Case Analysis of 3 Billion Fake Financial Management Internal Control Failure of Minsheng Bank
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.54097/gcn74n16Keywords:
Minsheng Bank, Wealth management products, Internal control, Evolutionary gameAbstract
This paper aims to analyze the 3 billion cases of fake wealth management products of Minsheng Bank in 2017, discuss the causes of the case from the perspective of internal control failure, and summarize the enlightenment of the case to the internal control of commercial banks in China, mainly including the following research contents: First, from the origin and evolution of internal control theory, the commercial Banks internal control theory and evolutionary game from three perspectives in the application of internal control theory of internal control for overview; Second, from the overall situation of internal control in China's banking industry, the minsheng bank false financial product case a panoramic review and analysis, from the Angle of empirical observation of minsheng bank failure reasons of internal control, influence and inspiration are summarized; Third, build an evolutionary game model, from the perspective of internal control to discuss the evolution of the people's livelihood bank head office and branch path and stable strategy, and sums up the head office and branches in steady and unsteady state strategy choice; Fourthly, combined with theoretical analysis, case analysis and evolutionary game model analysis, this paper puts forward targeted countermeasures and suggestions from the two aspects of stable and unstable strategy states. The main conclusions of this paper are as follows: first, in the fake financial management case of Minsheng Bank, the strategic choices of head office and branches change dynamically in the long run; Second, the strategy choice of branches depends on whether the head office carries out strict internal control and the punishment of branches after carrying out strict internal control; Thirdly, the main ways for the head office to improve internal control are to increase the proportion of business sharing of branches and to increase the punishment. This article possible innovation lies in: one is to choose the minsheng bank false financial case as the breakthrough point analysis of commercial Banks internal control failure problem; Second, in the evolutionary game model, the author analyzes the reasons of minsheng bank internal control failure, and considering the bounded rationality, head office and branch; Thirdly, the evolutionary game model is used to analyze the evolution process of the strategic choices of the head office and branches in a long period of time.
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