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Structural Coupling and Functional Reshaping: A Political Economy Analysis of Party Building Leading High-Quality Development of Rural Industries

-- A case study of Qingyuan's Practice in the "100-1000-10000 Project"

Taoyu Zou[1], Jiajun Zhou[2], Dongjin He[3,*]

[1]School of Finance and Investment, Guangdong University of Finance, Guangzhou, China
[2]General Education Department, Southern Medical University, Guangzhou, China
[3]Department of Physical Education, Guangdong University of Finance, Guangzhou, China

[*] **Corresponding author**: Dongjin He

Abstract: Against the macro background of comprehensively promoting rural revitalization and implementing the "High-quality Development Project for Hundreds of Counties, Thousands of Towns, and Myriads of Villages" (hereinafter referred to as the "100-1000-10000 Project"), the high-quality development of rural industries faces structural contradictions characterized by fragmented factors, loose organization, and difficulties in market docking. Traditional reliance solely on market mechanisms or administrative directives struggles to effectively solve the connection problem between "small farmers and big markets." Based on the perspective of Marxist political economy, this paper introduces the analytical framework of "Structural Coupling" and "Functional Reshaping." Taking the rural industrial practice in Qingyuan City, Guangdong Province, as a field observation object, it explores how Party building leadership becomes the core endogenous driving force for promoting rural industrial modernization. The study finds that the essence of Party building leading rural industrial development is the active adaptation and positive reaction of the superstructure to the economic base. By embedding the political structure of Party organizations into the economic structure of the industrial chain, the transformation from political potential to economic momentum is realized (Structural Coupling). By reconstructing resource allocation methods, reducing institutional transaction costs, and optimizing interest distribution mechanisms, the Party organization realizes a role transformation from single administrative control to empowering industrial development (Functional Reshaping). This "Qingyuan Experience" provides a vivid practical sample and theoretical footnote for understanding the political economy of rural areas with Chinese characteristics.

Keywords: Party Building Leading, Rural Industries, Structural Coupling, Functional Reshaping, Political Economy, The 100-1000-10000 Project.

1. Problem Statement and Theoretical Perspective

1.1. Historical Background and Practical Dilemmas

The Report to the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China explicitly points out that "the most arduous and heavy task of building a modern socialist country in all respects still lies in the countryside." Industrial revitalization is the top priority of rural revitalization and the prerequisite for solving all rural problems. Currently, Guangdong Province is making every effort to implement the "High-quality Development Project for Hundreds of Counties, Thousands of Towns, and Myriads of Villages" (hereinafter referred to as the "100-1000-10000 Project"), aiming to break the urban-rural dual structure and promote the high-quality development of counties, towns, and villages. However, in the micro-implementation process of this grand narrative, rural industrial development still faces severe structural constraints.

Examined from the perspective of productive forces and relations of production, current rural industries mainly face three major contradictions: First, **the** contradiction **between the atomization of production factors and the demand for industrial scale**. Land fragmentation, labor aging, and capital dispersion make it difficult to form the scale effect required by modern agriculture. Second, **the contradiction between the high risk of market entities and the risk aversion of financial capital**. The natural weakness of agriculture combined with information asymmetry makes social capital afraid and unwilling to enter. Third, **the contradiction between the looseness of interest linkage and the goal of common prosperity**. In the process of capital going to the countryside, it is extremely easy to have the capital crowding-out effect where "bosses get rich while fellow villagers lose out," deviating from the original intention of socialist rural revitalization.

Facing the dual dilemma of market failure and organizational failure mentioned above, relying solely on traditional administrative orders ("Administrative Embeddedness") often leads to formalism, while relying solely on market regulation struggles to balance fairness and efficiency. Therefore, how to leverage the institutional advantages of socialism with Chinese characteristics and reshape the production relations of rural industries through high-quality Party building leadership has become a focus of attention for both academic and political circles.

1.2. Literature Review and Analytical Framework

Existing research on Party building leading rural revitalization mainly focuses on political science and

sociology, emphasizing governance effectiveness, organizational legitimacy, and elite absorption [1]. In recent years, some scholars have attempted to analyze the impact of Party building on the collective economy from an economic perspective, proposing concepts such as "Red Engine" and "Organizational Dividend" [2]. However, research that starts from the deep logic of political economy to systematically explain how Party building leadership intervenes in the entire process of production, exchange, and distribution, and achieves deep coupling between political structure and economic structure, is still insufficient.

This paper attempts to construct a political economy analytical framework of **"Structural Coupling - Functional Reshaping"**:

- **Structural Coupling:** Refers to the deep mutual embedding of political organizations (Party organizations) and economic organizations (cooperatives, enterprises, industrial chains) in terms of organizational architecture, personnel allocation, and operational mechanisms, solving the subjective problem of "who organizes production."
- **Functional Reshaping:** Refers to the way Party organizations, after embedding into economic activities, change traditional resource allocation efficiency and interest distribution patterns through credit endorsement, resource integration, and rule supply, solving the value-laden problems of "how to produce efficiently" and "for whom to produce."

This paper will take Qingyuan City in Northern Guangdong as an empirical case to analyze how Party building leadership cracks industrial development problems through the above mechanisms in the process of creating the "Five Major Ten-Billion Agricultural Industries."

2. Structural Coupling: The Organizational Logic of Party Building Embedding in Industrial Chains

Marxist political economy holds that relations of production must adapt to the development of productive forces. In the process of agricultural modernization, decentralized small-scale peasant production methods are no longer adapted to the needs of large markets, and new production relations must be reconstructed through organizational means. The practice in Qingyuan City shows that Party building leadership is precisely the core link in constructing these new production relations.

2.1. Vertical Penetration: Isomorphism of Organizational Chain and Industrial Chain

Traditional rural grassroots Party building often stops at the administrative village level, presenting a spatial misalignment with modern agricultural industrial chains that span across villages, towns, and even counties. In the process of promoting the "Five Major Ten-Billion Agricultural Industries" (Qingyuan Chicken, Yingde Black Tea, Lianzhou Flowering Cabbage, Qingyuan Silk Seedling Rice, Xiniu Hemp Bamboo Shoots), Qingyuan City broke the barriers of administrative divisions and explored a new model of "Industrial Chain Party Building."

1) Physical Operation of Party Organizations in Industrial Chains.

In industrial cluster areas such as Yingde Black Tea and Xiniu Hemp Bamboo Shoots, local Party committees took the lead in establishing "Industrial Chain Joint Party Committees" or "Industrial Party General Branches." This organizational setting is not a virtual joint conference but a physical leadership institution. It incorporates leading enterprises, farmers' professional cooperatives, industry associations, scientific research institutions, and Party branches of planting bases into the same organizational system. This practice of "building the branch on the industrial chain" achieves isomorphism between the political system and the economic system in organizational structure, ensuring that the Party's organizational tentacles can extend along with the industry, ensuring the Party's comprehensive leadership over industrial development [3].

2) Personnel Coupling through "Two-way Entry and Cross-appointment".

The key to structural coupling lies in the coupling of people. Qingyuan City promoted village Party organization secretaries serving as heads of village collective economic organizations (shareholding economic cooperatives) through legal procedures, while encouraging outstanding Party member business operators in the industrial chain to enter the "Two Committees" (Party branch committee and village committee) of the village. In demonstration villages like Lianzhang Village, we observed a typical "political-economic unity" elite structure: the village Party secretary is both the political core and the industrial leader ("Head Goose"). This personnel allocation greatly reduces communication costs between political decision-making and economic decision-making, avoiding the friction of "two skins" (disconnect) between the village "Two Committees" and the collective economic organization.

2.2. Horizontal Connection: Integration of Dispersed Factors by Party Organizations

In the atomized small-scale peasant economy, production factors such as land, capital, and labor are in an extremely dispersed state and cannot form a synergy. Through structural embedding, the Party organization acts as a "Factor Integrator."

1) Re-organization of Land Factors.

In the process of promoting the "Hemp Bamboo Shoot" industry in Qingyuan, land transfer was the biggest difficulty. For a single enterprise facing thousands of farmers, the negotiation cost is extremely high (high transaction costs). At this time, the intervention of the Party organization becomes a key variable. Through the model of "Party Branch + Cooperative + Farmers," the village Party branch leads the cooperative, uniformly transferring farmers' dispersed land to the collective, which then uniformly connects with enterprises. Using its political authority and mass trust, the Party organization solves historical legacy issues such as land confirmation and boundary disputes, realizing the large-scale supply of land factors [4].

2) Organized Absorption of Labor Factors.

Addressing the problems of rural hollowing out and lack of talent, Qingyuan City implemented the "Geese Return Plan" and the "Rural Craftsman" project. Party organizations established detailed ledgers of talents working outside, using local ties and policy incentives to bring back a group of "New Farmers" who understand technology and are good at management. After returning, these talents are often prioritized for absorption into Party organizations or placed in

key positions in the industrial chain, achieving dual accumulation of human capital and political capital.

3. Functional Reshaping: The Economic Logic of Party Building Empowering Industrial Development

If structural coupling solves the combination of "form," then functional reshaping solves the fusion of "spirit." From the perspective of political economy, the function of the Party organization is no longer limited to traditional propaganda and mobilization but deeply intervenes in the economic cycle of value creation, resource allocation, and interest distribution.

3.1. Reducing Institutional Transaction Costs: The Credit Intermediary Function of Party Organizations

New Institutional Economics believes that transaction costs are key factors hindering the improvement of economic efficiency. In the process of transforming rural acquaintance society into semi-acquaintance society, lack of trust is the biggest obstacle to industrial development.

1) Credit Endorsement and Financial Credit Enhancement.

In agricultural lending, farmers lack collateral, and banks face high risk control costs. Qingyuan City explored the "Party Building + Finance" model, linking "Whole Village Credit Granting" with grassroots Party building evaluations. The vanguard index of Party member households and the star rating of Party branches are directly converted into bank credit lines. For example, in some specialized tea villages, farmers awarded the "Party Member Demonstration Household" plaque can enjoy lower loan rates and higher limits. Here, the political credibility of the Party organization is transformed into economic credit, greatly reducing information asymmetry and trust costs between banks and farmers [5].

2) Contract Execution and Default Governance.

In "Company + Farmer" contract farming, default phenomena (companies suppressing prices or farmers selling privately) often occur when market prices fluctuate. As a third-party authoritative force, the Party organization intervenes in the contract execution process. On the one hand, it disciplines Party members to take the lead in honoring contracts; on the other hand, it uses village regulations and social public opinion to supervise default behaviors. This informal institutional constraint effectively compensates for the high cost of formal legal systems operating in rural areas, maintaining the stability of market order.

3.2. Optimizing Resource Allocation Efficiency: The Overall Coordination Function of Party Organizations

Market mechanisms fail in solving the supply of public goods and externalities, while Party building leadership can optimize resource allocation through the organic combination of administrative power and market mechanisms.

1) Cross-regional Resource Coordination.

Qingyuan's "Five Major Ten-Billion Industries" often span multiple administrative villages. Relying solely on village-level autonomy makes it difficult to solve cross-regional public goods supply problems such as irrigation, road construction, and brand co-construction. Through the coordination of town-level Party committees or industrial chain Party committees, dispersed agriculture-related funds (poverty alleviation, water conservancy, transportation, etc.) can be bundled and used to concentrate forces on major tasks, building high-standard modern agricultural industrial parks. This resource allocation method of "clenching fingers into a fist" reflects the institutional advantage of socialism in concentrating forces to accomplish great deeds [6].

2) Organized Channel for Docking with Big Markets.

Small farmers face an extremely weak bargaining position when docking with big markets. Cooperatives or unions led by Party organizations actually assume the role of "Market Agents." In the sales link of Qingyuan Chicken, the Party organization takes the lead in connecting with supermarkets and e-commerce platforms in the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area, unifying brands, standards, and pricing. This not only enhances the bargaining power of products but also forces standardization reforms at the production end, realizing the organic connection between small farmers and modern agricultural development [7].

3.3. Reshaping Interest Distribution Mechanisms: The Value Orientation Function of Party Organizations

The core of political economy is the issue of interest distribution. The profit-seeking nature of capital determines its tendency to squeeze the surplus value of laborers and landowners in the process of rural industrial development. The core mission of Party building leadership is to ensure that the dividends of industrial development benefit the vast number of farmers and realize common prosperity.

1) Establishing the Distribution Principle of "Guaranteed Minimum + Dividend".

In Qingyuan's practice, when introducing social capital, Party organizations set strict entry thresholds and interest linkage mechanisms. For example, in poverty alleviation workshops and industrial projects in Lianzhang Village, the village Party branch adheres to the "Three Incomes" model of "Guaranteed Rental + Equity Dividend + Salary Income." Using its negotiation advantage, the Party organization ensures the principal status of farmers in the industrial chain and prevents capital from excessively depriving farmers' interests [8].

2) Institutional Arrangements for Strengthening the Collective Economy.

Unlike private enterprise profits owned by individuals, rural industries under Party building leadership emphasize the appreciation of collective assets. Qingyuan City confirms rights of poverty alleviation assets to the village collective, managed and operated by the Party organization, with proceeds used for village-level public services (such as canteens for the elderly, scholarships) and assisting disadvantaged groups. This distribution method realizes "taking from the people and using for the people," consolidating the Party's ruling foundation in rural areas from the level of the economic base [9].

4. Case Deep Description: Typical Samples in Qingyuan's "100-1000-10000 Project"

To illustrate the above theoretical logic more concretely, this chapter selects representative industrial practices in Qingyuan City for deep description.

4.1. Lianzhang Village: The Metamorphosis from Poverty-Stricken Village to Rural Revitalization Model

Lianzhang Village was once a typical poverty-stricken village; its transformation process is a microcosm of Party building leading industrial reshaping.

- **Structurally:** Established a strong General Party Branch and brought back retired soldier Lu Feihong (pseudonym) to serve as secretary, realizing "Head Goose" navigation.
- **Functionally:** The General Party Branch coordinated and integrated originally idle land resources and introduced a modern agricultural technology demonstration park.
- **Effectiveness:** This process was not simple investment attraction, but rather the Party organization leading industrial planning and interest distribution. Village collective income grew from less than 2,000 yuan to millions currently, fully reflecting the decisive role of Party building in the adjustment of production relations [10].

4.2. Xiniu Hemp Bamboo Shoots: The Organizational Code Behind the Ten-Billion Industry

Xiniu Town is known as the "Hometown of Hemp Bamboo Shoots in China." Behind its industrial scale exceeding ten billion yuan is the strong support of industrial chain Party building.

- **Pain Points:** In the past, bamboo shoot farmers fought alone, prices were suppressed by buyers, and lack of deep processing led to low product added value.
- **Breakthrough:** The town Party committee established the Hemp Bamboo Shoot Industrial Chain Party Branch, formulated industry standards, and built a trading center. The Party organization promoted "Peeling Shells on the Mountain" (primary processing at the origin) and "Deep Processing Entering the Park," extending the industrial chain.
- **Mechanism:** Through the industry association led by Party building, a minimum purchase protection price was formulated, protecting the enthusiasm of shoot farmers, stabilizing raw material supply, and achieving a win-win situation for industrial capital and agricultural laborers.

5. Conclusion and Policy Implications

5.1. Research Conclusion

Based on the political economy analysis of Qingyuan City's "100-1000-10000 Project" practice, this paper draws the following conclusions:

1) Party building leadership is an endogenous variable rather than **an external decoration for the high-quality development of rural industries.** Through the embedding of organizational structure (Structural Coupling), it solves the fundamental contradiction that atomized rural society cannot adapt to socialized mass production.

2) The function of Party organizations is undergoing a profound transformation. Transitioning from purely administrative control to economic service, resource allocation, and interest coordination (Functional Reshaping), this transformation reduces institutional transaction costs for rural industrial development.

3) Political logic and market logic can achieve dialectical unity. Under Party building leadership, the decisive role of the market in resource allocation (efficiency) is exerted, while the role of the government (Party organization) is better played (fairness), exploring a path of agricultural modernization with Chinese characteristics.

5.2. Policy Implications

Based on the Qingyuan experience, the following suggestions are proposed for promoting rural revitalization in other regions:

1) Strengthen the physical construction of industrial chain Party building. Avoid the "virtualization" and "decoupling" of Party building work; build Party organizations in key links of the industrial chain and endow them with substantive power to coordinate economic affairs.

2) Improve the institutional design of interest linkage. Be vigilant against "alienation" phenomena in the process of capital going to the countryside, exert the regulatory role of Party organizations in interest distribution, and safeguard the bottom line of increasing farmers' income.

3) Enhance the economic governance capabilities of grassroots cadres. In the "100-1000-10000 Project," it is necessary to cultivate a large number of "Double Strong" Party organization secretaries who understand both politics and markets, which is the talent foundation for realizing functional reshaping.

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