Research Group Compliant Behaviour and Regulatory Choice under Incomplete Internal Control Supervision in Colleges and Universities
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.54097/fbem.v12i1.13974Keywords:
Internal control regulation, Game analysis, Key supervision, Compliant behavior of the research group.Abstract
Subject to the realistic dilemma of insufficient supervision ability, the incomplete internal control supervision of scientific research projects will exist widely in colleges and universities in China for a long time and tend to be normal. Furthermore, exploring and designing effective internal control regulation strategies to deal with the violations of the research group have become an urgent practical problem to be solved in the internal control of colleges and universities. Based on the key supervision of the research group in Colleges and universities, this paper deeply discusses the dynamic choice of compliance behavior, the effectiveness of regulation strategy and its optimal design of the research group under the key supervision mechanism by using the method of game analysis. The research shows that under the condition of obvious constraints on the ability of school supervision, the carefully designed key supervision mechanism can become a powerful tool to guide and control the benign behavior of research groups in Colleges and universities.
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