Minority shareholders’ participation and corporate green innovation
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.54097/hbem.v7i.6960Keywords:
Voting for minority shareholders, corporate governance, green behavior.Abstract
In recent years, the Internet has greatly reduced the cost of minority shareholders to obtain information, and has also enabled them to participate in corporate governance more conveniently and effectively. Based on the data of China’s A-share listed companies from 2011 to 2020, this paper examines the impact of minority shareholders’ participation in corporate governance on corporate green behavior. The study found that the minority shareholders can effectively promote green innovation in enterprises. This conclusion still holds true after robustness tests such as replacement variables, multiple fixed effects, addition of omitted variables, and propensity score matching test. Further research finds that state-owned enterprises and non-heavy polluting industries, the participation of minority shareholders in corporate governance will have a more significant role in promoting green innovation. This paper not only enriches the research on minority shareholders of listed companies and green behavior, but also has important theoretical and practical significance for minority investors to protect their own rights and interests.
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