Personalised Pricing and Its Implications for Fairness, Competition, and Privacy
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.54097/qpcnvg72Keywords:
Algorithmic Pricing, Consumer Welfare, Data PrivacyAbstract
Personalised pricing uses consumer data to tailor prices to individual willingness to pay. This paper critically examines its implications for distributive fairness, market competition, and privacy through a narrative analysis of economic research and regulatory evidence. Although algorithmic prices could expand access, limited alternatives and unequal digital capabilities can expose vulnerable consumers to disadvantage. Data and algorithmic interaction may diminish competitiveness in particular market contexts; comprehensive profiling raises additional issues with genuine consent and consumer independence. These insights indicate that welfare outcomes depend on market structure and institutional protections, and they advocate collaborative oversight of pricing strategies, data use, and consumer safeguards.
Downloads
References
[1] Krishna, A. (2025). In defense of “surveillance pricing”: Why personalized prices could be an unexpected force for equity. The Conversation. https://doi.org/10.64628/aai.j346j39ar DOI: https://doi.org/10.64628/AAI.j346j39ar
[2] Global Pricing Innovations. (2025, December 17). Bridging the gap: Pharmaceutical pricing and the urgent need for equitable access to medicines in low and middle income countries. https://globalpricing.com/bridging-the-gap-pharmaceutical-pricing-and-the-urgent-need-for-equitable-access-to-medicines-in-low-and-middle-income-countries/
[3] Valentino DeVries, J., Singer Vine, J., & Soltani, A. (2012, December 24). Websites vary prices, deals based on users’ information. The Wall Street Journal. https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887323777204578189391813881534
[4] Sáez Linero, C., Rodríguez de Dios, I., & Jiménez Morales, M. (2026). Algorithmic personalization and social inequality: Young people’s knowledge and perceptions of bias in digital advertising. Technology in Society, 86, 103287. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.techsoc.2026.103287 DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.techsoc.2026.103287
[5] Tschantz, M. C. (2022). What is proxy discrimination? In 2022 ACM Conference on Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency. https://doi.org/10.1145/3531146.3533242 DOI: https://doi.org/10.1145/3531146.3533242
[6] Angwin, J., Larson, J., Kirchner, L., & Mattu, S. (2017, April 5). Minority neighborhoods pay higher car insurance premiums than white areas with the same risk. ProPublica. https://www.propublica.org/article/minority-neighborhoods-higher-car-insurance-premiums-white-areas-same-risk
[7] Bandama, R. (2025, November 28). How Big Tech’s monopoly of AI threatens fair competition. TRENDS Research & Advisory. https://trendsresearch.org/insight/how-big-techs-monopoly-of-ai-threatens-fair-competition/?srsltid=AfmBOooI9WVf2m_-wqu2c_xuS6Wp-lo77_hAb5Xo-RZple1D9lHhxaVD
[8] Yborra, M. (2026, March 11). What is a MOAT? Understanding its application in the tech industry. Vaultinum. https://vaultinum.com/blog/moat-in-tech-industry
[9] May, R. (2024). Artificial intelligence, data and competition. OECD.
[10] Adams, J. J., Fang, M., Liu, Z., & Wang, Y. (2025). The rise of AI pricing: Trends, driving forces, and implications for firm performance. Journal of Monetary Economics, 157, 103875. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmoneco.2025.103875 DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmoneco.2025.103875
[11] Calvano, E., Calzolari, G., Denicolò, V., & Pastorello, S. (2020). Artificial intelligence, algorithmic pricing, and collusion. American Economic Review, 110(10), 3267–3297. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20190623 DOI: https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20190623
[12] von Thun, M. (2023, October 23). Monopoly power is the elephant in the room in the AI debate. TechPolicy.Press. https://www.techpolicy.press/monopoly-power-is-the-elephant-in-the-room-in-the-ai-debate/
[13] Massimo, M. (2022, December 5). The AI Act: Help or hindrance for SMEs? European DIGITAL SME Alliance. https://www.digitalsme.eu/the-ai-act-help-or-hindrance-for-smes/
[14] Ezrachi, A., & Stucke, M. E. (2016). Virtual competition: The promise and perils of the algorithm driven economy. Harvard University Press. DOI: https://doi.org/10.4159/9780674973336
[15] Brown, Z. Y., & MacKay, A. (2023). Competition in pricing algorithms. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 15(2), 109–156. https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20210158 DOI: https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20210158
[16] Chen, Q. (2022, February 9). China wants to put data to work as an economic resource—But how? DigiChina. https://digichina.stanford.edu/work/china-wants-to-put-data-to-work-as-an-economic-resource-but-how/
[17] Federal Trade Commission. (2025, January 17). FTC surveillance pricing study indicates wide range of personal data used to set individualized consumer prices. https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/news/press-releases/2025/01/ftc-surveillance-pricing-study-indicates-wide-range-personal-data-used-set-individualized-consumer
[18] Acquisti, A., & Grossklags, J. (2005). Privacy and rationality in individual decision making. IEEE Security and Privacy Magazine, 3(1), 24–30. https://doi.org/10.1109/msp.2005.22 DOI: https://doi.org/10.1109/MSP.2005.22
[19] Li, X., Li, B., & Yang, Z. (2024). The dark side of voluntary data sharing. MIS Quarterly. https://doi.org/10.25300/misq/2024/18829 DOI: https://doi.org/10.25300/MISQ/2024/18829
[20] Litman Navarro, K. (2019, June 12). We read 150 privacy policies. They were an incomprehensible disaster. The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/06/12/opinion/facebook-google-privacy-policies.html
[21] Dorfleitner, G., Hornuf, L., & Kreppmeier, J. (2021, October 28). Promise not fulfilled: FinTech, data privacy, and the GDPR. SSRN. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3950094 DOI: https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3950094
[22] Rhodes, A., & Zhou, J. (2024). Personalization and privacy choice. The RAND Journal of Economics. DOI: https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4795118
[23] Zuboff, S. (2015). Big other: Surveillance capitalism and the prospects of an information civilization. Journal of Information Technology, 30(1), 75–89. https://doi.org/10.1057/jit.2015.5 DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/jit.2015.5
[24] Kaspersky. (2023, December 12). Average 1,700 posts with corporate data surface on the dark web monthly. https://www.kaspersky.com/about/press-releases/average-1700-posts-with-corporate-data-surface-on-the-dark-web-monthly
Downloads
Published
Issue
Section
License

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License.







