Research on group distribution leakage analysis method for RSM

Yiqin Feng; Yi Wang

doi:10.54097/fcis.v3i1.6352

Authors

Yiqin Feng
Yi Wang

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.54097/fcis.v3i1.6352

Keywords:

Leakage Analysis, RSM Rotaing S-box, KL distance

Abstract

Side channel attack is a new and simple attack idea, and its proposal has created a significant threat to the security of cryptographic devices. With the continuous development of deep learning techniques, deep learning-based side channel attacks have enabled the attack techniques to reach new heights, but the attack efficiency and training time have become new problems. In order to improve the attack efficiency, researchers have proposed a large number of leakage analysis methods, which can effectively extract the intervals with significant leakage in the energy consumption curve and reduce the training parameters and data volume. In order to deal with side channel attacks, researchers have proposed various resistance strategies, among which masking protection is the simplest and widely used way. RSM rotating S-box masking scheme is a particularly important masking protection scheme, which uses a first-order masking scheme to randomize the leakage energy consumption of sensitive information using random masks, thus making the algorithm resistant to first-order side channel attacks. For this type of masking algorithm, this paper proposes a new leakage analysis algorithm, namely "Group Distribution Difference" (GDD). This algorithm is based on the distribution difference of energy consumption, and the energy consumption frequency in the group is calculated instead of the probability distribution. The KL distance is used to calculate the difference between groups and find out the leakage interval, so as to achieve an efficient attack.

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