Patterns of Shareholder Interest Imbalance and Their Remedies in the Context of Shareholder Heterogeneity based on U.S. Corporate History

Authors

  • Lei Li

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.54097/z32y3y47

Keywords:

Shareholder Heterogeneity, Efficient Market Hypothesis, Short-term Shareholders, Institutional Shareholders, Imbalance of Interest

Abstract

Although the basic principles of corporate law emphasize the principle of equity equality and the principle of equal shares and equal rights, the ideal corporate shareholder group presents equality and consistency, but the reality of the business practice level lacks to present a heterogeneous quality of shareholders, in terms of for the interests of the different arrangements, from the United States, the development of the company's history of observation that the short-term shareholders and long-term shareholders as well as ordinary shareholders and institutional investors present shareholders heterogeneous background in the The pattern of imbalance of interests, which is reflected in the short-term shareholders will be the company's short-term behavior, the institutional investors' pursuit of merit will also be detrimental to the company's long-term development and real interests. In the final analysis, it is necessary to make corresponding institutional arrangements for the reality of shareholder heterogeneity in order to protect the long-term development of the company and the balance of interests of the company's shareholders.

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References

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Published

14 May 2025

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Section

Articles

How to Cite

Li, L. (2025). Patterns of Shareholder Interest Imbalance and Their Remedies in the Context of Shareholder Heterogeneity based on U.S. Corporate History. International Journal of Education and Humanities, 19(2), 23-28. https://doi.org/10.54097/z32y3y47