The impact of female executives on the pay disparity relationship between organizational staff and executives from a diversity perspective

Authors

  • Xinrong Jiao

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.54097/9h5vfn59

Keywords:

Female executive; pay disparity; diversity perspective.

Abstract

The pay disparity between staff and executives has always been a hot issue in corporate governance. This paper empirically analyzes the governance effect of female executives on the pay disparity between staff and executives based on principal-agent theory, social equity theory, role theory, and upper echelon theory. The study found that female executives have a significant inhibitory effect on the salary gap between executives and employees; compared with state-owned enterprises, the inhibitory effect of female executives on the salary gap between executives and employees is more significant in non-state-owned enterprises; the environment is uncertain The more extraordinary the gender, the more influential the inhibitory effect of female executives on the pay disparity between staff and executives; the greater the power of female executives, the more significant the inhibitory effect of female executives on the pay disparity between staff and executives. The research conclusion helps to deepen the understanding of the effects of female executives’ participation in corporate governance from the perspective of compensation governance. It has reference significance for the construction of corporate senior management teams.

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Published

19-04-2024