Study of Modern Hiring Strategies Stemmed from the Secretary Problem

Abstract

The use of the optimal stopping framework is becoming more relied upon in contemporary hiring practices. Various models that are founded on the classical secretary problem emerge to get the best solutions in different circumstances. This review summarizes various articles on the same subject to explore the impact of various variants, including multiple choice, multiple references, parallelization, concurrent employment and multiple employers with strategic competition, on the quality and Hiring efficiency. This paper examines technical contributions, such as Poisson Process of finite arrivals, Primal-Dual linear programming of shared parallel quotas, dynamic programming of temporal coverage, Nash equilibrium to access competitiveness and analytic combinatorics of rank-based selectivity. Key findings indicate that strategic competition re-optimizes the optimal stopping threshold between 37% and 31% and concurrent employment is a mathematical requirement to obtain the same ratios of competition in dynamic environments. The synthesis offers a set of tools to design selective and resilient recruitment systems in the face of various distributional and structural uncertainty.