A Probable Future of Constitutional Review in China

Abstract

State power has a natural tendency to violate private rights. Inadequate protection of fundamental rights reflects the lack of institutional safeguards. Based on the current inadequacy of fundamental rights protection in China, an institutional reform to the constitutional review system is necessary. The paper first analyzes the supremacy of the Constitution and the legitimacy of constitutional review. Further, it examines the three main review models of the significant constitutional countries in the world, compared with the currently implemented constitution review system in China. Considering the specific conditions of Chinese society, recognizing the structural shortages of the current system, and pointing out the infeasibility of the judicial review model in China, this paper argues that a constitutional review model where an independent review subject conducts the review can solve the problem of lack of independence while simultaneously adapting to the political tradition of China's People's Congress system. This future system is envisioned in the hope that it will better uphold the authority of the Constitution, regulate the administrative power, and thus protect the constitutional rights of citizens.