The Impact of Equity Incentives on the Performance of Listed Companies

Abstract

With the formal implementation of the Administrative Measures for Equity Incentives of Listed Companies, the scope of equity incentives for listed companies in China has been expanding, and the equity incentive system has been gradually improved. Among them, executive equity incentive and employee equity incentive are two important subjects in the incentive plan, and their respective impacts on corporate performance have also attracted much attention, which part has a greater impact, and whether the two are opposed has become a question discussed by many scholars. Based on human capital theory and entrusted agent theory, this paper selects A-share listed companies that implemented equity incentive plans from 2011 to 2020 as a sample, and uses a fixed-effect regression model to investigate the impact of different equity incentives on company performance. It is found that executive equity incentive can have a positive impact on the company's performance, and executive equity incentive enables them to join the enterprise management decision-making as the "master", share the surplus value of the enterprise with the owner, promote the enthusiasm and creativity of senior executives, reduce the agency cost between shareholders and executives, and meet the needs of long-term development of enterprises. Second, the effect of employee equity incentives is better than that of executives. Employees can only receive the benefits of equity incentives by working hard to meet the conditions for exercise (unlocking). As the most direct participants and executors in the company's business activities, employees have the motivation and ability to work hard to achieve equity incentive conditions and realize their own benefits.  That is, the incentive effect of large-scale employee equity incentive is better, and the effect on the performance of listed companies is more significant.