How Populism Replaced Elitism: The Institutional Logic in the Shift of U.S. Trade Policy Under Trump

Abstract

Since the Ratification of RTAA in 1934, U.S. trade policy has trended toward trade liberalization. However, this trend experienced a significant shift following Donald Trump’s election as president in 2016. This paper analyzes the roles of Congress and the President in shaping trade policy, and by introducing Olson’s collective action theory, examines the logic behind U.S. trade policy formation before and after Trump’s election. The study finds that traditionally, pro-trade groups were able to effectively lobby Congress. In contrast, anti-trade groups struggled to organize effectively due to collective action problem. However, the trade policy formation mechanism underwent a fundamental shift during the Trump administration. By frequently invoking legal provisions such as Section 232, the Trump administration was able to bypass Congress and unilaterally implement protectionist policies, shifting the policymaking authority from Congress to the President, and the primary locus for policy formation from congressional lobbying to presidential elections. In presidential elections, anti-trade groups became highly politically active, forming strong collective action that drove the adoption of protectionist policies. This study provides insights into the institutional logic and political processes behind U.S. trade policy during the Trump era, offering insights into how group political participation influences policymaking.