An Analysis of the Double Game Theory in the Negotiation of Structural Obstacles between the United States and Japan

Abstract

The U.S.-Japan Structural Barriers Talks took place in 1989 and were initiated by then-U.S. President George W. Bush on the issue of the trade imbalance between Japan and the United States. After the subsequent negotiations between the U.S. and Japanese governments, the two sides signed the U.S.-Japan Agreement on Structural Barriers (hereinafter referred to as the "Agreement") on issues such as forms of savings and investment, land policy, and corporate behavior. The Agreement is an in-depth economic and trade cooperation between the United States and Japan, and is also a microcosm of US-Japan relations in the 80s. Relying on Milner's dual game model, this paper explores the negotiation game between the two sides at the domestic and foreign levels, and studies the situation background, negotiation attitude, negotiation process and focus of the two sides at the international level, as well as the differences in the preferences and systems of the two actors at the domestic level.