Research on the Participation Strategies of Enterprises, Power Grid Companies, and Local Governments Under Dual Subsidies and Revenue Sharing

Abstract

Incentive-based demand response (DR) programs play a vital role in maintaining the stability and efficiency of power grid operations. However, enhancing enterprises’ enthusiasm for participating in these programs remains a critical challenge. This study introduces a revenue-sharing contract between enterprises and power grid companies, while considering the impact of local government subsidies and rewards on the implementation of incentive-based DR programs. A tripartite evolutionary game model involving enterprises, power grid companies, and local governments is constructed, and numerical simulations are conducted using MATLAB. The results indicate that the intensity of subsidies from power grid companies significantly influences the strategic choices of both enterprises and power grid companies. Appropriate subsidy levels can guide enterprises to respond actively and sustain power grid companies’ proactive subsidization. The revenue-sharing ratio critically guides enterprises’ decisions to adopt active response strategies. Additionally, the outage risk cost borne by enterprises not only affects their willingness to respond actively but also serves as a key basis for determining subsidy intensity. This study further defines effective intervals for factors driving the system toward different stable states, providing theoretical references for strategic decision-making among enterprises, power grid companies, and local governments.