The Combination of Hedging and Rules of Great Power Rivalry——Taking the Example of Vietnam in Sino-US Rivalry

Abstract

The competition between China and the United States for dominance in global governance is intensifying. In such an international context, strategically significant small states often adopt a hedging strategy to stay neutral amidst the rivalry of major powers. This paper aims to study the phase-specific characteristics and overall trends of hedging, and to detail the phase-specific motivations behind it. Contrary to previous academic views, this paper argues that hedging is not merely a passive balancing act for small states, but an active pursuit of maximizing economic and security interests. This paper concludes that hedging represents a cyclical trend divided into three stages. In addition to the manipulations of small states pursuing their own interests, the competition rules between major powers also influence the trend of hedging. This study is beneficial for 3further understanding the mindset of small states in employing hedging strategies and promotes the internalization of hedging theory in the field of international relations. It also provides insights into China's decision-making in its diplomatic relations with Vietnam.