Research on Agricultural Film Recycling Mechanism Based on Intelligent Optimization Algorithms and Game Theory

Xingyu Gan

doi:10.54097/vq6c7b43

Authors

Xingyu Gan

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.54097/vq6c7b43

Keywords:

Agricultural Film Recycling, Intelligent Optimization Algorithms, Game Theory, Sustainable Development

Abstract

This study employs an intelligent optimization algorithm model to quantify key factors influencing the cost of agricultural film recycling through multi-dimensional data analysis, optimizing parameters for an economically feasible cost coordination mechanism. Simultaneously, a game theory algorithm model is constructed to systematically elucidate the theoretical framework and technical pathways for agricultural film recycling. Through model solving, the study clarifies the interests and game relationships among the government, production enterprises, and farmers, proposing an optimal mechanism for multi-party interest coordination. This research provides a significant theoretical foundation and practical reference for policy formulation, technology promotion, and operational practices in agricultural film recycling.

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