthening of Town-Level Hub Functions: From "Administrative Node" to "Operation Center"

In the traditional rural governance structure, towns mainly played the role of "microphones" and "intermediaries," with relatively weak economic functions. In the practice of the "Hundreds, Thousands, and Ten Thousands Project," Qingyuan City clearly proposed to strengthen town nodes and build them into regional centers serving farmers.

The core grasp of this transformation is the formation of "Strong Town and Wealthy Village Companies." Qingyuan City has generally established Rural Revitalization Investment and Development Companies (referred to as "Strong Town and Wealthy Village Companies") in various towns, led by the town government with participation from the collective economic organizations of administrative villages. This platform is essentially a mixed operation entity of town-level state-owned capital and village-level collective capital.

Through this platform, the town government has realized the role extension from "administrative manager" to "rural operator." Using its administrative coordination capabilities, the town unifies the storage and confirmation of dormant assets such as idle school buildings, office buildings, barren hills, and wasteland within its jurisdiction, and then injects them into the company for market-oriented operation. For example, in ethnic minority areas such as Liannan and Lianshan, town-level companies uniformly package and sell agricultural products from various villages via e-commerce, solving the problems of small scale, inconsistent standards, and difficulty in connecting with large markets for single-village products. As an "Operation Center," the town effectively undertakes industrial projects sunk from above and converts them into specific commercial opportunities distributed to villages [9].

4.2. Reshaping of Village-Level Organizational Power: From "Atomized Loose Sand" to "Organized Docking"

The "Village" is the "cell" of rural revitalization and the ultimate carrier of resource landing. However, facing the status quo of weak and lax organizations and insufficient endogenous motivation in some villages, pure capital injection often fails to work.

Qingyuan City strengthened village-level organizational power through "Party Building Guidance." The Town Party Committee and the Village Party Branch conduct "Pairing and Co-construction," selecting outstanding young cadres to serve as First Secretaries in villages, directly embedding them into the village governance structure. This embedded assistance not only regulates the operation of village-level power but, more importantly, activates the mobilization capacity of the village collective through the "Head Goose Effect."

Under the framework of "Town-Village Linkage," the main functions of village-level organizations have shifted: from "asking for money and goods" in the past to "organizing the masses and integrating factors." In matters involving the vital interests of farmers such as land transfer and industrial project landing, the village "Two Committees" cadres played an irreplaceable lubricant role. For example, in a vegetable industry base project in Qingcheng District, the Village Party Branch completed the contiguous transfer of thousands of mu of land within just one month by holding "bench meetings" and having Party members visit households, and organized scattered farmers into labor cooperatives to work at the base. This collaboration model of "Town contributes capital and attracts projects, Village contributes land and labor" effectively absorbed farmers into the modern industrial chain.

4.3. Construction of Interest Linkage Mechanism: From "One-way Blood Transfusion" to "Benefit Sharing"

Whether "Town-Village Linkage" can be sustainable depends on whether the benefit distribution mechanism is fair and reasonable. Qingyuan City explored a new interest linkage mechanism of "Town Planning, Village Shareholding, and Villager Dividends."

Under this mechanism, assistance funds are no longer directly distributed to farmers but are quantified as shares to the village collective, which then invests in the "Strong Town and Wealthy Village Company" or leading enterprises. The proceeds generated by the project are distributed among the town-level company, the village collective, and farmers according to a set proportion.

This mechanism produced multiple positive effects:

1) Risk Sharing: Through the coordination of the town-level platform, the market risks that a single project might face are spread out.

2) Revenue Guarantee: For disadvantaged groups lacking labor, bottom-line protection is achieved through asset income dividends.

3) Strengthening the Collective: The village collective has stable operating income and is no longer a "shell village," having the economic basis to provide public services for villagers (such as road repair, street lamp maintenance, and canteens for the elderly).

4) Incentive Compatibility: The interests of the town,

village, and people are tightly bound together, forming a situation of "mutual glory," greatly stimulating the enthusiasm of grassroots cadres and the masses to participate in rural revitalization [10].

5. Process Analysis: Operational Flow and Practice Logic of Cross-Level Coordination

Comprehensively examining the entire practice process of "Government-Led, Town-Village Linkage" in Qingyuan City, we can clearly see how resources are filtered layer by layer and precisely sunk along the vein of "Administration-Market-Society." This process reflects profound practice logic.

5.1. Political Logic: Organizational Absorption and Mobilization under Party Building Guidance

In this assistance model, Party building guidance runs through the whole process, playing the role of "axis" and "engine." Cross-level coordination can be achieved fundamentally due to the vertical leadership system of the Party organization from top to bottom and its strong political mobilization capability.

"Government Leadership" is essentially the manifestation of the political will of the Party committee and the government. Qingyuan City incorporated the "Hundreds, Thousands, and Ten Thousands Project" into the cadre performance appraisal system, implementing "quarterly notifications and annual assessments," linking the effectiveness of rural revitalization with the "hats" (careers) of cadres, thus generating a powerful administrative drive within the bureaucratic system. This pressure transmission mechanism forces officials at all levels to break departmental interests and actively seek coordination.

"Town-Village Linkage" is the manifestation of the organizational power of grassroots Party organizations. By building Party branches on the industrial chain (such as the "Qingyuan Chicken Industry Chain Party Committee") and on projects, the Party organization "absorbs" scattered social forces (enterprises, social organizations, new sages) and atomized farmers into the organizational system of rural revitalization. This "Organizational Absorption" mechanism reduces transaction costs and social friction during resource downward allocation, ensuring the effective implementation of national will at the grassroots level. Party building is no longer an illusory slogan but has become concrete productive forces [11].

5.2. Administrative Logic: Departmental Integration and Process Reengineering of the Project System

From the perspective of administrative logic, this model is an "adaptive adjustment" to the traditional bureaucratic system. By establishing temporary institutions (such as task forces, commands) or joint conference systems, it achieves "flexible integration" across departments and levels without changing the original administrative architecture.

In the process of resource downward allocation, Qingyuan City explored the optimization logic of the "Project System." The traditional project system often suffers from "emphasizing application, neglecting management." Qingyuan established a full-cycle project management mechanism:

1) Front-end Screening: Establish a project library and implement competitive application, forcing towns and villages to improve project planning capabilities and ensuring resources are directed to areas with development potential.

2) Mid-end Supervision: Use digital technology to build a fund supervision platform to monitor fund flows in real-time and prevent interception and misappropriation.

3) Back-end Evaluation: Introduce third-party evaluation institutions to evaluate project performance, using the results as the basis for resource allocation in the next year.

This mechanism of "promoting integration through projects and promoting implementation through performance" ensures that administrative resources are no longer a "big pot of rice" distributed equally per capita but are tilted towards areas with capacity, planning, and enthusiasm, objectively improving the precision of resource allocation.

5.3. Market Logic: Operating the Countryside and Ecological Value Conversion

The ultimate goal of "Government-Led, Town-Village Linkage" is not to establish a huge administrative distribution system but to activate market mechanisms. Practice shows that pure administrative assistance is difficult to sustain and market logic must be introduced.

The innovation of the Qingyuan model lies in the fact that the government and towns/villages do not directly act as market entities but act as "incubators" and "partners" of the market. The government is responsible for optimizing the business environment and providing public goods (infrastructure, policy supply), while towns and villages are responsible for integrating factors (land, labor), thereby attracting market capital.

Through the mixed operation model of "State-owned Capital Guidance + Private Capital Participation + Village Collective Shareholding," Qingyuan City successfully achieved the value conversion of ecological resources. For example, in Liannan Yao Autonomous County, through the platform built by the government, cultural and tourism leading enterprises were introduced to convert local Yao culture and terraced landscapes into high-value-added tourism products. In this process, assistance resources (such as funds for road construction and tourist center construction) became the leverage to pry social capital. The embedding of this market logic transforms assistance resources from "consumer goods" to "investment goods," possessing the potential for self-appreciation and recycling [12].

6. Challenges and Reflections: Deep Thinking on Mechanism Optimization

Although the "Government-Led, Town-Village Linkage" model in Qingyuan City has achieved significant results in practice, as an institutional innovation in dynamic evolution, it still faces a series of deep-seated challenges that require clear recognition in theory and practice.

6.1. "Mobilization Fatigue" under Administrative Dominance and Sustainability Concerns

The current assistance model relies heavily on high-intensity mobilization of administrative forces. Both the dispatch of stationed work teams and the high-frequency

scheduling of "Top Leaders" of the Party and government belong to the category of "campaign-style governance." This governance method can concentrate resources to tackle key problems in the short term, but in the long run, it can easily lead to "mobilization fatigue" among grassroots cadres. Once the assessment pressure from superiors weakens or the assistance work team withdraws, whether the established coordination mechanism can continue to operate relying on institutional inertia is a huge question mark. How to shift from "unconventional mobilization" to "routine governance" is the primary challenge facing the Qingyuan model.

6.2. Shortcomings in Town/Village Operation Capabilities and Market Risks

Although "Strong Town and Wealthy Village Companies" have been established, many company operation and management personnel are currently still concurrently served by town and village cadres. These cadres are familiar with administrative affairs but often lack professional knowledge and experience in market operation. In a fiercely competitive market environment, this governance structure where "government and economy are not separated" faces the risk of operational decision-making errors. In addition, some projects have a tendency towards homogeneous competition. For example, multiple towns rushing to build campsites and homestays may lead to overcapacity. How to introduce a professional manager system, establish a modern enterprise system, and improve the risk resistance capability of town and village collectives are urgent problems to be solved.

6.3. Lack of Farmer Subjectivity and "Onlooker" Psychology

In the grand narrative of "Government-Led, Town-Village Linkage," farmers are often viewed as passive beneficiaries rather than active participants. In some projects, although farmers receive dividends, they do not truly participate in the entire process of industrial development, leading to the phenomenon of "cadres working, masses watching." If assistance cannot stimulate the endogenous motivation of farmers and improve their human capital, then this assistance will never escape the nature of "blood transfusion."

7. Conclusion and Policy Recommendations

7.1. Research Conclusion

Through a deep analysis of the rural revitalization assistance practice in Qingyuan City, this study draws the following conclusions:

First, "Government Leadership" and "Town-Village Linkage" are the "dual-wheel drive" to solve the dilemma of rural revitalization in underdeveloped areas. The former provides necessary external potential energy, institutional supply, and resource guarantees, while the latter provides endogenous power, organizational carriers, and landing channels. Both are indispensable and must be deeply coupled in mechanism.

Second, the key to precise resource downward allocation lies in building a "vertically consistent and horizontally interconnected" collaborative governance network. This network achieves political integration through Party building guidance, administrative integration through the project system, and interest integration through shareholding cooperation, thereby avoiding the risks of "resource suspension" and "involution."

Third, Qingyuan's practice shows that the effectiveness of the assistance model depends on the compatibility of "Administrative Logic" and "Village Logic." Only when top-down policy goals fit with bottom-up villager needs and are transformed into economic value recognized by the market can assistance forces truly be transformed into high-quality development momentum for rural areas.

7.2. Policy Recommendations

Based on the above analysis, to further optimize assistance forces and support the "Hundreds, Thousands, and Ten Thousands Project," this paper proposes the following recommendations:

1) Promote the sinking of governance focus and build a long-term mechanism of "Pluralistic Co-governance."

Excessive reliance on administrative orders should be gradually reduced, and the experience of "Town-Village Linkage" should be solidified through legislation and institutional construction. Give towns and villages more substantive resource control rights, while introducing third-party forces such as social organizations and industry associations to participate in the distribution and supervision of assistance resources, forming a collaborative and complementary governance ecology of government, market, and society.

2) Deepen the reform of "Strong Towns and Wealthy Villages" and improve the level of market-oriented operation.

Accelerate the physical and professional operation of town-level platform companies. Encourage the introduction of professional manager teams who understand operation and management through open recruitment, implementing the "separation of ownership and management rights." Establish strict risk isolation mechanisms to prevent commercial risks from being transmitted to fiscal risks. At the same time, strengthen training on market economy knowledge for town and village cadres to improve their ability to control the market.

3) Strengthen the mechanism of linking and leading farmers and reshape the subjectivity of farmers.

The ultimate goal of assistance is the "modernization of people." It is necessary to improve the interest linkage mechanism, not only allowing farmers to receive dividends but also enabling them to gain skill improvement and concept renewal through participation in industrial development. Establish a villager consultation mechanism to fully listen to villagers' opinions in project initiation, implementation, and distribution, turning farmers from "bystanders" into "partners."

4) Leverage digital technology to improve the intelligent level of cross-level coordination.

Relying on the construction of "Digital Government," build a big data platform for rural revitalization. Break down departmental data barriers to achieve full-process visual supervision of agriculture-related funds, project progress, and asset resources. Use big data analysis to assist decision-making, improve the precision and predictability of resource allocation, let "data running" replace "favor running," and enhance the transparency and credibility of assistance work.

In summary, the practice of "Government-Led, Town-Village Linkage" in Qingyuan City provides a valuable "Northern Guangdong Answer" for the path of rural revitalization with Chinese characteristics. It proves that in underdeveloped areas, through institutional mechanism

innovation and the organic combination of effective government, strong grassroots, and efficient markets, it is entirely possible to blaze a new trail of precise resource downward allocation and integrated urban-rural development.

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