Refund Without Return: A Three-Stage Game of Platform Rules, Opportunism and Product Quality

Authors

  • Jiakai Liu Department of E-commerce, Jinan University Shenzhen Campus, Shenzhen, China

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.54097/v04d3a89

Keywords:

Refund-without-return, platform governance, product quality, opportunistic claiming, three-stage game

Abstract

A refund-without-return rule shifts the cost of a return from buyer to seller. Advocates expect quality to rise; critics point to sellers who lose both the money and the goods. We model the policy as a three-stage game of complete information: the platform sets rule strength, a seller sets price and quality, and buyers decide whether to purchase and then whether to claim. Because a claim succeeds only with probability equal to rule strength, the share of satisfied buyers for whom claiming pays rises with rule strength: a tougher rule manufactures the opportunism that defeats it. The threshold below which quality improves therefore falls as the rule is strengthened, and the quality-maximising rule is interior and declining in opportunism. The price response also changes sign: absent opportunism a tougher rule raises price; once claiming pays it lowers price, because a high list price is itself the inducement to claim. Welfare rises with rule strength, but the gain accrues almost entirely to consumers while seller profit falls by more than two-fifths; and since the platform pays to process claims, its privately optimal rule falls well short of the social one.

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References

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Published

16-11-2026

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Articles