Reflections on Morality-as-cooperation Theory: Curry's Interpretation of Morality, Evolutionary Ethics, and Consequentialism

Authors

  • Wanze Li
  • Ziye Wang
  • Tianzhe Zhao

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.54097/ryfz9v74

Keywords:

Morality, Evolutionary Ethics, Consequentialism, naturalistic.

Abstract

Morality-as-cooperation theory is an evolutionary moral theory that emphasizes the influence of individual thinking and character on moral behavior. It suggests that morality is shaped by cognitive abilities, social norms, and cultural values, with individuals motivated by both their interests and the welfare of others. Character plays a crucial role in providing consistency and stability in moral actions. However, the theory inherits flaws from evolutionary ethics and consequentialism, leading to the naturalistic fallacy. This theory fails to distinguish between natural facts and moral values, overlooking normative morality. It lacks attention to moral values and normativity, essential aspects of any moral theory. Additionally, its consequentialist character equates cooperation with moral normality, ignoring the distinction between morally "good" and "bad" cooperation. To address these shortcomings, it should explore the moral values behind cooperative behaviors and differentiate descriptive and normative morality. It should consider culture, beliefs, and rationality as vital factors in moral development, along with evolutionary processes. Avoiding the naturalistic fallacy requires analyzing the moral nature of cooperation and its various consequences. The theory offers valuable insights into moral behavior formation, considering individual thinking and character alongside external influences.

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Published

29-12-2023