The Role Mechanism of Social Preferences and Price Advantage in the Market Economy
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.54097/v4vwan64Keywords:
Market Economy, Social Preferences, Price AdvantageAbstract
In today's market economy environment, social preferences and price advantage, as two core driving forces, directly influence market operation and development trajectories. As consumer demand becomes increasingly diversified, social preferences intuitively reflect deep-seated cultural identity and value orientations, even guiding market trends. Price advantage, as the cornerstone of market competition, also impacts corporate production and development. These two elements intertwine: social preferences infuse emotional and cultural content into pricing strategies, while price advantage becomes an effective means to satisfy social preferences and achieve market penetration. A deep understanding and skillful application of these mechanisms are crucial for companies to navigate the complex and ever-changing market environment and achieve sustainable development.
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