The Impact of Couples’ Joint Holdings Governance on Corporate Violations
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.54097/hbem.v20i.14741Keywords:
Couple’ Joint Holdings, Corporate Violation, Family Enterprise.Abstract
In China's capital market, there are many cases of corporate violations, and the internal governance structure of enterprises will greatly affect the situation of enterprise violations. As a special governance structure of family enterprises, couple’ joint holdings governance mode plays an important role in the violation of capital market. At present, the classification framework of corporate violation factors has been mature, and the advantages and disadvantages of couple’ joint holdings have been analyzed, but there is still a gap in the research on the correlation between the two. This paper takes A-share listed family corporates from 2007 to 2021 as the research sample and finds through multiple empirical regression test that the governance mode of couple’ joint holdings can significantly reduce the number of corporate violations. Meanwhile, the lower the proportion of institutional investors, the higher the negative correlation between couple’ joint holdings and the number of corporate violations. Negative correlation between the two was significantly enhanced by the addition of the capital occupied by major shareholders. It is of great significance for the development of family enterprises in capital market to explore the relationship between couple’ joint holdings and corporate violation.
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