Officials' Social Networks and Local Indebtedness - A Study Based on Provincial Data

Yinming Lyu

doi:10.54097/57wp1182

Authors

Yinming Lyu

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.54097/57wp1182

Keywords:

Local government, Social networks, Indebtedness

Abstract

This paper takes the average annual growth of indebtedness of provincial party secretaries and the places where they serve from 2006 to 2017, and aims to investigate whether the social network of officials significantly affects the indebtedness of places. This paper adopts the linear regression method and establishes a unique evaluation system of officials' social networks. It is finally found that officials' social networks have a significant impact on the indebtedness of local governments. At the same time, the provincial officials' tenure, during which the growth of the indebtedness of other provincial governments also significantly affects the indebtedness of that provincial government.

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References

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