The Impact of Financial Competition on Carbon Emissions
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.54097/hbem.v9i.9255Keywords:
Fiscal Expenditure Competition; Tax Competition; Carbon Emission Intensity; Financial Autonomy.Abstract
Based on the panel data of 30 provinces (municipalities, autonomous regions) in China from 2003 to 2019, this paper constructs a two-way fixed effect model to analyze the influence of financial competition on carbon emissions. It is found that fiscal expenditure competition and tax competition will push up local carbon emission intensity. The analysis of regional heterogeneity shows that the financial competition in the eastern region has no significant impact on carbon emission intensity, while the financial competition in the central and western regions has a more obvious impact on carbon emission intensity. The analysis of time heterogeneity shows that after China’s economy entered a new normal in 2012, the impact of financial competition on carbon emission intensity was significantly enhanced. Meanwhile, considering the influence of financial autonomy on carbon emissions, this paper constructs related intersection terms, which further reflect the role of financial autonomy.
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