A Composite Approach Towards Robot Rights in the Era of AI: Preference, Capability and Social Order
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.54097/pfmha721Keywords:
AI robots; robot rights; performance; ethical system; social-relational; capability.Abstract
Should we grant rights to highly intelligent AI robots? Traditional approaches related to deontology and utilitarianism cannot adequately argue that robots without consciousness and sentience can be justified as moral patients. An alternative social-relational approach is also limited to the moral standing of robots rather than their legal roles. In response to these issues, this paper provides a rough modified outline of the traditional theories according to the characteristics of current AI robots by further analysing how to grant moral rights and legal rights to robots regarding the human ethical system and human interests. In addition, it is suggested by this paper that a new resource of robot rights, compatibility, can be further integrated into traditional theories to form a composite approach towards robot rights in the era of AI.
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