Retail Enterprise Corporate Social Responsibility and Freshness Preservation in Fresh Agricultural Products Supply Chains

Abstract

A fresh agricultural products supply chain composed of a manufacturing enterprise (ME), a retail enterprise (RE), and a logistics company (LC) is considered. When logistics freshness-preservation effort affects both the RE's pricing decision and the market value of fresh agricultural products, Stackelberg game models are developed for two scenarios: one in which the RE does not implement Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR), and another in which the RE implements CSR. The equilibrium changes in wholesale price, order quantity, freshness-preservation effort, and member profits are then analyzed. The results show that, after the RE implements CSR, a higher degree of CSR engagement promotes increases in order quantity and logistics freshness-preservation effort, thereby improving consumer surplus. Meanwhile, CSR implementation increases the profits of the ME and the LC, but reduces the RE's pure economic profit. Furthermore, when consumer surplus is incorporated into the RE's objective function, the RE's Corporate Social Responsibility-oriented payoff increases with the degree of CSR engagement, and the overall payoff of the supply chain is also improved. These findings indicate that moderate CSR implementation helps enhance the operational performance of the fresh agricultural products supply chain, while the RE should maintain a reasonable balance among economic profit, consumer welfare, and preservation investment.