Can International Human Rights Law Bind Sovereign States?
-- The Case of Dobbs v. Jackson
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.54097/gs24te61Keywords:
International Human Rights Law, Sovereignty, Symbolic Compliance, American Exceptionalism, Compliance Theory, Critical Legal Studies, Dobbs v. JacksonAbstract
This paper examines Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization, focusing on the efficacy of international human rights law within the courts of a superpower. Through literature review and theoretical analysis, it introduces the concept of “symbolic compliance” and argues that the United States' approach to human rights treaties is “not selective, but strategic.” Its treaty practice employs such instruments as assets of legitimacy on the international stage while simultaneously de-legalizing them domestically through mechanisms like “non-self-executing” status and reservations, rendering them “merely symbolic.” Case analysis reveals that Dobbs not only disregards international human rights treaties but also reinforces American exceptionalism by establishing an insular judicial philosophy through its reaffirmation of “history and tradition.” Compared to the monistic practices in Europe and Latin America, the U.S.'s dualistic tradition makes it more prone to exclude international law. Therefore, this paper argues that international human rights law lacks effectiveness against powerful states, with its efficacy determined by domestic political culture or institutional design. Finally, it suggests that strengthening treaty monitoring, transnational judicial dialogue, and civil society participation can enhance its effectiveness.
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