Non-State Shareholder Participation and Technological Innovation in State-Owned Enterprises
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.54097/1lrg2ojrKeywords:
Non-State Shareholder Participation; Mixed Ownership Reform; Corporate Innovation.Abstract
The Third Plenary Session of the 18th CPC Central Committee established mixed ownership system as the main policy of SOE reform, and as the main form of SOE "mixed reform", can non-state shareholders' participation promote the technological innovation of SOE? Based on the research samples of China's A-share state-owned listed companies from 2010 to 2017, this paper finds that the participation of non-state shareholders promotes the technological innovation of SOE, and this result is more robust when the participation of non-state shareholders exceeds 10%, i.e., when the participation of non-state major shareholders is more robust. The results of the mediation effect model show that non-state shareholders' equity participation plays a positive role in the level of state-owned technological innovation by improving the incentive channel for executive compensation, while the results of the mediation effect test of the financial assets investment channel are not verified. This paper provides theoretical and empirical support for the rationality and effectiveness of mixed ownership reform from the dimension of technological innovation.
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