Research on Carbon Allowance Allocation Mechanism in Oligocompetitive Industries under Carbon Trading

Chunhua Qiao

doi:10.54097/s7qgdf98

Authors

Chunhua Qiao

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.54097/s7qgdf98

Keywords:

Carbon quota allocation; carbon trading; carbon emission reduction; oligopolistic competition.

Abstract

In response to global warming, countries have implemented measures to control greenhouse gas emissions. The government's choice of carbon quota allocation mechanism is crucial to the effectiveness of emission reduction and control. This paper presents a master-slave game model where the government leads and the oligopolistic competitors follow. The aim is to explore the conditions under which the government chooses the allocation mechanism, providing managerial insights for the government's allocation of quotas.

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