Research on the Competitive Strategy of Takeaway Platform Based on Nash Equilibrium
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.54097/hbem.v20i.12364Keywords:
Coopetition; Cournot game; Stackelberg game; Nash Equilibrium.Abstract
As an important part of China's tertiary industry, takeaway platforms bring consumers a lot of convenience, but also face serious challenges. From the perspective of game theory, the competitive relationship of takeaway industry in China is studied. The results show that the benefits of cooperation between two takeaway platforms, namely Meituan and ELEME, are always greater than the benefits of vicious competition. New entrants in the takeaway industry will increase the complexity of the game between the platforms; the ideal game between the oligarchs in the takeaway market in the future is a competitive game that involves both competition and cooperation.
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