The Influence of family Control on R&D manipulation: An Empirical analysis of listed companies in China

Han Qi; Kexin Zhang; Xinyue Yang

doi:10.54097/hbem.v12i.8361

Authors

Han Qi
Kexin Zhang
Xinyue Yang

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.54097/hbem.v12i.8361

Keywords:

Family Enterprises, R&D Manipulation, Corporate Governance.

Abstract

Innovation drives enterprises to carry out Research and development(R&D)activities, which leads to R&D manipulation. Reducing R&D manipulation is beneficial to improve the R&D performance of enterprises. Based on the data from 2008 to 2021, this paper studies the relationship between whether it is a family enterprise and the level of enterprise R&D manipulation, and finds that the level of R&D manipulation of family enterprise is lower. Family enterprises and non-family enterprises play an important role in the national economy. We should strengthen the supervision of the level of R&D manipulation of non-family enterprises and improve the corresponding policies and systems. The research results of this paper also have some enlightening effects on how to adopt strategic strategies and corporate governance in order to improve the competitiveness of family enterprises in the competition.

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