Strategic Analysis of Dollar Auction
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.54097/ehss.v2i.778Keywords:
Dollar Auction, Game Theory, Operations Research.Abstract
Shubik invented the dollar auction in 1971, which is a straightforward but practical auction model for elucidating the motivations and process of conflict escalation. Later on, several researchers used this paradigm to conduct the study on a variety of subjects. Waniek, for example, investigated the relationship between spitefulness and dollar auction in-depth and presented the optimal decision under different scenarios. In this paper, I simplified his results and merged them into simpler forms. Some proposals that may be advantageous to our economic environment are provided based on the performance.
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