A Study of Controlling Shareholds' Tunneling Behavior
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.54097/cxtfdd51Keywords:
Controlling shareholder, asset stripping, tunneling behaviorAbstract
Since the establishment of the Shanghai Stock Exchange and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange in the 1990s, China's capital market has emerged. Over the years, the domestic capital market has achieved certain results, but negative phenomena have gradually emerged, and the problem of tunneling is one of the representative issues. A concentrated ownership structure is prone to breed tunneling behavior, which results in a decrease in company value, damage to the interests of minority shareholders, and a reduction in market efficiency. This paper, through the study of relevant literature, summarized the behaviors of controlling shareholders' asset-stripping companies that harmed people's interests, listed different methods used by controlling shareholders for asset stripping, explored the causes of controlling shareholders' asset-stripping behavior, and examined the consequences of controlling shareholders' asset stripping methods.
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