Executive Vertical Concurrently to Enterprise Green Innovation
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.54097/fbem.v8i3.7825Keywords:
Executive vertical concurrent, Green innovation, Information Asymmetry, Profit motive.Abstract
Guiding enterprises to carry out green innovation and accelerating the forging of new competitive advantages in green industry has become an important direction of national innovation after the top 20. Based on the panel data of A-share non-financial listed companies from 2015 to 2020, this paper empirically examines the impact of vertical concurrent executive positions on corporate green innovation. The results show that the vertical concurrent position of senior executives significantly improves the degree of green innovation of enterprises. The vertical concurrent position of senior executives can effectively play the supervision function of major shareholders, improve the efficiency of resource allocation, and promote the green innovation behavior of enterprises. This result held up after a series of robustness tests. Therefore, more explicit regulations should be introduced for the vertical part-time system of senior executives of listed companies, so as to guide enterprises to establish a reasonable and efficient vertical part-time system of senior executives and improve the degree of green innovation of enterprises.
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