Beyond Traditional Norms Examining the Efficacy of Civil Liability in Marital Disputes through a Management Science Perspective

Authors

  • Jiaxu Wei
  • Rui Ye
  • Yunting Fan
  • Xiaoxi Ding
  • Yongze Chen
  • Kejia An

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.54097/ky9g3r19

Keywords:

Civil Liability, Marital Disputes, Management Science, Conflict Resolution, Legal Frameworks

Abstract

This study aims to explore the applicability and efficacy of civil liability in resolving marital disputes through the lens of management science frameworks. As marital disputes grow increasingly complex in modern society, traditional legal frameworks often fail to address these conflicts effectively and equitably. By integrating the principles of civil liability with advanced management science tools, this research investigates how innovative approaches can improve the resolution process. The methodology involves a combination of legal analysis, game theory, and decision-making models to evaluate the effectiveness of civil liability in achieving fair and efficient outcomes. Legal analysis provides the foundational understanding of civil liability principles, while game theory offers insights into strategic interactions between disputing parties. Decision-making models, such as multi-criteria decision analysis (MCDA), are applied to assess the multidimensional outcomes of civil liability mechanisms. The findings indicate that civil liability mechanisms, when aligned with management science principles, not only streamline dispute resolution but also enhance fairness and satisfaction among the involved parties. By leveraging structured decision-making and strategic models, this study demonstrates the potential of civil liability frameworks to bridge the gap between legal norms and practical conflict resolution needs.

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Published

24-12-2024

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