Research on the Gap between the Perception of Impermanence and Spiritual Peace: Phenomenological Reflections based on Buddhist Emptiness Concept
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.54097/rkd2vm51Keywords:
Impermanence, Emptiness, Phenomenology, Spiritual Peace, Embodiment, Existential GapAbstract
The intellectual grasp of impermanence does not necessarily bring about a sense of peace in life and spirit, and thus a psychological and spiritual vacuum occurs. Using the idea of Emptiness (Śūnyatā) in Buddhist philosophy, Husserl's and Merleau-Ponty's phenomenological theories were combined to examine the origin and form of this gap in this paper. Although people today are aware of the fleetingness of life through their minds, they still feel deep-seated anxiety and suffering (Dukkha). Based on a phenomenological study of the structure of internal time consciousness and intentionality, this paper finds that the gap arises from a habit of embodied 'self-grasping'-a pre-reflective inclination to reify the self despite rationally knowing that it is transient. As shown in the above analysis, true spiritual freedom cannot be achieved by reason alone; otherwise, it will still be limited by the subject-object distinction. Therefore, in order to resolve this existential contradiction, one needs to take a form of embodied non-duality and experience emptiness directly. Combine the ontology of Mahayana Buddhism with enactive cognitive phenomenology to provide a theoretical foundation for linking the awareness of impermanence with genuine existential peace, and put forward an idea to add philosophy to the practice of life in the body.
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