Managerial Analysis of The Crew Labor Inspection System

Abstract

The labor inspection system of competent authorities will directly affect the protection of labor rights and interests of crew members in shipping enterprises, and the essential feature of the combination of behavioral strategies of two parties is the game and interaction between the parties to maximize their own interests, however, few studies have focused on how to coordinate the strategic choices of competent authorities and shipping enterprises to achieve the most adequate protection of labor rights and interests of crew members in practice. Therefore, it is reasonable and necessary to analyze the interaction between the labor inspection strategy of competent authorities and the crew management behavior of shipping enterprises from the game perspective. To this end, we construct an evolutionary game model between the competent authority and the crew management of shipping enterprises by considering the influence of the labor inspection of the competent authority on the crew management behavior of shipping enterprises, and simulate the main factors affecting the evolutionary stabilization strategy. The results show that the key points to reduce the probability of enterprises violating labor rights and interests of crew members are: reducing the cost of investigation by competent authorities, increasing the probability of successful investigation by competent authorities, increasing the fines of shipping enterprises and improving the positive effect of monitoring by competent authorities. As a result, in order to effectively protect the labor rights and interests of crew members, the state should further improve the relevant legal system and increase the amount of compensation for shipping enterprises. The competent authorities should increase the management personnel and working expenses appropriately to reduce the cost of investigation and ensure the quality of handling cases.