Exploring The Question of Why Knowledge Is Often Supposed to Have More Value Than Justified True Belief

Abstract

Knowledge has always been supposed to have more value than true beliefs. This is because the process of attaining knowledge has often been intended to involve more trials than obtaining a true belief, which gives knowledge more value. However, the definition of such trials is vague. In addition, sometimes essential pieces of knowledge are obtained by luck, which means an absence of such trials and the knowledge's possession of high value. Even though we can define such trials, it is hard to relate the value of obtaining knowledge with knowledge itself. This article seeks to find 1). How is knowledge more valuable than true belief or 2). If knowledge is not prior to true belief because of value, what does knowledge have in addition to true belief? The article starts by analyzing the value problem. The value problem suggests that knowledge does not have an additional value comparing to true beliefs of the same content, since knowledge is true beliefs formed reliably. Then, the article seeks to find a solution to the value problem. Arguments from Zagzebski about virtue epistemology are analyzed and criticized. Then, the concept of epistemic virtue is used to solve the problem. This research can provide readers with a viewpoint that allows them to consider the value problem of knowledge from another perspective.