A Comparative Study of Fiduciary Duty Examination Systems in Corporate Decision-Making

-- Based on the Tesla Shareholders Litigation and similar cases in China

Authors

  • Yuke Lin

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.54097/ajmss.v5i1.13928

Keywords:

Company Acquisition, Company Law, Controlling Stockholder, Fiduciary Duty

Abstract

In recent years, China has witnessed a surge in corporate governance irregularities both internally and externally. Terms like "financial scandals" have frequently trended, drawing high attention from the general public and causing significant damage to China's financing environment. Even though there are complex regulations in place, there are still speculators who, under the guise of legal decision-making processes, act dishonestly, making it difficult to prevent. Perhaps we should consider introducing a fiduciary duty system and learning from the legal systems of the United States and the United Kingdom to protect the interests of small and minority shareholders. In the state of Delaware, often referred to as the world's corporate capital, a shareholder lawsuit involving "the world's richest person," Elon Musk, and his prideful Tesla company unfolded in the Delaware Chancery Court. It immediately attracted the attention of business owners, investors, and corporate legal scholars from across the United States and the world. Since Tesla officially announced the acquisition of Musk's affiliated enterprise in 2016, SolarCity, founded by his cousins, a protracted legal battle initiated by a substantial group of plaintiffs lasted for over five years, finally coming to an end in early 2022 with Musk's victory. This enduring lawsuit, centered around whether Musk violated his fiduciary duties to minority shareholders under Delaware corporate law, with its lengthy process, complex evidence, and the judge's astute rulings, has provided us with insights into the examination logic and techniques applied by top-tier corporate law regarding fiduciary duties. This holds significant guiding significance for the subsequent amendments and practices of China's Company Law.

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References

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tesla,_Inc.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SolarCity.

Corwin v. KKR Fin. Hldgs., 125 A.3d 304, 313–14 (Del. 2015).

Kahn v. M & F Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635, 644 (Del. 2014).

Larkin v. Shah, 2016 WL 4485447, at *7 (Del. Ch. Aug. 25, 2016), at *8.

Citron v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co.,5 84 A.2d 490, 502 (Del. Ch. 1990)

Thorpe by Castleman v. CERBCO, Inc., 676 A.2d 436, 442 (Del. 1996).

Harbor Fin. P’rs v. Huizenga, 751 A.2d 879, 892 (Del. Ch. 1999) .

Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 263.

Guo Fuqing, Rethinking the transplantation of the fiduciary duty model in China's company law.

Chen Zhide, Jia Yongqing and Han Songxue, Regulation of the Rights of Controlling Shareholders - Fiduciary Obligations as an Entry Point.

Pan Lin, Legal construction of controlling shareholders' obligations.

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Published

14-11-2023

Issue

Section

Articles