

Profit Maximization in Monopoly Markets: Economic Optimization Using Derivatives

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Abstract. This study examines the system of profit maximization in monopoly markets, focusing on how monopolists determine optimal output and price levels through calculus-based on selecting. The essential problem addressed is the internal output limiting by monopolies, which contrasts with the higher output level observed in competitive markets. Using linear demand and cost functions, the research is applicable first and second order requirements of calculus to derive the profit-maximizing quantity (Q^*) and price (P^*). Key findings confirm that monopolies produce less than socially optimal quantities, resulting in deadweight loss—the measurement of reduced producer and consumer welfare. The analysis is contextualized with the real-world applications, especially in pharmaceutical and technology markets, where monopolistic structures such as patent-protected drugs, dominant operating systems are prevalent. This research will also contribute to understand monopoly inefficiency by formally conformation the optimal output level through mathematical derivation, strengthening the needs for antitrust regulation to reduce benefit losses.

Keywords: Monopoly, Profit Maximization, Deadweight Loss, Calculus.

1. Introduction

Monopoly is when there is only one seller in a market selling a product which means no one else can copy that, therefore the seller has decisive control on the price. Unlike in the competitive market, businesses have to take whatever the price that market sets, monopolies face a demand curve that slopes going downward. That means if they want to sell more, they have to reduce the price, in the other word, if they raise the price, they will sell less. This trade-off is how monopolies act and how they affect the market works [1].

Studying how monopolies maximize profit is not just about theory. The things that monopolies have directly affecting consumers just like making them pay more money and giving them fewer choices, and they also have impact on antitrust laws. For example, a drug company with a patent on a life-saving medicine could set the price higher than what it costs, which means poor people might not be able to afford that high cost. Similarly, a famous technology company that controls the specific operating system may stop other companies from competing by bundling products together, which it can slow down the time of new ideas come out. Knowing how monopolies decide how much to produce and what price to charge is significantly important for making rules that balance how much money that the company makes with what is good for the society.

In mathematically, a monopoly would like to maximize the profit(π), which is the total revenue (TR) minus the total cost (TC). To find the maximum value, using the first order condition—the method called derivative of profit with quantity ($d\pi/dQ$) equals zero. it tells the quantity where marginal revenue (MR) equals marginal cost (MC). That is the highest profit point.

For example, Microsoft's control over the operating system market in the late 1990s. The company called Windows had over 90 percent of the market, therefore Microsoft could set prices higher than they would be in a competitive market and make it hard for other software to work with Windows. Another example is Pfizer with drug Lipitor. Even the patent was in place, though Pfizer did not have enough competition, therefore it could limit how much they produced compared to the competitive market to maximize the profit. All these examples are showing how monopoly profit maximization works in the real-world life.

In this essay, it will consider what other studies have said about monopolies being inefficient and how they optimize their profits. In the next step, it will explain the method that used, and including the mathematical model and how to find the best output level with that model. Next, it will show the results from an example, comparing what happened in a monopoly versus to the competitive market. After that, talking about the findings meaning. Finally, getting through the limitations of this study and ideas for the future research.

2. Literature Review

Doing the research on the behavior of monopoly has a long stage in the industrial organization economics with foundational work, especially the inefficiencies of monopolistic markets. Cowling and Mueller, they were among to measure the welfare loss resulting from monopolies, suggesting that deadweight loss in the US economy varied between 0.5% and 2% of overall national product [2]. The research indicated how monopolies raise prices by limiting output, which transfers excess from all the consumers to all producers and causing a net losing for the society.

Tirole provided a theoretical model for analyzing monopoly, distinguishing between natural monopolies (where economies of scale to justify a single firm) and also artificial monopolies (created through barriers). He argued that while natural monopolies may achieve the cost efficiency, all monopolies exhibit allocative inefficiency because the profit maximizing behavior.

Modern monopoly theory focused on the digital market, what network effects and it creates new forms of the market power. Belleflamme and Peitz indicated that digital monopolies just like the social media apps, it always operates with zero marginal costs, changing the profit-maximization calculus [1]. In the markets, firms may supply the basically services for free while monetizing the user's data, it always complicates the output measurements restriction.

Perloff has formalized the mathematical method being to monopoly optimization. It demonstrates how FOC ($MR = MC$) and the second order condition named SOC (making sure the profit function is concave at the maximum point) begin from the optimal quantity [3]. However, that work has the lack which is the validation of the conditions in our real-world markets. It leaves a gap between the theoretical derivations and the outcomes.

Viscusi et al. explored the supervised responses with the monopoly. It argues that policies should target not only high prices but also the output limitation, that's important [4]. They indicated that just like in the medications market, patent laws grant temporary monopolies, but the policymakers must balance that and measures to reduce deadweight loss. For example, compulsory licensing in low-income countries.

This study shows the research gap by formally deriving Q^* using both the FOC and the SOC and validating results with numerical examples from the technology and pharmaceuticals markets. Connecting mathematical optimization to the real-world welfare implications [5].

3. Model Setup

Demand Function: Assume the market demand curve is linear, that is $P = a - bQ$, where P is the price, Q is the quantity, a is the price intercept (maximum price that the consumers will pay), and b is the slope (capturing how the price affects quantity demanded).

Therefore, the Total Revenue (TR):

$$TR = P \times Q = (a - bQ)Q = aQ - bQ^2 \quad (1)$$

The Marginal Revenue (MR): The derivative of TR with respect to the Q :

$$MR = d(TR)/dQ = a - 2bQ \quad (2)$$

Total Cost (TC): Assume a linear cost function: $TC = cQ + d$, where c is the marginal cost, which is constant, and d is fixed cost (does not changing in optimization).

The Marginal Cost (MC): The derivative of TC with respect to Q : $MC = d(TC)/dQ = c$.

The Profit Function: Profit (π) is defined as $TR - TC$; $\pi(Q) = (aQ - bQ^2) - (cQ + d)$; $\pi(Q) = (a - c)Q - bQ^2 - d$

Using the First-Order Condition (FOC) for finding the value of the Profit Maximization to find the quantity that maximizes profit, take the derivative of π with respect to Q and set it to zero:

$$d\pi/dQ = (a - c) - 2bQ = 0 \quad (3)$$

Solving for Q^* (optimal quantity):

$$(a - c) - 2bQ^* = 0 \quad (4)$$

$$2bQ^* = a - c \quad (5)$$

$$Q^* = (a - c)/(2b) \quad (6)$$

This confirms the economic principle that profit is maximized when the $MR = MC$; $MR = a - 2bQ^* = c = MC$.

To ensure Q^* is a maximum, the second derivative of the profit function must be a negative value (or concavity):

$$d^2\pi/dQ^2 = -2b \quad (7)$$

Since $b > 0$ (demand curve slopes downward), $d^2\pi/dQ^2 = -2b < 0$, satisfying the SOC. Thus, Q^* is indeed the profit-maximizing quantity.

The profit function $\pi(Q)$ is a downward-opening parabola, and its vertex at Q^* . When the quantities less than Q^* , should increasing the output raises profit ($d\pi/dQ > 0$); when the quantities greater than Q^* , should increasing the output reduces profit ($d\pi/dQ < 0$). The peak of the parabola corresponds to Q^* , where is the $MR = MC$.

4. Results

Numerical Example:

The Demand: $P = 100 - 2Q$ (so $a = 100$, $b = 2$); The Cost: $TC = 20Q + 100$ (so $c = 20$, $d = 100$)

Step 1: Calculate Q^*

Using $Q^* = (a - c)/(2b)$: $Q^* = (100 - 20)/(2 \times 2) = 80/4 = 20$ units

Step 2: Calculate P^*

$P^* = 100 - 2(20) = 100 - 40 = \60

Step 3: Monopoly vs. Competitive Output

In a competitive market, the price equals the marginal cost ($P = MC$) to maximize social welfare. which is setting the $P = MC$:

$100 - 2Q_{\text{competitive}} = 20$, $2Q_{\text{competitive}} = 80$, $Q_{\text{competitive}} = 40$ units

Step 4: Deadweight Loss (DWL)

$DWL = 0.5 \times (Q_{\text{competitive}} - Q^*) \times (P^* - MC)$

$DWL = 0.5 \times (40 - 20) \times (60 - 20)$

$DWL = 0.5 \times 20 \times 40 = \400

Primarily, displaying the model with specific values, and calculate Q^* to obtain the first value of this numerical example, in the step 2, we calculate P^* to substitute Q^* into the demand function. Next, we need the result of Monopoly vs. Competitive Output. This represents a 42% reduction in the output under monopoly (from 40 to 20 units), confirming the restrictive nature of monopoly behavior. Finally, calculating Deadweight Loss (DWL), DWL is the area of the triangle formed by the monopoly quantity, competitive quantity, and the demand curve. This loss reflects the foregone for the consumers and producer being left because of the underproduction.

Step 5: Validation with the Literature

Cowling and Mueller (1978) found that monopoly deadweight loss increases with the gap between the price and the marginal cost ($P - MC$) and the reduction in output. In my example, $P - MC = \$40$, and output is halved of that, resulting in significant DWL— it is consistent with the findings.

5. Conclusion

This study demonstrates that calculus on the base working for optimization, and it provides a clear framework for understanding monopoly profit maximization, which means the profit-maximizing quantity (Q^*) is derived from the first-order condition ($MR = MC$), and the second-order condition confirms that value is a maximum value of this function. The numerical example validates that monopolies limit the output by that significant margin (42% in the example) and also creating the substantial deadweight losing.

Limitations of the study include the reliance on static; the linear functions and the exclusion of behavioral economics market have been changed. Future research could explore in these parts below.

First of all, the Stochastic demand: How the uncertainty in all the consumer behaviors affect Q^* . Besides, the Real-time pricing: In the digital markets, where prices adjust instantaneously, so how monopolists optimize the output in the real time. Understanding the monopoly profit maximization remains the crucial for the modern economics, as the digital platforms and the global supply chains increasingly concentrate all the market power. This study provides a fundamental method for evidence which is based on policies that protect the consumers.

References

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