Game Research Based on Social Responsibility of Major Engineering
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.54097/ijeh.v5i3.2437Keywords:
Major engineering, Social responsibility, Game model, Simulation analysis.Abstract
In order to solve the problem of major engineering accidents caused by the lack of social responsibility, a tripartite evolutionary game model of government, social capital and the public is constructed, and the strategy selection and equilibrium conditions of the three parties are analyzed through simulation. The research shows that the greater the government's supervision, the higher the cost of social capital performing social responsibility, and the greater the loss of failure to perform social responsibility, and the more incentives for public participation, the three-party strategy choice will evolve to an ideal state. Based on this, provide suggestions for the government’s policy formulation and the strategy choice of social capital and the public to give full play to the role of the public to achieve a win-win situation for all three parties and promote the sustainable development of major engineering.
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