Financial Fraud, Audit Failure, and Regulatory Oversight Breakdown: An Empirical Analysis of the Wirecard Scanda
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.54097/q8xwnm90Keywords:
Wirecard; accounting fraud; audit failure; regulatory oversight; corporate governance.Abstract
The 2020 Wirecard scandal exposed one of Europe’s largest corporate frauds, revealing 1.9 billion euros in fictitious assets and years of inflated revenue created through forged bank letters and sham third party processors. This paper meticulously dissects the deceptive accounting mechanics, EY’s decade long failure to challenge management despite mounting red flags, and critical gaps in Germany’s fragmented supervisory architecture. By systematically comparing Wirecard with Carillion and FTX, the study uncovers recurring patterns of governance collapse, auditor complacency, and regulatory inertia. Drawing on agency theory and the audit expectation gap lens, it shows how weak whistle blower protections, fee driven auditor dependence, and jurisdictional loopholes magnified the fraud. The paper concludes by outlining a multidimensional reform agenda that includes consolidating regulators, mandating audit rotation, incentivising ethical governance, deploying techique- (such as artificial intelligence) driven real-time monitoring, and enhancing cross-border enforcement to restore market trust and curb systemic risk in global capital markets.
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